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ABSTRACT 
 
Einav Srulovici: Assets and Health: Examining the Asset-Building Theoretical Framework and 
Psychological Distress 
(Under the direction of Barbara Mark) 
 
 Policy makers who propose developing policies to improve the health of individuals have 
an enormously complicated task given the complex, multifaceted, and interacting determinants 
of health. For social determinants of health, research has been conducted to evaluate the 
relationship between assets and numerous health measures. Michael Sherraden’s (1991) 
theoretical framework on asset-based welfare policy is acknowledged as the most complete 
statement thus far of these relationships. Several randomized trials based on Sherraden’s 
framework have been conducted. However, few asset-building programs have examined the 
influence of asset building on health outcomes. 
 The purpose of this study was to test the asset-building theoretical framework using 
psychological distress as the dependent variable. The study employed longitudinal data from 
6,295 families from the 2001 and 2007 Panel Study of Income Dynamics data sets. Structural 
equation modeling was used to test 7 direct and 7 indirect hypotheses based on the theoretical 
framework. 
 In general, the data displayed a good fit to the model in cross-sectional and longitudinal 
models. Most of the directional hypotheses were supported. Better individual components were 
associated with higher saving and investment actions and greater intergenerational transfers were 
associated with greater asset accumulation. However, institutional components and 
iv 
intergenerational transfers were not associated with saving and investment actions. 
Unexpectedly, saving and investment actions were also associated with lower asset 
accumulation. Finally, greater asset accumulation was associated with an increase in 
psychological distress over time; however, less psychological distress was associated with an 
increase in asset accumulation over time. 
 Although the hypothesis of a reciprocal relationship between asset accumulation and 
psychological distress was only partially supported, it is important to examine this relationship in 
future studies before reaching a conclusion about it. In conclusion, the asset-building theoretical 
framework needs modifications so asset-building programs can be tailored to different samples.
v 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Introduction 
 It has long been understood that an individual’s health depends, to some degree, on their 
economic status. Until recently, it was common to measure economic status using a person’s or a 
family’s income, and considerable research has been conducted to evaluate the relationship 
between income and health outcomes (Banks, Muriel, & Smith, 2010; Berrigan, Dodd, Troiano, 
Krebs-Smith, & Barbash, 2003; Boyas, Shobe, & Hannam, 2009; Frank, Andresen, & Schmid, 
2004; Kahn & Fazio, 2005; J. Kim, 2011). However, in the last two decades, a new perspective 
has arisen that suggests that economic status should be measured using both income (i.e., the 
flow of resources available on a daily basis) and assets (i.e., the stock of saved resources 
available for investments in the future), but little research has been conducted to examine the 
relationship between individuals’ financial assets and their health. 
 Michael Sherraden’s (1991) theoretical framework regarding asset-based welfare policy 
and Lerman and McKernan’s (2008) extension of the theory to include a simultaneous 
relationship between asset accumulation and health and psychological well-being are together 
acknowledged as the most complete framework thus far for depicting these relationships. The 
asset-building theory states that three mechanisms can foster individuals’ saving and investing of 
money: institutional mechanisms, individual mechanisms, and an intergenerational transfer of 
assets (Beverly & Sherraden, 1997; Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden, 1991). Savings and 
investments can affect financial-asset accumulation, which in turn can affect and be affected by 
health outcomes (Beverly, Sherraden et al., 2008). 
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 Few randomized trials based on asset-based welfare policy have been conducted to 
examine the relationship between asset building and health outcomes. The results are mixed and 
not entirely supportive of the asset-building theoretical framework (Grinstein-Weiss, Sherraden, 
Rohe et al., 2012; Y. Kim, Lee, & Kim, 2011; Ssewamala, Han, Neilands, Ismayilova, & 
Sperber, 2010). However, these studies did not comprehensively examine the entire theory; 
rather, they examined only parts of it. Therefore, a more comprehensive empirical examination 
of Sherraden’s (1991) framework is the purpose of this dissertation.  
 To set the context for understanding Sherraden’s (1991) framework, I will discuss the 
differences between assets and income, asset poverty and income poverty, and the strengths and 
weaknesses of assets and income measures. Next, I will review evidence from the literature 
about the relationship between assets and health outcomes and give an introduction to the asset-
building theoretical framework and asset-building programs that have examined the relationships 
between assets accumulated through asset-building programs and health outcomes. Finally, I will 
describe the purpose and hypotheses of this study.  
Economic Status and the Definition of Assets Versus Income 
 Historically, measures of income have been used to determine an individual’s and/or a 
family’s economic status. It is one of the three major components of socioeconomic status, the 
other two being education and occupation (Liberatos, Link, & Kelsey, 1988; Oakes & Rossi, 
2003). Income refers to the flow of resources available on a daily basis; it can be a payment for a 
person’s work in the labor force (e.g., wage earning), a public assistance program transfer, 
investment returns, or business profits (McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; 
Shapiro, 2006; Sherraden, 1991). Income provides resources that can be spent on current 
consumption needs (Johnson & Sherraden, 1992; McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Sherraden, 
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1991). Income is vital for the maintenance of everyday life, but it is not necessarily permanent 
(Rothwell & Han, 2010); therefore, a household that relies only on income is at risk for being 
driven into poverty during economic hardship. Putting aside a portion of income as savings can 
help fund future expenses (Sherraden, 1991).  
 Hurd, Juster, and Smith (2003) stated that measures of income (e.g., monthly or annual 
personal or household income) have several limitations that may cause significant bias. For 
example, people may find it difficult to estimate a household’s or other family members’ income 
levels or their own income if received on an irregular basis. They may also have difficulty when 
a question about income relates to previous years and not just the recent year.  
 In the United States (US), poverty is measured based on the annual cash income of a 
household, which means that a household below a certain threshold is considered poor (Haveman 
& Wolff, 2004). Low-income households that are considered poor may be eligible for several 
public assistance programs to help fulfill basic consumption needs essential to the well-being of 
families and their children (Nam, Huang, & Sherraden, 2008a). However, income support 
through public assistance programs is not enough to move low-income families out of poverty 
and break its intergenerational cycle, and increasingly, eligibility for these programs is shifting 
toward more temporary forms of assistance (Nam, Huang, & Sherraden, 2008b). The eligibility 
criteria of public assistance programs include asset tests (i.e., a household should have less than a 
minimum level of assets); thus, public assistance programs may depress savings and asset 
accumulation instead of encouraging low-income families to accumulate assets to leave poverty 
(Caskey, 1997; Nam et al., 2008a, 2008b; Sherraden, 1991).  
 A newer perspective suggests that income should not be the sole indicator for poverty but 
should be examined in addition to a measure of assets (Johnson & Sherraden, 1992; Shapiro, 
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2006; Sherraden, 1991). Assets refer to the stock of a household’s saved resources available for 
investments for the future (McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Shapiro, 2006; Sherraden, 1991), but 
they can also be converted into a flow of income during economic hardship (McKernan, 
Ratcliffe, & Shank, 2011). In asset-building research, “the term ‘assets’ is restricted to the 
concept of wealth, including both property and financial holdings” (Page-Adams & Sherraden, 
1997, p. 423). Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation, I will use the original terminology 
of each reviewed study, thus treating assets and wealth as equivalents unless defined differently 
in a particular study, at which point I will point that out. 
Assets provide choices to individuals that can improve their long-term goals. They are 
essential for development (Rothwell & Han, 2010; McKernan & Sherraden, 2008). They can 
help one get ahead and plan for a better future (McKernan & Sherraden, 2008). They can create 
both financial security and opportunity (Sherraden, 1991). There are two types of assets: tangible 
and intangible. Tangible assets refer to savings, financial securities, and real estate property (e.g., 
buildings or land); intangible assets refer to human capital, cultural capital, political capital, and 
so forth (Nam et al., 2008b; Sherraden, 1991). Low-income individuals may have different 
concepts and definitions of assets than middle- or upper-income individuals (Nam et al., 2008a, 
2008b). For example, middle- and upper-income individuals may consider vehicle ownership or 
stocks as assets that can be converted into cash for immediate use, but low-income individuals 
may consider household equipment such as a washing machine, a dryer, or a dish washer as a 
group of assets that in times of economic hardship could be converted into cash for immediate 
use. These different concepts and definitions of assets represent more than the difference in 
terminology for assets; they represent the difference in the amount of funds that can be secured 
by converting assets in times of need.  
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 According to Beverly et al. (2008), there are several ways to define asset accumulation: 
liquid savings, retirement savings, net financial worth, home equity, and net worth. Liquid assets 
are relatively easy to convert to cash in a hardship situation and are the sum of checking and 
savings accounts, stocks and mutual funds, and other savings (Huang, 2011). Retirement savings 
are an important asset for an individual’s and/or family’s future financial balance, and it is often 
missing in low-income households (Cramer, Sherraden, & McKernan, 2008; Johnson & 
Sherraden, 1992). Net financial worth is “the total amount of financial resources accumulated as 
precautionary savings” (Nam et al., 2008b, p. 5). For most American families, home equity is the 
asset with the highest value when calculating net worth (Beverly et al., 2008; Shapiro, 2006). 
Finally, net worth is the difference between everything a person owns and everything a person 
owes (Carasso & McKernan, 2008; Sherraden, 1991).  
 Researchers have proposed an alternative approach to measuring household poverty, 
asset poverty, which provides a more complete definition that relies on assets in addition to 
income (Haveman & Wolff, 2004; Nam et al., 2008b; Sherraden, 1991). The most common 
definition of asset poverty is the lack of resources needed for a household to meet its basic 
expenses for three months in the absence of income (Haveman & Wolff, 2004; Nam et al., 
2008a; Shapiro, Oliver, & Meschede, 2009). Many households may not be considered income 
poor but are asset poor (Nam et al., 2008b). An examination of 10 large cities in the US found 
that on average, 16% of households were income poor, 40% were asset poor, and 26% were 
extremely asset poor (i.e., households that had zero or negative net worth; Corporation for 
Enterprise Development, 2011). Shapiro et al. (2009) reported similar results: 42% of households 
of working age were asset poor. Asset poverty may be more persistent than income poverty, and 
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asset-poor households are more vulnerable to economic hardship than non-asset-poor households 
(Nam et al., 2008b).  
Relationships Between Assets and Health 
 Income and assets are significantly correlated measures of economic status (Hajat, 
Kaufman, Rose, Siddiqi, & Thomas, 2010; Sherraden, 1991; Zagorsky, 2005). However, studies 
have shown that each contributes to the explained variance of health outcomes. The well-being 
of an individual, a family, or even a community is based on both income and assets; although 
income allows the fulfillment of everyday needs, assets can “create opportunities, secure a 
desired stature and standard of living, or pass class status along to one’s children” (Oliver & 
Shapiro, 1995, p. 2). The most common measures of assets that have been used in developed 
countries are net worth, wealth, and homeownership. 
 It is hard to evaluate the influence of assets on health across studies because different 
studies have measured different components of assets (Carasso & McKernan, 2008; Pollack, 
Chideya Cubbin, Williams, Dekker, & Braveman, 2007). Among asset measures, there is 
variation in how a specific measure was calculated or manipulated across different studies. For 
example, studies that measured homeownership usually dichotomized the participants into 
homeowners and non-owners (Boyas et al., 2009; de Groot, Auslander, Williams, Sherraden, & 
Haire-Joshu, 2003; Grinstein-Weiss, Zhan, & Sherraden, 2006; Laaksonen, Sarlio-Lahteenkorva, 
& Lahelma, 2004), but some studies categorized them into three (e.g., owner occupier, private 
rental, and local authority or housing association) or four (e.g., owner, buying, renting, and rent 
free) categories (Shewry, Smith, Woodward, & Tunstall-Pedoe, 1992; Tanaka, Gjonca, & 
Gulliford, 2011). Different asset measures or different measurements of the same asset may 
create different results and magnitudes of results among studies. For example, Laaksonen et al. 
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(2004) found no significant difference in obesity between men who were homeowners and men 
who were not homeowners, and Shewry et al. (1992) found no difference in obesity between 
men who were homeowners and men who were private renters but did find that men who were 
homeowners were significantly less likely to be obese compared with men who were living in 
local authority or housing associations.  
Asset-Building Theoretical Framework 
 The cornerstone of the asset-building theoretical framework is presented in Sherraden’s 
(1991) asset-based welfare policy. The theory will be described briefly here and in more depth in 
the next chapter, and it explains what effects assets have on social, psychological, and economic 
welfare and how and why these effects occur. It states that individuals can accumulate assets 
through savings accounts or the investment of money into portfolio composition. Within the 
framework, there are three mechanisms that can help individuals save and invest money: (a) 
institutions can provide easy access to savings accounts and investments, encourage individuals 
to save and invest money with incentives, and increase their financial knowledge; (b) an 
individual’s ability to save or invest money, which depends on the individual’s resources, social 
networks, level of financial knowledge, orientation toward the future, motivation for saving, and 
experiences with successful savings in the past; and (c) an intergenerational transfer of assets, 
wherein parents with low income are likely to have fewer assets and can provide their children 
with fewer assets for their expenses than parents with higher levels of income and assets 
(Beverly et al., 2008).  
 Asset-building theory implies that assets can improve household stability because they 
can provide a buffer from economic hardship. They can also shape future opportunities for both 
children and adults because they are long-term components of wealth and having them can create 
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hope for the future that in turn increases individuals’ self-improvement. They can provide 
choices to individuals that can improve their long-term goals. They allow multiple investments 
that can increase returns. They provide more control and security that increase self-efficacy and 
can increase social status and provide better positioning for negotiations. They increase political 
awareness; for example, homeowners may be more likely to vote due to automatic registration, 
and they will try to protect their main asset: their home (Sherraden, 1991).  
 Lerman and McKernan (2008) expanded the asset-building framework and included a 
simultaneous relationship between asset accumulation and health and psychological well-being. 
It is important to remember that even when results have suggested that increased wealth may 
have a positive influence on health, it is possible that wealth is an endogenous variable (i.e., a 
variable that is explained or predicted by one or more other variables) and that more limited 
health conditions may lead to less wealth (Burkhauser & Weathers, 2001; Robert & House, 
2000; Yadama & Sherraden, 1996). 
Asset Building From the Life-Course Perspective 
 The influence of a life-course perspective should be applied when specifically 
considering the asset-building approach toward health outcomes (Rank, 2008). The life-course 
perspective explains an individual’s development through events and transitions over a lifetime. 
Those events and transitions can be both positive and negative. Factors that can influence asset-
building across the life course include social class, intergenerational transfers, race, income, 
family structure, life-cycle stage, and timing of life events (Rank, 2008). For example, the 
chance to move out of poverty is not high for young, low-income, Black people who come from 
low-income families that cannot help them financially. However, the same individuals may have 
high motivation to succeed in life, which may push them to take on student loans, get a higher 
9 
education, get good jobs with good incomes, and save money. However, their families may also 
expect them to help other family members financially, which can make it more difficult to save 
and accumulate assets (Beverly et al., 2008). In addition, a negative life event may cause a chain 
of events that can adversely affect their wealth; a medical crisis may cause high expenses and the 
loss of work days, which in turn may cause job loss and so on (Barr, 2012).  
 Although the life course influences asset building, it should be noted that socioeconomic 
circumstances during the life course can also affect health outcomes (Shuey &Wilson, 2008; 
Wadsworth, 1997). Occupation, education, housing environment and homeownership, and 
family circumstances have different effects on an individual’s health at each stage in life, such as 
during pregnancy, infancy, childhood, adolescence, and adulthood (Wadsworth, 1997). Pearlin, 
Schieman, Fazio, and Meersman (2005) found that individuals who suffered from ongoing 
economic strains during their lives had more health problems compared with individuals who 
experienced multiple periods of economic hardship but still had periods of economic relief. 
Asset Building and Health Outcomes 
 According to Lerman and McKernan’s (2008) extension of the asset-building theoretical 
framework, health and psychological well-being includes physical and mental health, an 
orientation toward the future, feelings of financial security, stress, happiness, and satisfaction 
from life. Holding more assets may improve physical and mental health by providing 
opportunities to look for appropriate care and financial security to deal with unexpected expenses 
such as illnesses (Lerman & McKernan, 2008; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995). For example, health 
insurance is usually obtained through an employer, but a person who holds more assets may be 
able to afford better health insurance even in the case of job or income loss. The utilization of 
health-care services will usually be greater and less expensive for a person with better health 
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insurance. Fewer assets, however, may lead to choosing no health insurance or a less expensive 
health-insurance plan with higher deductibles, which in turn can influence the decision to seek 
health-care services. In addition, holding more assets can reduce stress levels from unexpected 
costs (Lerman & McKernan, 2008). A person who holds fewer assets and needs to undergo an 
expensive medical procedure will probably be more stressed if that expenditure limits his or her 
ability to buy food or pay rent or the mortgage than a person who holds more assets and is less 
likely to be in that situation.  
 Finally, holding more assets makes it easier to plan goals for the future (Lerman & 
McKernan, 2008; Sherraden, 1991; Shobe & Page-Adams, 2001; Yadama & Sherraden, 1996), 
and an orientation toward the future may positively affect behaviors, including health behaviors, 
and attitudes (Grinstein-Weiss, Shanks, & Beverly, 2014; Lerman & McKernan, 2008; 
Ssewamala et al., 2010). Sherraden (1991) provided an example of the influence of future 
orientation on learning behavior. Sixth graders in Harlem, mainly poor children, were promised 
college tuition if they stayed in school. Although the high-school drop-out rate in that area was 
high, all the participants still living in the New York area at the study’s conclusion graduated 
from high school, and about half enrolled in college. The participants explained that during their 
early lives, they and their families did not think they could afford college, so it was not an option 
for them. But the promise of tuition changed their and their families’ beliefs and caused them to 
change their behaviors and stay in school. Ssewamala et al. (2010) stated that child development 
accounts (CDAs) for orphan youth from Uganda may have provided them hope for their future 
that in turn reduced their sexual risk-behavior intentions. 
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Evidence on the Relationship Between Assets and Health  
 Studies have provided empirical evidence on the positive impact of asset accumulation on 
health outcomes and health behaviors, particularly on physical-health outcomes. General health 
increased significantly across increasing wealth quintiles (Banks et al., 2010; J. Kim, 2011), and 
people in the lowest quartile of wealth had higher odds of reporting fair or poor health than 
people in the highest quartile (Cubbin et al., 2011; Finnegan, Marion, & Cox, 2005). Also, 
holding assets such as home ownership or checking accounts was significantly associated with 
better health statuses (Boyas et al., 2009). However, in the same study, wealth was not 
significantly associated with the general health of people 65 years or older when income was 
entered into the regression. That result may be explained by the fact that assets are not 
necessarily liquid (e.g., home equity) and therefore may not provide a flow of resources for 
immediate needs during retirement (Kahn & Fazio, 2005).  
 Asset accumulation was also associated with psychological distress. Psychological 
distress is usually defined as a state of emotional suffering characterized by symptoms of 
depression and anxiety. Therefore, scales that measure psychological distress typically share 
several items with scales that assess depression and anxiety levels (Drapeau, Marchand, & 
Beaulieu-Prévost, 2011). In studies that examined psychological distress, holding more assets 
was significantly associated with improving psychological distress (Carter, Blakely, Collings, 
Imlach Gunasekara, & Richardson, 2009; Headey & Wooden, 2004; Myer, Stein, Grimsrud, 
Seedat, & Williams, 2008; Xu, 2011) and lower depressive symptom severity (de Groot et al., 
2003; Dew, 2007), but when only homeownership was evaluated as a measure of wealth, it was 
not significantly associated with depressive symptom severity (Muntaner, Eaton, Diala, Kessler, 
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& Sorlie, 1998). It may be that homeownership is not a sensitive-enough variable for evaluating 
this relationship. 
 Most studies that focused on obesity and body mass indices (BMIs) have found a 
significant association for health outcomes with assets. Less wealth was significantly associated 
with higher odds for obesity (Banks et al., 2010) when adjusted for income and education (Hajat 
et al., 2010) or for age, sex, and other socioeconomic status variables (Janssen, Boyce, Simpson, 
& Pickett, 2006). In addition, men and women have shown significantly higher odds of obesity if 
not homeowners (Laaksonen et al., 2004). In that study, the relationship was an association and 
not a causal effect; thus, fewer assets may have caused the obesity or obese participants may 
have accumulated fewer assets. 
 Inheritances of more than $10,000 have predicted substantial decreases in obesity and 
severe obesity rates (B. Kim, & Ruhm, 2010). People who reported having less than $10,000 in 
liquid assets and people who reported having more than $10,000  in liquid assets did not 
significantly differ in their BMI scores (Robert & Reither, 2004), but that finding may have been 
due to the cutoff of $10,000, which may not be sensitive enough to detect changes in BMI 
scores. Zagorsky (2004, 2005) found that over a period of 15 years, regardless of BMI, net worth 
increased over time. However, shifting from a normal BMI to an overweight BMI to an obese 
BMI was followed by a decline of net worth. In addition, individuals that had less than the 
median wealth before retirement had a significant increase in their BMI scores after retirement, 
but individuals that had more wealth before retirement had no significant change in their BMI 
scores after retirement (Chung, Domino, & Stearns, 2009). 
 It appears that general health, psychological distress, and BMI are associated with asset 
accumulation. However, a potential reverse causality needs to be considered when examining 
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health outcomes and asset accumulation. People who hold fewer assets may experience a higher 
level of psychological distress because they feel less secure about their lives and futures or 
people experiencing greater psychological distress may skip work or need medical attention that 
limits their asset accumulation.  
Evidence on the Relationship Between Assets and Health Behaviors 
 In addition to health outcomes, some studies in the US have reported significant 
relationships between assets and health behaviors. A negative association was found between 
wealth and smoking (Banks et al., 2010; Cubbin et al., 2011; Hajat et al., 2010; Headey, Marks, 
& Wooden, 2005), and a positive association was found between physical activity and wealth for 
both youth (11–15 years old; Janssen et al., 2006) and older people (55–80 years old; Banks et 
al., 2010). The influence of wealth on smoking and physical activity may be related to more 
knowledge about healthier lifestyles and the financial ability to be a gym member and engage in 
physical activity. Despite the assumption that greater wealth would be related to less alcohol 
consumption1, study results have been mixed. Some studies found that greater wealth was 
positively associated with higher alcohol consumption (Banks et al., 2010; Headey et al., 2005; 
B. Kim & Ruhm, 2010), and others found it was negatively associated with higher alcohol 
consumption (Muntaner et al., 1998). It is difficult to interpret those findings due to the different 
measurements used in each study. 
 
 
                                                        
1 Different studies had different definitions for alcohol consumption. Banks et al. (2010) defined heavy drinking as 
drinking six to seven days per week and moderate as one to five days per week. Kim and Ruhm (2010) used a 
continuous variable that was the product of the number of weekly drinking days times the number of beverages 
consumed on those days over the last three months. Headey et al. (2005) and Muntaner et al. (1998) both used 
vaguer definitions of “standard alcoholic drinks consumed per month” and “alcohol abuse or dependence”, 
respectively. 
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Summary  
 Asset accumulation is a financial activity that can be achieved through institutional, 
individual, and intergenerational support and can influence individuals’, families’, and 
communities’ health outcomes and health behaviors. Studies have found evidence that higher 
assets are related to better health outcomes and more positive health behaviors. However, there is 
little evidence from asset-building program interventions about these relationships. Most of that 
evidence, which will be discussed in depth in the next section, does not indicate statistically 
significant differences in health outcomes between participants in treatment groups (e.g., 
participants who received the opportunity to open an individual development account [IDA] or 
CDA) and participants in comparison groups (e.g., participants who did not receive such 
opportunities). These results may have various causes including study designs and analytical 
methods.  
 Due to the limited evidence about the relationships between assets and health using the 
asset-building theoretical framework, Lerman and McKernan (2008) suggested that “more 
empirical evidence is needed to assess the benefits and consequences of assets for low-income, 
low-educated, and minority households” (p. 201). Although the asset-building theoretical 
framework implies an association between assets and health, more studies should be done to 
examine the topic in general and particularly to examine the theory in its entirety. This study will 
try to fill that gap in the knowledge about the relationships between assets and health, relying on 
the asset-building theoretical framework. 
Asset-Building Programs 
 Sherraden (1991) proposed IDAs as a way to encourage individuals and families to 
change their saving behaviors and accumulate assets. Usually, an asset-building program 
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includes three key mechanisms: matched IDA savings, constraint of matches to specific 
purchases (i.e., the entire amount that was saved plus matches can be withdrawn only for a preset 
goal such as higher education, a down payment for a home, or the seed money to start a business) 
with the opportunity to make unmatched withdrawals, and financial education (Nam, Ratcliffe, 
& McKernan, 2008; Page-Adams & Sherraden, 1997; Sherraden, 1991). Child development 
accounts are another form of IDA that provide children and their families with institutional 
support for accumulating assets through savings. Asset-building programs that provide CDAs 
usually offer matched CDA savings with matches that are constrained to specific purchases, an 
initial deposit, and sometimes benchmarks (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2014; Huang, Sherraden, & 
Purnell, 2014; Mason, Nam, Clancy, Kim, & Loke, 2009; Loke & Sherraden, 2009).  
 Asset-building programs can help low-income individuals and families build savings and 
improve their economic, social, health, and psychological well-being by accumulating assets. 
They are intended to encourage long-term savings and can have a positive influence on 
children’s and parents’ behaviors, aspirations, and goals. This improvement can lead to higher 
educational performance, better well-being, and better health outcomes (Lerman & McKernan, 
2008; Sherraden, 1991). Therefore, both IDAs and CDAs are assumed to assert positive 
influence in a variety of areas that might also affect each other. For example, opening a CDA 
may help a child develop an orientation toward the future, improve the child’s educational 
attainment, and reduce his or her risky health behaviors (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2014; Scanlon & 
Adams, 2009; Shobe & Page-Adams, 2001; Ssewamala et al., 2010).  
Evidence From U.S. Asset-Building Programs on the Relationships Between Assets and 
Health  
 
 Only a few studies of asset-building programs have examined the relationships between 
assets and health; these studies presented mixed results. The primary large-scale demonstration 
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project that examined the influence of IDAs on low-income individuals in the US, called the 
American Dream Demonstration (ADD), was conducted in 14 states from 1997 until 2001. For 
13 of the 14 states, non-experimental research and cross-sectional methods were applied. 
However, at the ADD Tulsa, Oklahoma (OK) site, an experimental study was implemented in 
which participants were randomly assigned to treatment (i.e., access through the program to a 
matched IDA and financial education) and control (i.e., no access through the program to a 
matched IDA or financial education) groups. The Tulsa OK ADD experiment was carried out in 
three waves: the first at baseline before the random assignment to intervention and control 
groups, the second at the first follow-up 18 months after the random assignment, and the third at 
a second follow-up 48 months after the random assignment (Grinstein-Weiss, Sherraden et al., 
2013). None of the waves examined the influence of asset accumulation on health outcomes.  
 Moore et al. (2001) conducted a cross-sectional survey with 318 ADD participants from 
13 sites, not including the Tulsa OK ADD experiment site. All participants had received an 
opportunity to open a matched IDA. The majority reported that they felt more confident about 
their future because of their IDAs, and 30% reported spending less on cigarettes and alcohol to 
set aside money for their IDAs. But 17% reported that they postponed visits to the doctor or 
dentist to set aside money for their IDAs. These findings suggest that IDAs may be associated 
with a decline in smoking and alcohol consumption. However, it is disturbing that some 
participants reported postponing visits to the doctor or dentist to set aside money for their IDAs, 
which is not the intent of asset-building programs. Because the study had a cross-sectional 
design that included only participants who received an opportunity to open a matched IDA, there 
was no way to track changes over time in smoking and alcohol consumption. In addition, there 
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was no comparison group, so differences between participants who had the opportunity to open a 
matched IDA and participants who did not could not be examined. 
 A fourth wave was added to the Tulsa OK ADD experiment ten years after the random 
assignment. It measured health and health-behavior outcomes. There were no statistically 
significant differences between treatment and control groups regarding BMI, general health, pain 
interference with work, health limits, medical expenses in the past year, and drinking and 
smoking behaviors; however, there were also no significant differences between treatment and 
control groups regarding net worth, homeownership, and total assets (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 
2013). The strength of the Tulsa OK ADD is that it was a randomized controlled study, and the 
strength of the fourth wave is that it had lower attrition rates compared with the third wave 
participation (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2012; Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2013). Despite these strengths, 
no health outcomes or health behaviors were significantly better for participants in the treatment 
group compared with the control group ten years after random assignment. However, it was not 
the intent of the original program to evaluate the influence of IDAs on health outcomes. Some 
health outcomes may have been short-term, such as alcohol consumption or smoking behaviors, 
with no effect over a longer term after the intervention ended. In addition, there was no baseline 
for comparing the results for both short- and long-term outcomes; therefore, there was no way to 
examine the change in health outcomes over time.  
 Saving for Education, Entrepreneurship, and Downpayment (SEED) was an asset-
building program tailored to children. Wheeler-Brooks and Scanlon (2009) described SEED as 
“a national policy, practice, and research initiative designed to test the efficacy of universal and 
progressive accounts for children and youth” (Wheeler-Brooks & Scanlon, p. 758). Twelve 
community-based organizations across the country and in Puerto Rico operated the SEED 
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children and youth savings account programs . In 2008, 2,704 newborn children in OK, which 
constituted 37% of the newborns in OK that year, were enrolled in an asset-building program 
called SEED OK. Those newborn children were randomly assigned to treatment or control 
groups, and their mothers reported outcomes to the study. The treatment group received a state-
owned CDA with $1,000 and an opportunity to open a participant-owned CDA with a program 
contribution of $100 to open it, and the control group received no intervention. The participant-
owned CDA was a matched savings account for low- and moderate-income families.  
 Controlling for baseline depressive symptoms, mothers in the treatment group reported 
significantly fewer depressive symptoms at the 3-year follow-up compared with mothers in the 
control group, though what was measured was participants’ self-reported intent to treat 
symptoms rather than actual treatments received. For low-income and low-education 
subsamples, that relationship was significantly greater when compared with the entire sample. 
There were no significant sociodemographic differences between treatment and control groups at 
baseline, and there was a low attrition rate (16%) between 2008 and 2011 (Huang et al., 2014). It 
is also significant that only 37% of OK’s families with newborns agreed to participate in the 
SEED OK program (Huang et al., 2014). That low-response rate may imply a selection bias and 
have limited the generalizability of the findings. 
 The Michigan SEED program was conducted in 2004. According to enrollment and 
demographic characteristics, 14 Oakland Livingston Human Service Agency Head Start centers 
were matched as pairs to administer the program. In each pair, one center was randomly assigned 
to be the treatment group and the other center was randomly assigned to be the control group; 
thus, participants were assigned to either treatment or control groups based on which center they 
utilized. The study participants were parents of the children eligible for the program. A total of 
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790 participants enrolled in the program. The treatment group received an initial deposit of $800 
into a matched CDA for each participant. Both the treatment and control groups had a decrease 
in their psychological distress levels between baseline and the 4-year follow-up, which was 
measured as a self-reported intent to treat. However, there was no significant difference between 
their distress levels at that time (Marks, Rhodes, Engelhardt, Scheffler, & Wallace, 2009). A 
Limitation of the Michigan SEED study includes significant differences between treatment and 
comparison groups at baseline in terms of race, the ratio of adults to children living in the 
household, average housing payments, and possessing savings (Marks et al., 2009).   
Evidence From Asset-Building Programs Outside the US on the Relationship Between 
Assets and Health 
 
 Asset-building programs have been conducted in developed and developing countries 
outside of the US. An IDA and CDA program called the Seoul Hope Dream Project (SHDP) was 
implemented in 2008 in Seoul, South Korea. Participants in the SHDP were considered the 
treatment group, and the comparison group was selected from the Korea Welfare Panel Study 
data set. The treatment group received an opportunity to open a matched IDA in 2009 and 
reported at 1- and 2-year follow-ups that they experienced less stress and anxiety and more 
positive feelings and changes in psychological well-being. They showed orientation toward the 
future by reporting that after completing the program, they were setting new plans for the future 
and had continued to save money by reducing their consumption (Y. Kim, Lee, & Sherraden, 
2012).  
 However, the SHDP had several limitations: (a) The program did not use random 
assignment to determine treatment and comparison groups as every person who participated in 
the Seoul Hope Dream Project received the IDA opportunity and the comparison group was 
selected from the Panel Study of Welfare. Thus, conclusions about causality cannot be drawn; 
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(b) The program only examined changes over time for participants in the treatment group and 
provided qualitative evidence of positive changes in stress, anxiety, positive feelings, and 
psychological well-being for that group. There was no examination of differences between 
participants in the treatment and comparison groups or changes over time for the comparison 
group; (c) The high attrition rate (25%) between baseline and 1-year follow-up may have 
introduced bias into the results; and (d) There were significant differences between participants 
in the treatment and comparison groups at baseline for factors such as age, education, and 
working status (Y. Kim et al., 2011), and those differences may have introduced selection bias 
and may have caused biased results. 
 An asset-building project called the Suubi project was conducted between 2005 and 2008 
in Uganda for orphans with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Suubi translates as 
hope in the local Ugandan language. The participants from 15 schools were randomly assigned 
to treatment or control groups at the school level. Randomization at the school level is a strength 
of the study because it reduces the threat to construct validity due to treatment diffusion 
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), meaning that there is a lower chance that children who 
study in different schools share information about the program. At the 10-month follow-up, 
participants in the treatment group had a statistically significant reduction of 64% in self-
reported sexual risk-taking intentions (Ssewamala et al., 2010). However, the study examined 
only intentions and not actual sexual risk behaviors; therefore, there is no way to know if the 
treatment group indeed reduced their risky sexual behaviors compared with the control group.  
 Additionally, at the 20-month follow-up, participants in the treatment group reported a 
significant decrease in their depressive symptoms, and participants in the control group reported 
no significant change in their depressive symptoms. At baseline, the treatment group had also 
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reported significantly lower depressive symptoms compared with the control group, but a double 
robust estimator suggested that even if the depressive symptoms at baseline had been similar 
between the two groups, the treatment group would still have indicated significantly lower 
depressive symptoms compared with the control group at both the 10- and 20-month follow-ups 
(Ssewamala, Neilands, Waldfogel, & Ismayilova, 2012). 
 The Suubi project’s outcomes have construct validity threat because of the participants’ 
potential reactivity to the experimental situation, wherein youth in treatment groups try to 
provide results that will satisfy the researchers (Shadish et al., 2002). Also, baseline results 
showed that treatment and control groups were significantly different in household size; 
ownership of hut, mud, or brick homes; peer pressure to have sexual intercourse; and intentions 
to have sexual intercourse (Ssewamala et al., 2010). However, Ssewamala et al. (2010) stated 
that they controlled for those variables in the regression analyses.  
Summary 
 Asset-building programs that provide low-income individuals and families the 
institutional support to open matched and restricted IDAs and financial education encourage 
participants to change their saving behaviors and accumulate assets. Several asset-building 
programs have been conducted in the US and around the world; however, only a few programs 
have examined the influence of asset-building on health outcomes, and even fewer were 
originally set up to examine health outcomes. In the future, it will be helpful to research asset 
building programs that utilize random assignment to be set up in advance to collect health 
outcomes data that will theoretically change within the study timeframe due to asset 
accumulation. The information in those programs needs to be collected in a longitudinal manner 
using several time points, and they need to include both short-term and long-term health 
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outcomes. Regarding health behaviors that can be changed in the short- and long-term, those 
outcomes should include both intended and actual behaviors.  
Purpose and Hypotheses of the Study  
 The asset-building theoretical framework suggests that assets may have positive 
influences on health outcomes and health behaviors and that better health and health behaviors 
may have positive influences on asset accumulation. Prior studies found that holding more assets 
was significantly associated with better health outcomes. However, results from the few studies 
that examined this relationship were mixed. That may be due to the limited nature of those 
studies; only two asset-building programs in the US, the ADD and SEED, tested the relationship 
between assets and health, and the ADD collected health variables only 10 years after random 
assignment. The Korean asset-building program, the SHDP, did not compare the change in 
health outcomes between treatment and comparison groups and had a high attrition rate. The 
asset-building program in Africa, the Suubi project, only examined depressive symptoms and 
health-behavior intentions and not actual behavior. In addition, those studies were limited to 
specific paths of the asset-building theoretical framework: institutional support, saving and 
investment actions, asset accumulation, and health outcomes. Asset-building programs have been 
developed based on the asset-building theoretical framework, but to my knowledge, nobody has 
examined the entire theory. An examination of the theory as a whole may be useful in 
developing future asset-building programs that will be health oriented. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to test Sherraden’s (1991) asset-building 
theoretical framework (Figure 1) as presented by Beverly et al. (2008) and Lerman and 
McKernan (2008) using a representative sample of the U.S. population over six years drawn 
from the 2001 and 2007 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data sets. The main hypothesis 
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(H1) of this study was that the observed covariance of the population under study would not be 
significantly different from the covariance of the parameter estimates of the hypothesized path 
model (Bowen & Guo, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 1. Asset-building theoretical framework. The theoretical framework is based on Beverly 
et al., 2008, and Lerman & McKernan, 2008. 
 
 The following hypotheses about direct effects in the asset-building theoretical framework 
were examined:  
 Direct Hypothesis 1 (DH1): Improvement in individual components (i.e., larger 
economic resources, fewer economic needs, and less informal financial social 
support) will increase saving and investment actions (i.e., larger deposits and smaller 
withdrawals).  
 
 Direct Hypothesis 2 (DH2): Improvement in institutional components (i.e., lower 
asset limits and greater access, security, and incentives) will increase saving and 
investment.  
 
 Direct Hypothesis 3 (DH3): Larger intergenerational and interhousehold transfers 
(i.e., larger inheritances) will increase saving and investment actions.  
 
 Direct Hypothesis 4 (DH4): Larger intergenerational and interhousehold transfers will 
increase asset accumulation (i.e., greater retirement savings, home equity, net worth, 
and liquid savings). 
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 Direct Hypothesis 5 (DH5): Greater saving and investment actions will increase asset 
accumulation. 
 
 Direct Hypotheses 6 (DH6): Greater asset accumulation will improve psychological 
well-being (i.e., lower psychological distress). 
 
 Direct Hypotheses 7 (DH7): Better psychological well-being will increase asset 
accumulation. 
 
The following hypotheses about indirect effects in the asset-building theoretical framework were 
examined: 
 Indirect Hypothesis 1 (IH1): Improvement in individual components will increase 
asset accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 2 (IH2): Improvement in institutional components will 
increase asset accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 3 (IH3): Larger intergenerational and interhousehold transfers 
will increase asset accumulation through an increase in saving and investment 
actions.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 4 (IH4): Improvement in individual components will improve 
psychological well-being through an increase in saving and investment actions 
and through an increase in asset accumulation.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 5 (IH5): Improvement in institutional components will 
improve psychological well-being through an increase in saving and investment 
actions and through an increase in asset accumulation.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 6 (IH6): Larger intergenerational and interhousehold transfers 
will improve psychological well-being through an increase in saving and 
investment actions and through an increase in asset accumulation.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 7 (IH7): Greater saving and investment actions will improve 
psychological well-being through an increase in asset accumulation.  
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CHAPTER 2: ASSET-BUILDING THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
 The asset-building theoretical framework (Figure 1) includes six components, each of 
which includes a number of dimensions. The six components are institutional components, 
individual components, intergenerational transfers, saving and investment actions, asset 
accumulation, and health and psychological well-being. The theoretical framework implies six 
directional paths between those components: institutional components, individual components, 
and intergenerational transfers predict saving and investment actions; intergenerational transfers 
and saving and investment actions predict asset accumulation; and asset accumulation predicts 
and is predicted by health and psychological well-being. In this chapter, I will describe each 
component and its dimensions and will also discuss evidence from the literature supporting the 
hypothesized paths between the components. 
The Relationship Between Individual Components and Saving and Investment Actions 
 Individual components includes four dimensions: economic resources and needs, 
informal social support, financial literacy, and psychological variables. Each dimension will be 
explained in this section. It is hypothesized that in the asset-building theoretical framework, each 
individual components dimension will influence saving and investment actions (Beverly et al., 
2008). 
Economic Resources and Needs 
 Economic resources can be defined as financial inflows, and they are an essential 
dimension of individual components. People who have more economic resources have more 
surplus money to save after they have paid their bills. People with low incomes have fewer 
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economic resources and therefore less surplus money to save (Beverly et al., 2008). Barr (2012) 
described individuals with less surplus money as individuals who have little room for slack in 
their finances; in other words, low-income individuals need to choose more carefully how to 
spend or save their money than high-income individuals because they have less financial 
flexibility.  
 Financial expenses are an example of economic needs. They can interfere with an 
individual’s saving or investment actions because high expenses increase income consumption 
and reduce the income amount that can be saved. Financial expenses include medical expenses, 
vehicle costs, debt payment, and other similar expenses. Medical expenses are usually higher for 
families without health insurance (Beverly et al., 2008), but families that have health insurance 
can find it hard to pay medical bills at times of acute or chronic health conditions. Vehicle 
ownership can cause expected and unexpected costs to a household, such as regular service and 
inspection or breakdowns. Debt payments include credit-card debt (Beverly et al., 2008) and 
other regular payments such as the rent or mortgage or loans.  
 For people considered asset poor, credit may not be available or fairly priced and 
sometimes can influence their eligibility to borrow against future income (Sherraden, 1991). For 
example, in an ethnographic study, low-income African Americans from northwest Mississippi 
and low- and moderate-income Hispanics from San Jose, California (n = 18 and n = 12, 
respectively), reported they had to cash their paychecks to pay debt and other payments, leaving 
them with money only for ongoing expenses and none for savings (Caskey, 1997). However, one 
of the limitations of that study was that participation was limited to people willing to share 
information about their personal finances, which introduces a potential for selection bias.  
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 Although debt can depress saving and investment actions, it can also be considered a 
good thing when it is “used to develop productive capacity for future economic growth” 
(Sherraden, 1991, p. 284). For example, debt for a student loan, which is a burden on daily 
consumption and reduces the amount and frequency of income savings, contributes to education 
that can present better job opportunities and potentially higher income in the future. 
Informal Social Support 
 A person’s social network can support and encourage saving behavior, but it can also 
take advantage of that saving for nonrestrictive purposes such as using savings that were 
restricted to a down payment for a house or higher education for the daily consumption of 
relatives and/or non-relatives (Sherraden, 1991). A supportive network can provide a positive 
saving environment that encourages saving actions and reminds a person to perform them. In 
contrast, a discouraging network expects a person to share that extra income with others. The 
latter is more common among low-income families, who feel emotional pressure from their 
friends and family members to help with daily expenses (Beverly et al., 2008). This discouraging 
network is more common in Black and Hispanic families (Caskey, 1997).  
 The relationship between informal social support and saving actions has been examined 
in several qualitative studies. Sherraden et al. (2005) interviewed 84 participants (59 who 
received the treatment and 25 controls) from the Tulsa OK ADD experiment, previously 
described in Chapter 1, two years after the random assignment and found that support from 
relatives and non-relatives was important for their saving actions2. The researchers sampled 
participants from the treatment group using a stratified sample that included low, middle, and 
high levels of average monthly deposit savers. They randomly selected participants from the 
control group. Although the interviewers in the study were trained and practiced in a pilot 
                                                        
2 Sherraden et al. (2005) did not provide information about the type of support participants mentioned. 
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interview, data collection overlapped with another survey, and some of the participants from the 
control group knew participants from the treatment group, which may have affected their saving 
behavior (e.g., by encouraging them to search for other programs that could promote and 
influence the result of the study).  
 In a qualitative study that conducted 14 focus groups with 76 participants from seven 
SEED program sites, the participants stated that they received a great deal of financial support 
from their family and friends. Frequently, that financial support was used to cover daily needs. 
Less frequently, but much costlier when it was needed, that support covered emergency 
expenses. Participants stated that although they had received financial support from their 
relatives and non-relatives, they could only make smaller deposits than they had intended or no 
deposits at all to the SEED CDA. However, a few participants who received financial help from 
their family and friends used some of those funds to make financial contributions to the child’s 
SEED CDA (Wheeler-Brooks, 2009). 
 Caskey (1997) found in an ethnographic study that low-income African Americans could 
not save money because they were under pressure to share their money with others and that low- 
and moderate-income Hispanics could not save money because they had to send it to their 
relatives in their countries of origin. However, there was no information in the study about how 
much financial help those families needed from their families and friends. Another cross-
sectional study provided information about the relationship between informal social support and 
saving actions (Moore et al., 2001). The majority of participants in the ADD who received the 
opportunity to open IDAs reported that their family and friends supported their saving actions; 
however, a substantial percentage (38%) reported that their family and friends often asked them 
for money.  
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 Although the response rate was good (79%) for ADD participants at the time of that 
study (Moore et al., 2001), it was low (29%) for former ADD participants. There were additional 
limitations to the study. There was no consistency in data-collection methods (i.e., face-to-face 
interviews, phone interviews, and group settings were used), which may have affected the 
participants’ responses. For example, some participants may have felt more comfortable sharing 
financial information in a face-to-face interview than in a group setting that involved sharing that 
information with other participants. Another limitation is that only half of the ADD sites agreed 
to recruit participants for the study, meaning that the study sample may not be fully 
representative of the ADD population.  
Financial Literacy 
 Financial literacy is “the ability to understand financial terms and concepts and to 
translate knowledge into behavior, including such skills as balancing a checkbook and managing 
cash flows in other accounts, preparing a budget and tracking spending, managing debt and 
saving and investing” (Schreiner & Sherraden 2007, p. 235). It is assumed that financial 
education will increase a person’s financial literacy, which in turn will cause better financial 
behaviors such as better investment decisions, which will affect a person’s saving actions and 
eventually increase the household’s financial well-being (Beverly et al., 2008; Willis, 2013). 
However, more financial knowledge does not necessarily prevent a person from making bad 
financial investment decisions.  
 Several researchers summarized the mixed evidence about financial literacy. They 
reported that some studies found a positive and significant relationship between financial 
knowledge and saving behavior, although others found no relationship, or a small magnitude of 
that relationship (Gale, Harris, & Levine 2012; Willis, 2013), or negative financial behaviors 
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after financial education (Willis, 2013). Moreover, in a recent meta-analysis study, Fernandes, 
Lynch, and Netemeyer (2014) found that the “financial education interventions studied explained 
only about 0.1% of the variance in the financial behaviors studied, with even weaker average 
effects of interventions directed at low-income rather than general population samples” (p. 
1872). 
 Willis (2013) provided potential reasons for the lack of a relationship between financial 
education and financial behaviors. The financial marketplace is a dynamic environment, meaning 
that something that was true today may not be the best investment decision for tomorrow. 
Therefore, teaching children financial education in school about specific information that is 
relevant for the present time may not be effective because it will take years until they finally use 
that knowledge. However, financial education focused on general information about markets and 
investments (e.g., interest rates, compound interest, loans and mortgages) may be effective. 
Financial illiteracy can cause poor financial choices (Beverly et al., 2008; Gale et al., 2012), 
which in turn can increase a person’s economic insecurity (Gale et al., 2012). Although low-
income individuals are likely to have lower financial literacy than high-income individuals 
(Beverly et al., 2008), low financial literacy is a problem for a significant portion of American 
adults (Gale et al., 2012; Willis, 2013).  
 In the ADD, participants who had the opportunity to open IDAs were also required to 
participate in financial education classes that included general information about saving 
strategies, how to prepare a budget, the benefits from savings, compound interest, and how to 
manage their credit (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). This kind of financial education is more 
general than education about specific investment actions; therefore it is more likely that the 
knowledge taught during the ADD will not change over time.  
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 Different subsamples of ADD participants reported that the financial education 
contributed to their abilities to save and indicated that they had learned specific skills for 
improving their saving and investment actions. One subsample included participants from 6 out 
of the 13 ADD sites and was examined in a cross-sectional study (Moore et al., 2001). Another 
subsample included participants from the Tulsa OK ADD and was examined using a qualitative 
method (Sherraden et al., 2005). In addition, a longitudinal study of 2,350 ADD participants who 
were program-selected and self-selected found that more hours of financial education, up to ten, 
was significantly associated with more asset accumulation through the IDA (Curley, Ssewamala, 
& Sherraden, 2009; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). Specifically for families with children 18 
years old or younger, a one-hour increase in financial education increased the average monthly 
net deposit (AMND) by $0.86 (Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner, & Ssewamala, 2006). That amount 
may not be considered financially meaningful, and due to the sample selection process, 
participants may not have represented the general population. Rather, they were “highly educated 
and had high rates of employment. . . . They were disproportionately females, African American, 
and never married” (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007, p. 122).  
 Marital status was also associated with women’s financial literacy; married women had 
lower financial knowledge than single women, perhaps because married women may trust their 
spouses to take care of the household’s financial issues and single women do not have that option  
and have to take care of their own financial issues (Sherraden et al., 2005; Zhan, Anderson, & 
Scott, 2006). One example of this relationship was presented by a qualitative study of 84 
randomly selected participants from the Tulsa OK ADD, wherein both married males and 
females stated that the male was responsible for financial decisions (Sherraden et al., 2005). 
Another example is provided in a study on a pre- and post-financial training program, the 
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Financial Links for Low-Income People program in Illinois. The 163 low-income participants, 
mainly Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients, had higher financial 
knowledge if they were unmarried compared with married participants. That result was 
consistent in both pre- and post-training questionnaires. However, the study sample was mainly 
females and African Americans, about half of whom had never been married (Zhan et al., 2006).  
Psychological Variables 
 Future orientation, motives for saving, and perceived ability to save are three examples of 
psychological variables that may influence saving and investment actions (Beverly et al., 2008). 
Beverly et al. (2008) defined future orientation as “willingness to invest in one’s future, even 
when one must postpone pleasure” (p. 107). The action of postponing present pleasure for future 
pleasure can lead to the conclusion that a stronger future orientation will result in more saving 
and investment actions. However, regardless of income level, people have trouble postponing 
present consumption (Caskey, 1997). A stronger orientation toward the future was significantly 
associated with greater savings for participants who completed or dropped out of an IDA 
program in a large IDA network agency in the U.S. Midwest compared with participants in the 
control group. However, that survey had a low response rate of 43%, and participants who 
completed the program were significantly different in several assets-related measures (e.g., 
household income, mortgage obligations, and household savings) from those who dropped out 
(Red Bird, Grinstein-Weiss, Loibl, & Zhan, 2010). In a qualitative study with a stratified sample 
from the Tulsa OK ADD, participants in treatment and control groups reported that savings 
allowed them to think about their future (Sherraden et al., 2005). People who find it important to 
save and who have a goal for their saving are assumed to have higher motivation for saving 
(Beverly et al., 2008; Sherraden, 1991).  
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 According to neoclassical economics, there are three main long-term goals of saving 
money: retirement, unexpected shocks, and transfers to offspring (Beverly et al., 2008). In a 
randomized control trial, called Refund to Saving (R2S), that sampled 4,087 TurboTax® users, 
participants were randomly assigned to specific motivational prompts3 and suggested saving 
amounts (i.e. 25%, 50%, and 75% of the refund or specific amounts of $100 or $250; Grinstein-
Weiss, Comer et al., 2013). Participants who were randomly assigned to specific motivational 
prompts significantly increased the percentage of their tax refunds intended for savings 
compared with participants in the control group. However, in a subsample of low-income 
individuals, those differences were not statistically significant (Key, Grinstein-Weiss, Tucker, 
Holub, & Ariely, 2013).  
 Other important long-term goals for saving money are homeownership (Cramer et al., 
2008; Nam et al., 2008b), higher education, and seed money to start a business (Nam et al., 
2008b; Sherraden, 1991). However, in a qualitative study of low- and moderate-income African 
Americans and Hispanics, most of the participants that saved money indicated they saved it for a 
short-term purpose (Caskey, 1997). Finally, people who believe they can successfully save 
money will probably do so, but people who do not believe they can save money will probably 
not experience successful saving. It is expected that past experiences, whether experienced by 
individuals or members of their social networks, with successful or unsuccessful saving will also 
shape individuals’ future saving and investment behavior (Beverly et al., 2008). 
The Relationship Between Institutional Components and Saving and Investment Actions 
 Institutions such as banks, employers, and federal or state programs provide formal and 
informal incentives such as matches and restrictions, for a specific purpose for savings accounts, 
                                                        
3
 The prompts encouraged participants “to think about things like their level of debt, the importance of emergency 
saving, or their goals for retirement” (Key et al., 2013, p. 1).  
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which can constrain the choice sets of individuals regarding saving and investment actions 
(Sherraden, 1991). Sherraden (2003) described four dimensions of institutional components that 
can influence saving and investment actions: access, incentives, information, and facilitation.     
Based on research from asset-building programs, Beverly et al. (2008) added three more 
dimensions to the institutional components: expectations, restrictions, and security. These 
dimensions are discussed in more detail in this section.  
 The dimensions of institutional components influence asset accumulation, mainly 
indirectly, through saving and investment actions (Beverly et al., 2008). For example, individuals 
will be more likely to have a pension savings account and more likely to deposit a portion of 
their income frequently into the pension savings account when (a) they have easier access to the 
pension savings account, usually through an employer; (b) the interest rates or matches from the 
employer for the pension savings account are better than those individuals will get from a private 
pension savings account not offered through the employer; (c) they are automatically enrolled in 
the pension savings account by the employer; (d) there are restrictions about when they can 
withdraw the money from the pension savings account; (e) they expect to save a certain amount 
of money each month; (f) they have good knowledge and financial skills; and (g) they feel more 
secure about depositing a portion of their income into the pension savings account that the bank 
is operating than using a portion of their income to put their money essentially under a mattress.  
 In general, low-income individuals have been excluded from the institutional benefits and 
incentives that promote savings and asset accumulation through saving and investment actions 
because they are less likely to be homeowners and are more likely to be employees without 
retirement benefits (Sherraden, 1991). However, the saving behaviors of low-income individuals 
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were strongly affected by access and incentives through IDAs in the ADD program (Sherraden, 
2003).  
Access 
 Individuals can take advantage of access through the tax system, potentially by receiving 
tax benefits for households, or through their employer, often through retirement savings accounts 
(Beverly et al., 2008; Johnson & Sherraden; 1992; Sherraden, 1991; Sherraden, Schreiner, & 
Beverly, 2003). Access benefits mainly wealthy and middle-class people because it is attractive 
and readily available to them through banks, employers, or federal and state programs. Persons 
with low incomes are less likely to own a house or work in a place that offers access to 
retirement benefits (Johnson & Sherraden, 1992; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 
1991). For example, in a sample of 1,801 families with children who participated in the ADD, 
which they qualified for as low-income households, only 16% were homeowners (Grinstein-
Weiss, Wagner et al., 2006) compared with almost 70% of the general population (Shapiro, 
2006).  
 In addition, access may also indicate physical access to financial institutions (e.g., banks), 
meaning that people who do not have easy access to their banks, usually people who live in rural 
areas or people without accessible and/or affordable transportation, prefer not to go to the bank 
to deposit or invest their money (Beverly et al., 2008). Curley et al. (2009) found no significant 
influence from the number of deposit locations available to participants on saving performance 
in the ADD sample. In the last decade, this physical-access limitation has declined due to a 
transition toward technology use; one way to encourage people, especially low-income 
individuals, to use banking services, is through advocating for mobile banking. High percentages 
of low-income individuals have mobile phones, and mobile banking allows them to make 
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deposits and pay bills through their mobile phones (Gross, Hogarth, & Schmeiser, 2012). In an 
online survey sent from KnowledgePanel®—a proprietary, probability-based web panel of more 
than 50,000 individuals—to more than 3,000 participants with a response rate of 67.7%, the 
majority of respondents had a mobile phone (87.1%) and about a fifth used mobile banking. The 
underbanked4 group reported the highest use of mobile banking (28.4%) compared with fully 
banked5 or unbanked6 groups (20.8% and 9.7%, respectively; Gross et al., 2012). However, an 
online survey is prone to bias; for example, the sample that uses the Internet may not be 
representative of the total population. Regardless, people who benefit from access are more 
likely to have higher saving rates than those who do not have available access (Sherraden, 
Schreiner, & Beverly, 2003). 
Information 
 Information refers to knowledge about financial opportunities, how to gain that 
knowledge and skills (Beverly et al., 2008), and an understanding of the process and rewards of 
saving. Whenever people have more knowledge and better understanding of financial 
opportunities, their functioning in the financial marketplace is better (Willis, 2013) and the more 
likely they are to save (Sherraden, 2003; Sherraden et al., 2003) and increase their economic 
security (Gale et al., 2012). Lusardi and Mitchell (2010) stated that people who were exposed in 
school to economics classes had higher financial literacy compared with people who were not 
exposed in school to economics classes and that people who reported greater financial 
                                                        
4
 An underbanked consumer was defined as someone who had a checking, savings, or money market account but 
who also used at least one alternative financial service in the past 12 months such as an auto title loan, payday loan, 
check-cashing service, or payroll card.  
5 A fully banked consumer was defined as someone who had a bank account and did not use alternative financial 
services. 
 
6 An unbanked consumer was defined as someone who did not have a checking, savings, or money market account; 
also, the consumer’s spouse or partner did not have such an account. 
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knowledge thought more about retirement planning. Although their study used sampling weights 
to make the sample a representative sample of the US, it was an Internet-based survey (i.e., the 
Rand American Life Panel), which may have caused a biased sample. In addition, information 
from peers in the ADD was also significantly associated with saving performance (Curley et al., 
2009). 
 General information, such as knowledge of the different types of savings accounts that 
have different interest rates and restrictions, or information specific to a program, such as 
eligibility for financial opportunities of saving and investment actions, can be gathered 
independently through employers or through governmental support (Beverly et al., 2008). 
However, in the US, there is a general problem of economic illiteracy, especially for some 
disadvantaged groups such as those with low incomes (Gale et al., 2012; Sherraden, 1991), 
women, minorities, the less well educated, the young (i.e., around the age of 20), and the old 
(i.e., retired; Gale et al., 2012; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2010).  
Incentives 
 People are more likely to save when the saving goal is feasible and if they receive 
incentives such as matching deposits and higher earnings on savings (Sherraden, 2003). In other 
words, people are more likely to save when they are enticed to do so (Sherraden et al., 2003). For 
example, most employers’ private pensions provide incentives for a person not to retire until a 
certain age, but they also provide incentives to retire when a person reaches a certain age 
(Sherraden, 1991). However, different studies that evaluated the ADD using different samples 
found inconclusive results regarding the influence of matched rates on different saving 
behaviors. Some studies reported that a higher match rate was significantly associated with any 
contributions to IDAs (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2012; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007) and with 
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lower likelihoods of unmatched withdrawals (Schreiner et al., 2001). But other studies did not 
find a significant influence of match rate on AMNDs (Curley et al., 2009; Schreiner et al., 2001; 
Sherraden et al., 2003), and other studies found that higher match rates were significantly 
associated with lower AMNDs (Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner et al., 2006; Han & Sherraden, 2009) 
and less frequent deposits into IDAs (Han & Sherraden, 2009).  
 The different results among studies of the same program can be explained by the different 
subsamples each study used. Some used a sample of 14 programs from the 13 different sites 
where the ADD was implemented (Curley et al., 2009; Schreiner et al., 2001). Others studied 
only families with children from those sites (Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner et al., 2006). Still others 
used only participants from the Tulsa OK ADD, which ran a random assignment experiment 
(Grinstein-Weiss, Sherraden et al., 2013; Han & Sherraden, 2009; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). 
Some of their findings contradict the asset-building theoretical framework. Sherraden et al. 
(2003) provided three possible explanations for that result. First, the match-rate levels of the 
ADD were defined without consideration of saving expectations from participants. Therefore, 
the amount saved by a person saving for a down payment for a home would be different than the 
amount saved by a person for higher education. Second, participants may have tried to reach 
their match caps (i.e., the maximum amount that would be matched through the program) 
regardless of the match rate, thus trying to reach the maximum AMND eligible for matching 
regardless of the match rate. Finally, participants who knew their saving goal from the beginning 
of the program may have chosen to save less and enjoy the same return. For example, a 
participant who set a saving goal of $3,000 for a down payment for a house at a match rate of 1:1 
would have required savings of $1,500, but a match rate of 1:3 would have required savings of 
only $750 to get to the same total amount of $3,000.  
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 Governmental asset-tests of federal and state assistance programs require a person to 
have limited assets to get or maintain assistance, which amounts to a governmental disincentive 
for saving (Beverly et al., 2008; Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner et al., 2006; Johnson & Sherraden, 
1992; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 1991). In a qualitative study of low- and 
moderate-income African Americans and Hispanics, some participants reported not saving 
money because they did not want to lose their welfare benefits, and a few reported that they did 
not own a checking account for the same reason (Caskey, 1997). Using four cross-sectional 
samples of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Carney and Gale (2003) 
found that participants who received public assistance were significantly less likely to have 
positive net worth, but they offered no information about whether public assistance discouraged 
those participants from accumulating assets due to asset-tests or whether they received public 
assistance because they could not accumulate assets. However, findings from the Tulsa OK ADD 
suggested that the receipt of food stamps, which is only one type of public assistance, does not 
significantly influence asset accumulation through IDAs (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). That 
result may be due to the more flexible asset-test used by the food stamps assistance program.  
 These different results may be attributed to a few causes. First, studies on the ADD 
examined only one type of public assistance program, and Carney and Gale (2003) examined 
receipts from multiple public assistance programs. Second, the goal of the ADD was to help low-
income people build their assets, and they received assistance in the form of access, information, 
expectations, and incentives to do so. Therefore, it is not surprising that participants tried to save 
and accumulate assets within the boundaries that the asset-tests required. In contrast, Carney and 
Gale (2003) examined people who did not receive that form of assistance and thus were not 
encouraged to save and accumulate assets. Finally, participants who received the opportunity to 
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open IDAs were required to participate in financial education classes that included information 
on balancing their IDAs against the asset-limits of public assistance programs (Schreiner & 
Sherraden, 2007), meaning that they were taught how to accumulate assets through saving in the 
IDA and maintaining eligibility for public assistance.  
Facilitation 
 Facilitation can be defined as any form of assistance that encourages a person to save and 
invest money through an institution. Usually, facilitation includes automatic enrollment into a 
saving plan or automatic or direct deposits into a saving plan or investment action (Beverly et al., 
2008). Sherraden et al. (2003) hypothesized that providing saving facilitation (i.e., making 
saving more manageable and convenient) would increase people’s saving and investment 
actions. In addition, they hypothesized that institutions that provided a more automatic system, 
such as opt-out automatic deposits when a person is automatically registered for a financial plan 
and needs to actively opt out of the plan, would encourage more saving. The positive influence 
of automatic transfers on asset accumulation through savings was demonstrated through the 
ADD. Direct deposits and automatic transfers were significantly related to an increase in the 
likelihood of accumulating assets through an IDA in the Tulsa OK ADD (Schreiner & 
Sherraden, 2007); specifically, families with children who used direct deposits saved $4.69 more 
with their AMNDs compared with families with children that did not use direct deposits (p < .05; 
Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner et al., 2006). However, that amount may not be considered financially 
meaningful.  
 A comprehensive study of more than 2,000 participants from all 14 ADD programs did 
not find a significant influence of automatic deposits on saving performance (Curley et al., 
2009). In addition, the population under study was low-income individuals who may have had 
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only small amounts of surplus money to save after daily consumption. Furthermore, the study 
design provided a low match cap of up to $750 per year (e.g., a person who wanted to receive the 
maximum matching-incentive would have needed to deposit only $62 per month and would not 
have received any match for larger saving amounts). In addition, low, moderate, and high savers 
from the Tulsa OK ADD and SEED reported during in-depth interviews that automatic deposits 
helped them save because it reduced the temptation to spend the money and the barrier to 
physically accessing the bank (Sherraden et al., 2005; Wheeler-Brooks & Scanlon, 2009). 
Wheeler-Brooks and Scanlon (2009) interviewed 30 SEED youth participants from the Juma 
Ventures of San Francisco site. The youth in that study were dependent on their parents to give 
them money or allowances and drive them to the bank, therefore the outcome in that study 
mainly depended on family involvement.  
Expectations 
 Expectations are embodied in the monthly saving target and the social pressure of staff 
and peers in saving programs. For example, the amount of deposits that can earn matching 
incentives, the match cap, creates a target for saving (Beverly et al., 2008). Sherraden et al. 
(2003) reported that many participants who were offered the opportunity to open IDAs tried to 
save the match cap each month. Those expectations may have caused low-income participants to 
save more than they would have otherwise (Sherraden et al., 2003). People who have specific 
savings expectations are more likely to save more money than people who do not (Beverly et al., 
2008).  
 The ADD program provided strong evidence on the relationship between match caps and 
saving behaviors. Participants who were offered the opportunity to open IDAs with higher match 
caps succeeded in saving more money than participants who were offered lower match caps 
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(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2012; Han & Sherraden, 2009; Schreiner et al., 2001; Schreiner & 
Sherraden, 2007). An increase of $1 in the match cap was associated with an increase of $0.57 in 
deposits to savings (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007), and participants offered a match cap of 
$2,250 saved $14.63 more per month compared with participants offered a match cap of $1,500 
or less (Han & Sherraden, 2009). That may mean that participants used the match cap as a goal 
expectation they needed to achieve (Schreiner et al., 2001). Similar evidence was presented for 
SEED youth participants; a $100.00 increase in match cap was associated with a $2.00 increase 
in average quarterly net savings (Mason et al., 2009). However, SEED was not an experiment 
and used a convenience sample, meaning the results were observational and do not represent all 
children in low- and moderate-income families.  
Restrictions 
 Most subsidized savings accounts have restricted access to or use of the savings. For 
example, retirement savings accounts are available only for future usage, after a person has 
retired from work. A common time restriction is that if a person chooses to withdraw the money 
before the set time, he or she will have to pay a penalty (Beverly et al., 2008). Although 
restrictions have negative connotations (Sherraden et al., 2003), they can help people resist the 
temptation to use the money in the savings account and thus guide people to save and invest 
money for future use (Beverly et al., 2008). Savings accounts may have specific restrictions that 
do not allow immediate consumption of the accumulated money; those kinds of restrictions are 
necessary to encourage saving for a specific goal and to protect savings from becoming a flow of 
income for daily consumption (Sherraden, 1991).  
 Participants in the ADD reported, in both quantitative and qualitative studies, that the 
IDA restrictions kept them from withdrawing money for other purposes and that they were 
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helpful for turning down family and/or friend requests for financial help (Moore et al., 2001; 
Sherraden et al., 2005). However, restrictions such as match caps may also interfere with the 
amount of saving, because as soon as people arrive at the match cap, they may postpone 
additional deposits to the savings account. That may happen because there is no longer an 
expectation to save nor an incentive, such as matching amounts, for additional saving (Sherraden 
et al., 2003). 
Security  
 Security refers to “freedom from unreasonable risk in saving and asset holding” (Beverly 
et al., 2008, p. 121). There are two levels of security: micro and macro. Micro security relates to 
the security people have regarding their property and investments. For example, homeowner’s 
insurance can increase feelings of security and reduce the risk of property loss from disasters 
such as theft and catastrophic destruction. Another example can be seen in the security or 
insecurity a person feels about banking. Almost half of the participants in an online survey 
reported that they felt insecure using mobile banking (Gross et al., 2012). Although the sample in 
that survey may have been be biased toward the usage of technology, it is reasonable to believe 
that people who are less technology oriented would be even less trusting and less likely to use 
mobile banking. However, in a cross-sectional study of selected ADD participants, Moore et al. 
(2001) found that the majority reported that their IDAs seemed secure (Moore et al., 2001).  
 Macro security relates to the protection from risks in the political system and the 
financial markets such as a depletion of savings and investments through mismanagement or 
corruption. However, there is only a small financial risk when considering the U.S. economic 
market and political system, and the main threat to asset accumulation is inflation. In general, 
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greater feelings of security in both the micro and the macro levels can shape more positive 
saving behaviors (Beverly et al., 2008).  
 The Relationships Between Intergenerational and Interhousehold Transfers and 
Saving and Investment Actions and Asset Accumulation 
 Intergenerational and interhousehold transfers refer to financial help family members 
provide to other family members during their lives. Bequests refer to the inheritance family 
members leave for other family members, usually offspring, after their death (Beverly et al., 
2008; Gale & Scholz, 1994). Families may support members of the family during hard times, but 
the main reason for saving in the US is the desire to financially support offspring by providing 
them inheritances and/or intergenerational transfers for higher education, down payments for a 
house, seed capital for starting a new business, and so forth (Gale & Potter, 2003; Gale & 
Scholz, 1994; Ploeg, Campbell, Denton, Joshi, & Davies, 2004; Sherraden, 1991). 
Intergenerational transfers can promote saving behaviors if the money is not consumed but 
saved. In addition, providing intergenerational transfers may increase asset accumulation directly 
or indirectly.  
 For example, help with the down payment for a house may enable the purchase of a 
house, which serves as an asset and decreases the total amount of debt people accrue through 
mortgages. In other words, a person who receives financial help to purchase a house may have a 
lower mortgage than a person who does not receive any. In addition, financial help may ensure 
that people can buy a house in a better neighborhood located near a better school system that 
may provide better opportunities for their offspring (Beverly et al., 2008).  
 In a convenience sample of 130 Canadians, 55 years old and older, a house was the main 
purchase by parents for their children (58%) and a trust or an education fund was the main 
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purchase by grandparents for their grandchildren (31%; Ploeg et al., 2004). Some cross-sectional 
studies have found that people who received intergenerational transfers were more likely to 
purchase a house compared with people who did not receive intergenerational transfers (Gale & 
Scholz, 1994; Schoeni, 1997). Those studies used data sets that represent the U.S. population: the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, which is a random sample of 3,824 U.S. households (Gale & 
Scholz, 1994), and the PSID, which is a representative sample of more than 6,000 U.S. 
households (Schoeni, 1997). Despite the fact that both studies were based on old data (i.e., from 
1983, 1986, and 1988), the gap between poor and rich families in the US has grown over the 
years (Oliver & Shapiro, 1995), thus the magnitude of the relationship reported would probably 
be greater today. In addition, a longitudinal study over 25 years using the PSID data set found 
that every inherited dollar contributed $0.91 of wealth for White families and $0.20 of wealth for 
African American families (Shapiro, Meschede, & Osoro, 2013).  
 Although intergenerational transfers are assumed to be a significant source of wealth, the 
majority of the population never receives an inheritance (Wilhelm, 2003; Shapiro et al., 2013). 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the main influence of intergenerational transfers on family 
members’ or offspring’s saving and asset accumulation is from transfers during the giver’s life 
rather than after his or her death.  
The Relationship Between Saving and Investment Actions and Asset Accumulation 
 Beverly et al. (2008) suggest liquid savings, retirement savings, net financial worth, home 
equity, and net worth as four different ways to conceptualize assets. Liquid assets are the sum of 
checking, savings, stocks, funds, and other savings that can be used during a financial 
catastrophe (Huang, 2011). Retirement savings are savings accumulated in the present that can 
be used after retirement and create a more secure financial future (Nam et al., 2008a). Low-
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income households usually do not have access to retirement savings (Cramer et al., 2008). Net 
financial worth is “the total amount of financial resources accumulated as precautionary savings” 
(Nam et al., 2008b) after subtracting unsecured debt. In general, home equity can be considered 
the largest contributor to net worth for American families, and specifically, it is the primary asset 
for low-income families (Beverly et al., 2008). However, it is important to keep in mind that 
although home equity is the asset with the largest financial value for American families, it also 
creates the largest debt (i.e., mortgage). Finally, net worth, which is the most commonly used 
measure of asset accumulation (Nam et al., 2008a), is the difference between everything a person 
owns and everything a person owes (Carasso & McKernan, 2008).  
 People allocate financial resources between saving and consumption (Schreiner et al., 
2001), and saving and investment actions can affect asset accumulation (Beverly et al., 2008). 
Youth who participated in SEED and received the opportunity to open a CDA reported in a 
qualitative study that they were more cautious about withdrawing money and that holding the 
CDA helped them differentiate between needs and wants (Scanlon & Adams, 2009). Those 
youth were sampled from one location in San Francisco based on their saving behavior (low, 
moderate, and high savers); therefore, they cannot be considered a representative sample of any 
other population.  
 Higher consumption causes a decrease in saving, which in turn decreases the income that 
can be allocated between consumption and production in the future (Schreiner et al., 2001). 
Income affects the level of resources available for saving actions (Beverly et al., 2008; Sherraden 
et al., 2003); therefore it is even more essential for poor people who have fewer resources 
available to save which in turn depresses future production, income, and consumption (Barr, 
2012; Schreiner et al., 2001). Low-income individuals experience higher resource scarcity that 
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leads to difficulties with payment for expenses (Shah, Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2012) such that 
people are forced to choose what expenses to spend their money on because they have no 
financial slack (Barr, 2012).  
 Shah et al. (2012) examined that relationship in a lab experiment, wherein participants 
were randomly assigned to receive small or large budgets for a game that reflected the real world 
regarding rewards and borrowing. They found that higher resource scarcity also led to different 
perspectives on problems and decision making, meaning that participants who received small 
budget were more engaged with current financial expenses and those were more urgent for them 
than future expenses. Although the study illustrated the supposed real world, it was still a 
simulation in a lab and participants played for virtual money. Regardless, reducing consumption 
to save for the future may potentially cause harm in the present time (Sherraden et al., 2003). For 
example, Moore et al. (2001) reported the previously discussed finding that almost 20% of 
participants that received the opportunity to open IDAs postponed doctor or dental visits and 
almost 10% gave up food to save more money. However, those participants received the 
institutional incentives through the ADD for a limited time. Therefore, it may be that such 
behaviors are specific to short-term programs and less of a concern for long-term ones.  
 Saving actions include the amount and frequency of deposits but also of withdrawals; 
investment actions include portfolio composition (Beverly et al., 2008). Investment actions are a 
set of choices a person has including principal-protected, interest-bearing accounts and bond 
funds and stocks (Sherraden, 1991). Beverly, Moore McBride, and Schreiner (2003) suggested 
that to accumulate assets, resources need to be converted from “some easy-to-spend form to a 
more difficult-to-spend form” (p. 4), but at the same time individuals need to resist pressures to 
spend their resources and try to maintain their savings to prepare for future needs and 
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investments such as pension, financial hardship, education, a house, and a car (Schreiner & 
Sherraden, 2007).  
 The decision about saving or not saving can also be affected by demographic 
characteristics such as income, race, education, and family size (Grinstein-Weiss, Zhan et al., 
2006). Savings are the product of saving actions; they are a way to accumulate assets (Schreiner 
& Sherraden, 2007). Low-income individuals can and do save for the future (Grinstein-Weiss, 
Wagner et al., 2006; Grinstein-Weiss, Zhan et al., 2006; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Shah et 
al., 2012). However, their savings are usually directed toward specific expenses and not a generic 
account (Shah et al., 2012). Home equity and accumulation in retirement pension accounts are 
the two main forms of assets related to savings (Sherraden, 1991).  
The Relationships Between Asset Accumulation and Health and Psychological Well-Being  
 Asset holding can create long-term financial stability because it provides a financial 
safety net in times of economic hardship. This buffer for the future can increase the feeling of 
security in the present (Sherraden, 1991). In a longitudinal study using the PSID data set, 
Yadama and Sherraden (1996) found a positive effect of assets on individuals’ confidence about 
the future. Specifically for asset-building programs, ADD and SEED participants who received 
the opportunity to open IDAs or CDAs reported more confidence and security about their future 
(Moore et al., 2001; Scanlon and Adams, 2009). Greater economic security can reduce 
individuals’ stress and “people are likely to be happier if they have the additional security of 
asset ownership” (Lerman & McKernan, 2008, p. 197).  
 Lower stress levels can reduce psychological distress and depressive symptom severity, 
and higher stress levels can increase them (Drapeau et al., 2011; Hammen, 2005). At the 3-year 
follow-up for SEED OK, mothers in the treatment group reported significantly fewer depressive 
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symptoms compared with mothers in the control group (Huang et al., 2014). However, at the 4-
year follow-up of Michigan SEED, there were no significant differences in distress levels 
between the treatment and comparison group (Marks et al., 2009). Additionally, orphan youth 
from Uganda who were in the treatment group in the Suubi project had a significant decrease in 
their depressive symptoms between baseline and the 20-month follow-up (Ssewamala et al., 
2012). 
Other studies not related to asset building have found that greater wealth was 
significantly associated with lower psychological distress and lower depressive symptom 
severity. Two longitudinal studies, one conducted in New Zealand (i.e., the Survey of Families, 
Income and Employment) and the other conducted in Australia (i.e., the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey), found that less wealth was significantly associated with 
greater psychological distress compared with higher wealth even after controlling for 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic variables (Carter et al., 2009; Headey & Wooden, 2004). 
Although both studies used representative samples, Headey and Wooden (2004) limited their 
analysis to 25- to 59-year-old participants.  
 Similar results were found in studies that examined minority populations. For Black 
women aged 25 to 55 who participated in a longitudinal investigation of a peer-led dietary 
intervention in the Midwestern US, holding more assets (e.g., home ownership, checking 
accounts) was significantly associated with lower depressive-symptom severity (de Groot et al., 
2003). Cubans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans (Xu, 2011) and South African adults (Myer et al., 
2008) who reported lower wealth reported significantly more psychological distress. Both Xu 
(2011) and Myer et al. (2008) conducted cross-sectional studies. The former study’s participants 
were from the National Latino and Asian American Study, which is a nationally representative 
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community household survey. The latter’s participants were from the South African Stress and 
Health national survey. The main limitation of both studies was that no conclusion about 
causality could be made; in other words, it is not clear if wealth influenced the participants’ 
psychological distress or if their psychological distress influenced wealth. 
 A feeling of economic security in the present can allow a person to plan and think about 
his or her future. Orientation toward the future is an important key in achieving success. People 
who create future goals are more likely to behave in ways that allow them to achieve their goals 
(Sherraden, 1991). That assumption was supported by Yadama and Sherraden (1996), who found 
that people with more assets, which can lead to more economic security, reported significantly 
more protective personal behaviors (i.e., prudence7, efficacy8, horizons9, and connectedness10). 
Protective behaviors can represent behaviors that allow people to achieve their goals, as was 
hypothesized by Sherraden (1991). Although Yadama and Sherraden (1996) used the PSID, 
which is a U.S. representative data set, they were restricted to five specific years (1968–1972) 
because questions about protective personal behaviors were omitted from questionnaires in the 
other years from which data were collected. That may have caused a result not necessarily 
representative of the influence of assets on protective personal behaviors at that current time or 
over longer periods of time.  
 In another study, individuals who were future oriented had a 7% lower chance of 
drinking and a 17% greater chance of exercising than individuals who were not (Chiteji, 2010). 
                                                        
7 Prudence assessed risk avoidance. 
 
8 Efficacy reflected feelings, expectations, and confidence about the future. 
 
9 Horizons referred to future plans such as obtaining a new job, considering having more children, and having 
specific educational goals for children. 
 
10 Connectedness assessed contact with relatives, friends, and/or organizations that could provide information and 
help. 
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Another example is given by the Great Smoky Mountains Study, a longitudinal study that 
became a natural experiment after a gambling casino opened on the Eastern Band of the 
Cherokee Indians’ federal reservation. The casino provided tribal members with additional 
income from the casino’s profits and automatically deposited that income in trust funds for the 
tribe’s children. The children who received that income after the casino opened showed 
significantly fewer psychiatric symptoms at adulthood than non-Cherokee-Indian children who 
did not receive the additional income from the casino (Costello, Erkanli, Copeland, & Angold, 
2010). In addition, both Cherokee Indian and non-Cherokee-Indian children who moved out of 
poverty after receiving income from the casino showed a decrease in their mean number of 
psychiatric symptoms, but there was no change in the children who remained in poverty or those 
who were never in poverty (Costello, Compton, Keeler, & Angold, 2003). Costello et al. (2003) 
and Costello et al. (2010) mentioned several limitations of the study. For example, the 
intervention group (i.e., those who received additional income from the casino) included only 
American Indians while the control group included only non-Hispanic Whites. 
 Another example of the influence of asset accumulation on health was provided by 
Ssewamala et al. (2010) who reported a decrease in risky health-behavior intentions due to an 
increase in savings through a CDA intervention. In that asset-building demonstration project for 
orphans with AIDS in Uganda, 13-year-old children who received the opportunity to open a 
CDA had a significant reduction of 64% in self-reported, sexual, risk-taking intentions compared 
with those who did not receive that opportunity. However, as was mentioned in the previous 
chapter, that study had several limitations.  
 Asset-building programs provide the opportunities to open a matched savings account 
and to receive financial education, both of which can improve health outcomes and 
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psychological well-being. Merely providing the opportunity to receive health insurance can 
improve health outcomes and psychological well-being. For example, the opportunity to apply 
for Medicaid had a significant positive influence on a group of uninsured, low-income 
individuals in Oregon. In 2008, those uninsured, low-income individuals were randomly selected 
to receive the opportunity to apply for Medicaid. The selected participants reported a significant 
improvement in self-reported health, a significant increase in the probability of negative 
screening for depression, and a significant increase in self-reported overall happiness compared 
with participants who were not given the opportunity to enroll in Medicaid (Finkelstein et al., 
2011). Finkelstein et al. (2011) stated that “to put this in perspective, if we compare our 
estimates to the literature on the impact of income on happiness, the impact of insurance [is] 
roughly equivalent to the impact of a doubling of income” (p. 1099). 
 It is important to keep in mind that the relationship between assets and behaviors can be 
reciprocal. Behaviors can influence asset accumulation, but a person with more assets will 
display certain behaviors (Sherraden, 1991). In a qualitative study of youth who participated in 
the SEED national demonstration project, a third of the participants who received the opportunity 
to open a CDA reported that since they had started their participation, they thought more about 
their future and their financial and educational goals (Scanlon & Adams, 2009). That reciprocal 
relationship holds true for health and health behaviors as well. In general, however, it is hard to 
compare the influence of assets on health across the different reviewed studies because different 
components and measures of assets were used (Carasso & McKernan, 2008). 
 In this chapter, I provided an explanation of each component of the asset-building 
theoretical framework (Figure 1) and evidence from the literature about the directional paths 
theorized between those components. The asset-building theoretical framework includes 
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institutional components, individual components, intergenerational transfers, saving and 
investment actions, asset accumulation, and health and psychological well-being components as 
well as the six directional paths theorized between those components. Most studies reported 
significant results on the relationships between those components, and few reported results 
opposite of the theory’s expectations.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Design 
 This study is a longitudinal observational study that examined the asset-building 
theoretical framework (Figure 1) and psychological distress (Figure 2) using six years of data 
from the PSID data set. Figure 2 presents the theoretical model with psychological distress as the 
health outcome using the available observed variables of the PSID data set. The main advantage 
of a longitudinal study is that it helps in establishing temporal order, assessing change over time, 
and making stronger causal interpretations, all of which may increase the power of the study 
(Rajulton, 2001; Shadish et al., 2002).  
 A longitudinal study is appropriate for examining the asset-building theoretical 
framework because it includes information about the same participants over time, which allows 
examination of the influence of different components of the theory over time. The different 
components of the theory are dynamic and can change over time, therefore a cross-sectional 
study can suppress the true causal relationship between them. Although a longitudinal study can 
suffer from high attrition rates, the response rates for the PSID have ranged from 94% to 98% 
between waves, and it has a high response rate for asset questions, which reduces concerns about 
attrition (Ratcliff et al., 2008). 
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Figure 2. Asset-building theoretical framework with psychological distress and the observed 
variables of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. IRA = individual retirement account; SSI = 
Supplemental Security Income; TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. 
 
 
 The PSID was designed to examine the dynamics of poverty in the US (Duncan, 1990). 
The study has been conducted by the Survey Research Center at the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. It began in 1968, and data have 
been collected yearly with a nationally representative sample of over 18,000 individuals living in 
5,000 families in the US. Beginning in 1999, the PSID collected data biennially. In the first five 
years, data collection was conducted by face-to-face interviews (1968-1972); each took about an 
hour to complete. Beginning in 1973, data were collected using telephone interviews that took 
about 30 minutes. For individuals without a telephone, the interview was conducted in a face-to-
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face format. Since 1993, telephone interviews have been conducted with the assistance of 
computer-assisted telephone technology (McGonagle, Schoeni, Sastry & Freedman, 2012).  
 Only one person has been interviewed per family in each wave, usually the head of the 
household. That person has provided information on himself or herself and other family 
members (Duncan, 1990). The head of household (HH) is defined as the individual, 16 years old 
or older, who has the most financial responsibility for the family. However, females who fit that 
definition and have a husband or a boyfriend with whom they have lived for at least one year 
have not been considered HHs; their husbands or boyfriends have instead. That definition can be 
considered a limitation of the PSID. The HH has usually been a male with or without a spouse 
and a female if she has no spouse or boyfriend. Information about the assets of the studied 
individuals and families was collected every five years from 1984 to 1999, and since then it has 
been collected every other year. 
 There are other data sets available for researchers interested in assets and liabilities. 
Ratcliffe et al. (2008) identified 12 data sets that have sufficient information about assets and 
liabilities to test their influence on individuals and/or families. They compared three strong data 
sets: the PSID, the Survey of Consumer Finances (a cross-sectional study), and the SIPP, which 
does not include information on health outcomes. The PSID includes less-detailed questions 
about business equity and other assets compared with the Survey of Consumer Finances, which 
may influence the measures of wealth for very wealthy families. In addition, the PSID includes 
less information about assets and liabilities and a smaller sample size than the SIPP. None of the 
data sets includes information about future social security benefits, which is an important asset 
for the family, but the SIPP can be linked to other administrative data to estimate that value. 
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 The reasons I used the PSID data set were that the PSID is a longitudinal data set that 
represents the U.S. population with an oversampling of low-income families. It has a high 
response rate across waves and estimates missing values based on several different techniques. It 
follows the same families over time; therefore, it allows examination of changes over time. And 
it includes comprehensive information about assets and several health outcomes, meaning that it 
is appropriate for examining the asset-building theoretical framework in relation to a health 
outcome. 
 However, data from the PSID also have limitations. First, although the PSID data set 
includes observed items that allow examination of each component of the asset-building 
theoretical framework, there are known omitted variables not measured in the PSID data set that 
may be essential for testing the asset-building theoretical framework. For example, for 
institutional components, there is no observed item in the PSID data set that represents the 
information a person gets about potential savings accounts and investments. Overall, four 
institutional mechanisms (i.e., information, facilitation, expectations, and restrictions), two 
individual mechanisms (i.e., financial literacy and psychological variables), three saving and 
investment actions mechanisms (i.e., frequency of deposits, withdrawals, and portfolios), and 
one asset mechanism (i.e., net financial worth) are not measured in the PSID data set.  
 Potential bias is possible in the strategy of data collection, specifically the interviewing of 
one person regarding information on HHs, wives, and other family members living in the same 
family unit. In other words, one person per family unit was the interviewee, and that person 
alone provided information on behalf of the other family members.  
 Historically, the PSID has held relatively little information on the health of its study 
population. Prior to the late 1980s, the only data available on health outcomes was information 
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on work limitations (Andreski, McGonagle, & Schoeni, 2009). In addition, psychological 
distress is not available as a measure for both HHs and wives but only for the one family member 
who was the interviewee. On balance, however, the many benefits of the data from the PSID 
mentioned in the previous paragraph outweigh those few limitations. 
Sample Selection 
 Today, more than 37,000 individuals participate in the PSID. The PSID sample includes a 
combination of two independent samples and additional Latino households and immigrant 
families that were added to the PSID in 1990 and 1997, respectively (PSID, 2012). Although the 
oversampled low-income families portion of the study has been dropped since 1997 due to a 
budget cut (Burkhauser, Weathers, & Schroeder, 2006; Ratcliffe et al., 2008), the full sample of 
the PSID still has oversampling of low-income families.  
 The first independent sample came from the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the 
University of Michigan, which is a center involved in interdisciplinary social science research, 
including the collection and analysis of data from scientific sample surveys (SRC, 2013). The 
sample selected by the SRC was a national sample based on a stratified, multistage selection of 
the civilian, non-institutionalized (i.e., individuals who did not live in institutions) population of 
the US in 1968. The strata used to create the weights for each family in the study included the 
source of the sample (i.e., the U.S. representative sample from the SRC, the Survey of Economic 
Opportunity sample, and the additional sample of immigrants from 1997), the age of the HH 
(i.e., < 34 years, 35–54 years, 55+ years), the race of the HH (i.e., Black, Non-Black), and the 
region of residence (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, South, West; Heeringa, Berglund, Khan, Lee, & 
Gouskova, 2011).  
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 The second independent sample came from the Survey of Economic Opportunity 
conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Office of Economic Opportunity, a national 
sample of low-income families whose HHs were under age 60 and from standard metropolitan 
statistical areas or nonstandard metropolitan statistical areas in the Southern region11 (PSID, 
2012). Researchers working on the PSID successfully interviewed 1,872 low-income families 
from the 2,000 families in the Survey of Economic Opportunity sample.  
 The full sample of the PSID in 1968, comprised of the two previously explained 
independent samples, included 4,802 families from 40 states in the US. In addition, the full 
sample included a disproportionately large number of low-income households, which led to a 
large subsample of Blacks. The reason is that the original purpose of the study in 1968 was to 
examine the dynamics of poverty using poor and non-poor participants (Duncan, 1990). The 
sample remained representative of the nation’s families and individuals over the years because it 
followed the original families and individuals who moved away from their original households, 
such as children who started their own households and other individuals who divorced and 
started new households (PSID, 2012).  
Data 
 The PSID collects information at the individual level and the family-unit level. Most of 
the individual-level information is about the HH, which is the male for married-couple families 
but can be either female or male for other family structures, and the wife. Some information is 
collected about all individuals in the family unit. That information includes general health, 
psychological distress, height and weight, health history (e.g., incidence and prevalence of health 
                                                        
11 No information was found regarding the reason the Southern region was selected to include participants from 
non-standard metropolitan statistical areas. 
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outcomes such as heart attack, asthma, high blood pressure), smoking, alcohol consumption, and 
physical activity.  
 This study focused on the 6,295 families from the 2001 wave. Those families were 
followed over six years and provided a total of two waves of data from 2001 and 2007. This 
study examined psychological distress as the health outcome. That specific outcome was selected 
because psychological distress captures a person’s psychological health status that in turn can 
impact a person’s physical health; in addition psychological distress can be sensitive to change 
over short and long periods of time. Health history was not examined as an outcome because 
each one of the outcomes included in that measure can have many other predictors not collected 
by the PSID, and therefore, it could not be controlled. In addition, from the temporality 
perspective, asset accumulation in the present cannot predict a health outcome that occurred in 
the past.  
 Both BMI and general health are appropriate health outcomes. The first is an objective 
measure that reflects a person’s physical health status, and the other is a common measurement 
that can be easy to compare across studies. However, the purpose of this study was to examine 
the asset-building theoretical framework using structural equation modeling (SEM), a statistical 
technique that uses more than two observed variables to create latent variables (e.g., 
psychological distress). Both BMI and general health were measured with a single variable in the 
PSID. The three health behaviors (i.e., smoking, alcohol consumption, and physical activity) 
were not examined as dependent variables because the purpose of this study was to examine the 
asset-building theoretical framework regarding health outcomes and not behaviors. Future 
studies should examine health behaviors as well. 
61 
 Data from two waves of the PSID were used: 2001 and 2007. The main reason to use 
these specific waves was that only those waves included information on wealth and 
psychological distress, which were the primary variables in this study. In addition, those time 
intervals are sufficiently long to capture changes in psychological distress. Psychological distress 
can be sensitive to changes in health outcomes for both a short period of time and a long period 
of time. For example, a decrease in socioeconomic status was significantly related to an increase 
in psychological distress using a three-year interval (Singh-Manoux, Marmot, & Adler, 2005), 
and an increase in the amount of a household’s annual savings was significantly associated with 
increased levels of psychological well-being using a five-year interval (Brown, Taylor, & 
Wheatley Price, 2005).  
 Although there are more updated data in the PSID data set, the data used for this study 
were from before 2008, the year in which a recession occurred in the US, which likely affected 
families’ socioeconomic and asset status. A recession is an economic national crisis that can take 
years to recover from. The asset-building theoretical framework does not take into consideration 
a national crisis like that. Using the years of the recession and those thereafter may present 
opposite results to what the theory proposes regarding asset accumulation. Although it is 
important to examine the effect of the recession on the U.S. population, it is beyond of the scope 
of this study. 
 This study used information aggregated to the family unit. Information about the HHs 
and the wives was used to explain their asset accumulation and psychological distress. 
Information was collected from one individual in each family unit. Psychological distress 
information was collected only for the individual who answered the questionnaire. Thus, in 
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families with a HH and a wife, there is information about psychological distress available only 
for one of them: the study respondent. 
Measurements 
Dependent Variable 
 Psychological distress. Psychological distress was an unobserved phenomenon assessed 
using the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale K6 (K6). This 6-item scale assesses the frequency 
(i.e., all, most, some, a little, and none of the time) of depression and anxiety (i.e., feeling 
nervous, hopeless, restless or fidgety, that nothing could cheer you up, that everything was an 
effort, and worthless) during the last month (Table 1). Individuals were asked to rate the 
frequency of the feelings they had over the last 30 days in the following manner:  
In the past 30 days, about how often did you feel ___ 
 so sad, nothing could cheer you up? 
 nervous? 
 restless or fidgety? 
 hopeless? 
 that everything was an effort?, and 
 worthless?  
 
Participants were asked to rate the frequency of these feelings as “1-All of the time,” “2-Most of 
the time,” “3-Some of the time,” “4-Little of the time,” or “5-None of the time.” Originally, the 
scores range from 0 to 24 (items scores range from 0 to 4), where lower scores present lower 
psychological distress, and serious psychological distress is considered a score of 13 or above 
(Kessler et al., 2002). However, the PSID coding was reversed (i.e. lower scores present higher 
psychological distress) and the scores were coded from 1 to 5. Therefore, serious psychological 
distress was considered a score of 15 or below. 
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Table 1. 
Psychological Distress and Observed Item Numbers 
 Variable  Observed 
Item # 
  HH W 
Psychological 
Distress 
(All of the 
time, Most of 
the time, 
Some of the 
time, Little of 
the time, or 
None of the 
time) 
In the past 30 days, about how often did you feel 
so sad nothing could cheer you up?  
 X59 
 
X67 
In the past 30 days, about how often did you feel 
nervous? 
 X60 X68 
In the past 30 days, about how often did you feel 
restless or fidgety? 
 X61 X69 
In the past 30 days, about how often did you feel 
hopeless? 
 X62 X70 
In the past 30 days, about how often did you feel 
that everything was an effort? 
 X63 X71 
In the past 30 days, about how often did you feel 
worthless? 
 X64 X72 
Note: HH = head of household; W = wife. 
  
 The K6 has performed similarly to the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale K10 (K10). 
They have both demonstrated good precision, in the 90th to 99th percentile range, among the 
U.S. population distribution and across major sociodemographic subsamples (Kessler et al., 
2002). Andrews and Slade (2007) stated that the K10 is preferred over the General Health 
Questionnaire  and the 12-Item Short Form Health Survey measures of psychological distress. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the K6 would also be preferred over those other psychological 
distress measurement tools. 
 The K6 was examined as a latent variable and not as a composite score of its items. A 
summary of the scale’s items provides only one dimension of psychological distress, but using 
each item as an individual path in measurement and structural models allows the presentation of 
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the psychological distress phenomenon in a multidimensional manner. This scale was validated 
in previous studies and demonstrated good internal consistency reliability at .89 as measured by 
Cronbach’s alpha (Kessler et al., 2002; Kessler et al., 2003). In addition, Mitchell and Beals 
(2011) found a satisfactory fit for all 6 items onto one underlying factor, using a one-factor 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
Independent Variables 
 The asset-building theoretical framework includes five latent variables (i.e., institutional 
components, individual components, intergenerational transfers, saving and investment actions, 
and asset accumulation) that directly and/or indirectly influence a latent health outcome (i.e., 
psychological distress). Each latent variable was estimated using available observed items, which 
will be shown in Tables 2 through 6 in this section. 
 The rationale for using the components of the asset-building theoretical framework as 
latent variables was that the items used to generate those latent variables were assumed to be 
caused by the unobserved phenomena (i.e., the latent variable) and that they were assumed to be 
highly correlated as opposed to index items that are not necessarily correlated (Bowen & Guo, 
2012). Previous studies that examined parts of the asset-building theoretical framework using 
SEM analyses have also defined those components as latent. Rothwell and Han (2010) created a 
latent asset variable using three indicators: home value, estimated value of liquid assets, and 
estimated value of retirement savings. In addition, Rothwell and Sultana (2013) created a latent 
variable that identified patterns of cash-flow management and saving. 
 Latent variable of individual components. The latent variable of individual 
components of the asset-building theoretical framework (Figure 1) was based on 25 observed 
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items (Table 2). The individual components had two subcomponents, which were measured by 
those 25 items: economic resources and needs and informal social support.  
 
Table 2. 
Individual Components and Observed Item Numbers 
Subcomponent Variable Observed 
Item # 
Economic 
resources and 
needs 
Current payment for car X11 
Other payment for car X12 
Payment for car repairs X13 
Payment for gasoline X14 
Payment for parking X15 
Payment for fare and train fare X16 
Payment for taxi X17 
Payment for other transportation costs X18 
Cost of child care X19 
How much was spent on food delivered to the door X20 
How much was spent on eating outside X21 
Car insurance X22 
Property taxes X23 
Loan payment for house X24 
Rent payment X25 
Payment for gas and heating X26 
Payment for electricity X27 
Payment for other utilities X28 
Payment for water and sewer X29 
School-related expenses X30 
Other school-related expenses X31 
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Subcomponent Variable Observed 
Item # 
Total amount of other debts such as credit card charges, 
student loans, medical or legal bills, or loans from relatives 
X32 
Social support Received any help from relatives X33 
Received any help from non-relatives X34 
Gave money toward the support of anyone 
who was not living at home 
X35 
 
 Economic resources and needs. Economic resources and needs included the total of 22 
financial expenses. Those financial expenses included payments for cars, transportation, child 
care, food, house and household related bills, school, luxuries, and other expenses. A positive 
value of payments for a car may suggest that the family possesses a car to use for their daily 
transportation needs. 
 Informal social support. Informal social support included two items representing the 
amount of financial help a person received from relatives and non-relatives in the last year and 
one item representing the amount of financial help a person gave to someone not living at home 
in the last year. 
 Latent variable of institutional components. The latent variable of institutional 
components of the asset-building theoretical framework (Figure 1) was based on 10 observed 
items (Table 3). The institutional components had four subcomponents, which were measured by 
the 10 items: access, security, incentives, and asset limits.  
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Table 3.  
Institutional Components and Observed Item Numbers 
Subcomponents Variable Observed 
Item # 
Asset limits Amount from food stamps X1 
Amount of help from the government to pay for heating 
or cooling the house 
X2 
How much money came from TANF X3 
How much money came from SSI X4 
How much money came from other welfare X5 
How much money came from unemployment 
compensation 
X6 
How much money came from child support X7 
Access  Years included in a main or basic pension or retirement 
plan by employer 
X8 
Security  Homeowner insurance premium X9 
Incentives Amount employer contributed to pension X10 
Note. SSI = Supplemental Security Income; TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. 
  
 Access. Access was based on one observed item. It asked how many years a person had 
been included in a main or basic pension or retirement plan by an employer. The range of years 
could be from zero to decades.  
 Security. Security was based on the amount of homeowner insurance premium in dollars 
that a person paid.  
 Incentives. Incentives assessed the amount of dollars an employer contributed to a 
person’s pension.  
 Asset limits. Asset limits included the combined amounts of money received from seven 
welfare assistance programs including food stamps, help from the government to pay for cooling 
and heating a house, TANF, Supplemental Security Income, unemployment compensation, child 
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support, and other welfare assistance. As mentioned before, a use of welfare program assistance 
may cause people not to save in order to meet the welfare program’s assets-test. 
 Latent variable of intergenerational transfers. The latent variable of intergenerational 
transfers of the asset-building theoretical framework (Figure 1) was based on two observed items 
(Table 4) that represent only one subcomponent of the latent variable of intergenerational 
transfers: actual inheritance.  
 
Table 4 
Intergenerational Transfers and Observed Item Numbers 
Subcomponent Variable Observed 
Item # 
Inheritance Amount of inheritance last year X36 
Amount of gifts and inheritances in last five years X37 
 
 Actual inheritance. Actual inheritance included the amount of inheritance and gifts a 
person received in the last year and in the last five years.  
 Latent variable of saving and investment actions. The latent variable of saving and 
investment actions was based on five observed items (Table 5) that represent two subcomponents 
of the latent variable of saving and investment actions: deposits and withdrawals.  
 
Table 5. 
Saving and Investment Actions and Observed Item Numbers 
Subcomponent Variable Observed 
Item # 
Deposits How much money was put aside in any private annuities 
or IRAs 
X38 
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Subcomponent Variable Observed 
Item # 
How much money was put into stocks, mutual funds, or 
investment trusts 
X39 
Amount voluntarily contributed to pension or retirement X40 
Withdrawals  How much cash was taken from any part of a pension, 
private annuity, or IRA 
X41 
How much cash was taken from stocks, mutual funds, or 
investment trusts 
X42 
Amount from the sale of any shares of stock in publicly 
held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts 
X43 
Note. IRA = individual retirement account. 
 Deposits. Deposits included the amount in dollars a person put aside for private annuities 
or IRAs, stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts, and pension or retirement accounts.  
 Withdrawals. Withdrawals included the amount in dollars a person took in cash from 
pensions, private annuities or IRAs, stocks, mutual funds, or investment trusts and any sales from 
shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts. 
 Latent variable of asset accumulation. Wealth measures, which represent assets, are 
generally more complicated and difficult to measure compared with income. The assessment of 
wealth depends on time, taxes, and locale and it can be difficult to value. Study participants 
sometimes do not remember the value of each asset they own or they do not want to share that 
information with others because it is private (Pollack et al., 2007). In addition, wealth measures 
are usually not scales; rather, they are a sum of assets or a sum of values of assets that a person 
owns. Considering assets a latent variable that needs to be measured by several observed items, 
the reliability of such a measure relates to the proportion of variance attributed to the true score 
of assets (Cohen, Cohen, West, Aiken, 2003; Devellis, 2003). The latent variable of asset 
accumulation was based on 13 observed items (Table 6) that represent four subcomponents of 
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the latent variable of asset accumulation: liquid savings, retirement savings, net worth, and home 
equity.  
 
Table 6. 
 Asset Accumulation and Observed Item Numbers 
Subcomponent Variable Observed 
Item # 
Retirement 
savings 
Amount in private annuities or IRA X44 
Amount in pension X45 
Amount rolled over to IRA X46 
Amount in pension from former employer X47 
Home equity Home value minus principle of mortgage X48 
Amount from sale of home used as main dwelling, not 
including sale commissions and costs 
X49 
Amount from sale of other real estate X50 
Amount put into buying any real estate other than main 
home 
X51 
Amount put into additions or improvements of home or 
real estate 
X52 
Net worth Value of bond funds, a life insurance policy, a collection 
for investment purposes, or rights in a trust or estate minus 
debt 
X53 
Value of second house minus debt X54 
Value of all vehicles minus debt X55 
Value of farm minus debt X56 
Amount invested in stock in publicly held corporations, 
mutual funds, or investment trusts minus anything owed 
on it 
X57 
Liquid savings Amount in checking or savings accounts, money market 
funds, certificates of deposit, government savings bonds, 
or Treasury bills 
  X58 
Note. IRA = individual retirement account. 
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 Liquid savings. Liquid savings included the sum of dollars in checking or savings 
accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposit, government savings bonds, and Treasury 
bills. A positive or negative amount in a checking or savings accounts may suggest that those 
families had a bank account, indicating bank account ownership. 
 Retirement savings. Retirement savings included the sum of dollars in pensions, pensions 
from a former employer, and amount of savings rolled over to an IRA.  
 Net worth. Net worth included the dollar value of a primary and secondary home, 
vehicles, farm, and business and stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment 
trusts minus debts.  
 Home equity. Home equity included home value and the amount of money spent on 
additions or improvements to the home. A positive or negative value given for home value may 
suggest that those families owned a home, and thus possessed homeownership. 
Control Variables  
 This study included four groups of control variables that may have influenced asset 
accumulation and psychological distress (Table 7).  
 
Table 7. 
Control Variables for Head of Household (HH), Wife (W), and Family Items 
Groups Variables Description in PSID Item 
HH W 
Individual and 
sociodemographic 
Age Age in years ξ6 ξ7 
Race White, Black, Native American, Asian, 
Pacific Islander, or another race 
ξ9 ξ10 
Gender Male or female ξ8  
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Groups Variables Description in PSID Item 
  Family 
Family size Number of persons in FU at the time of 
the interview 
ξ16 
Family 
composition 
Number of persons in the FU under 18 
years of age 
ξ17 
Marital 
status 
Married, Never married, 
Widowed, Divorced/Annulled, Separated 
ξ19 
Socioeconomic  Income Sum of income from wages and salary, 
farming, other farming or market 
gardening, businesses, professional 
practices or trades, roomers or boarders, 
rent, dividends, interest, trust funds, 
Social Security, Veteran’s 
Administration, retirement pensions, 
annuities, workers’ compensation, 
alimony or separate maintenance, big 
settlement from an insurance company, 
and other 
ξ18 
  HH W 
Education Less than high school, graduate from 
high school, GED, or college degree 
ξ11 ξ12 
Occupation 3-digit occupation code from 1970 
Census of Population: Not Working, 
Professional/Technical and Kindred 
Workers, Managers and Administrators, 
Sales Workers, Clerical and Kindred 
Workers, Craftsman and Kindred 
Workers, Operatives, Transport 
Equipment Operatives, Laborers, 
Farmers and Farm Managers, Farm 
Laborers and Farm Foremen, Service 
Workers, Private Household Workers 
ξ4 ξ5 
Health-related 
 
 
Chronic 
illnesses 
Had any of the following illnesses 
(yes/no): stroke, high blood pressure, 
diabetes, cancer, chronic lung disease, 
heart attack, coronary heart disease, 
psychiatric problem, arthritis, asthma, 
and permanent loss of memory or mental 
ability 
ξ13 ξ14 
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Groups Variables Description in PSID Item 
  Family 
Health 
insurance  
Health insurance coverage during the last 
year: no, yes, Medicare or Medicaid 
ξ15 
Statistical variables Imputed 
values 
Had any imputed value for independent 
variables (yes/no) 
 ξ20 
Wife in FU Whether there was a wife in the FU ξ21 
Note: FU = family unit; GED = general equivalency diploma, PSID = Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
 
 Individual and sociodemographic variables. The first group was individual and 
sociodemographic variables that included age, race, gender, family size, family composition, and 
marital status. Older age has been significantly related to higher household net worth (Carasso & 
McKernan, 2008; Carney & Gale, 2003) and asset accumulation through IDAs in the ADD 
program (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). However, mixed results have been reported for the 
relationship between age and psychological distress. Some studies found no significant 
association (Myer et al., 2008; Xu, 2011), and others reported a significant association, but with 
different directions for that relationship. Some found that older people had higher levels of 
psychological distress compared with younger people (Headey & Wooden, 2004; Pirraglia et al., 
2011), and others reported the opposite (i.e., older people had lower levels of psychological 
distress compared with younger people; Carter et al., 2009; G. Kim, Bryant, & Parmelee, 2012). 
Compared with White families, non-White or Hispanic families held significantly fewer assets 
and had less net worth (Carasso & McKernan, 2008; Carney & Gale, 2003) and higher levels of 
psychological distress (G. Kim et al., 2011; Pirraglia, Hampton, Rosen, & Witt, 2011). Women 
had significantly lower net worth (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007) and reported greater psychological 
distress compared with men (Carter et al., 2009; Headey & Wooden, 2004; G. Kim et al., 2011; 
Pirraglia et al., 2011; Xu, 2011).  
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 Although family size standardizes income and assets across families (Liberatos et al., 
1988), Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006) found no significant difference in the net worth of 
households with and without children, though Smith and Ward (1980) found a negative influence 
of family size on asset accumulation only when children were born early in a marriage. Couples 
with children reported significantly lower psychological distress compared with sole parents or 
those not in a family nucleus12 (Carter et al., 2009). Finally, married couples held significantly 
more assets, had higher net worth (Carney & Gale, 2003; Carasso & McKernan, 2008) and 
reported significantly less psychological distress (G. Kim et al., 2011; Pirraglia et al., 2011). 
 Socioeconomic variables. The second group of control variables was socioeconomic 
variables that included income, education, and occupation. As was discussed in Chapter 1, higher 
income has been significantly related to higher household net worth (Carney & Gale, 2003), but 
it has not been significantly related to asset accumulation through IDAs in the ADD (Schreiner 
& Sherraden, 2007). It is important to hold family income constant because it provides an 
independent influence of asset accumulation on health outcomes. In addition, higher income has 
been significantly related to less psychological distress (Carter et al., 2009; G. Kim et al., 2011; 
Pirraglia et al., 2011). More years of education have also been significantly related to higher 
household net worth (Carasso & McKernan, 2008; Carney & Gale, 2003; Zagorsky, 2005) and 
less psychological distress (G. Kim et al., 2011; Pirraglia et al., 2011; Xu, 2011). Finally, 
compared with higher occupational statuses, a lower occupational status has been significantly 
related to lower net worth (Oliver & Shapiro, 1995).  
 Compared with employed individuals, unemployed individuals have reported 
significantly greater psychological distress (Carter et al., 2009). In some cases, income, 
education, and occupation were not significantly associated with psychological distress; those 
                                                        
12 Carter et al. (2009) did not provide a definition to this term 
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cases have included specific races or after holding other socioeconomic variables constant 
(Headey & Wooden, 2004; G. Kim et al., 2011; Xu, 2011). 
 Health-related variables. The third group was health-related variables that included the 
prevalence, answered by yes or no, of any chronic illnesses such as stroke, high blood pressure, 
diabetes, cancer, chronic lung disease, heart attack, coronary heart disease, psychiatric problems, 
arthritis, asthma, and permanent loss of memory or mental ability that could influence 
psychological distress. In addition, health insurance coverage during the last year (indicated by a 
Yes, No, Medicare, or Medicaid answer) was controlled, because lack of insurance can cause 
high expenses in cases of acute or chronic illness, which can jeopardize the ability to save and 
accumulate assets (Beverly et al., 2008) and reduce health-care utilization due to the high 
expenses it generates. The PSID provides information about health insurance for anyone in the 
family unit and not individually for each member of the family unit. Therefore, health insurance 
was considered a family control variable that could influence asset accumulation and the 
psychological distress of HHs and wives. 
 Statistical variables. The last group of control variables included two dichotomous 
variables: the first indicated if a participant had any imputed values in the independent variables 
and was added to control for the influence of missing values imputed by the PSID, and the 
second indicated whether a family unit included a wife or not. The later was added to control for 
missing data due to the absence of a wife in the family unit. 
Missing Data 
 Although missing data is a problem in every type of study, for a longitudinal study, the 
issue can be more complicated. The PSID, however, has had a high response rate over the years 
and low item-nonresponse rates (Ratcliffe et al., 2008). The PSID user’s guide suggests using 
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appropriate sampling weights or multiple imputation methods to deal with missing data (PSID, 
2012).  
 In addition, the PSID imputes missing values for some variables such as wealth, income, 
and employment (Duffy, 2011; PSID, 2012). For example, the PSID imputed missing values of 
wealth variables for 347 families (4.7%) in the 2001 family data set (PSID, 2003) and 353 
families (4.3%) in the 2007 family data set (PSID, 2009). Each missing value received one 
imputed value calculated by the PSID using several imputation strategies, and each missing 
value was imputed using more than one imputation strategy (Duffy, 2011). Those strategies 
included using (a) other data that were collected in the PSID, (b) inflation-adjusted wealth values 
from previous waves of the PSID, (c) mean group replacement, (d) hotdeck replacement, and (e) 
median replacement (Duffy, 2011).  
Sampling Weights 
 Although the number of low-income families in the PSID was reduced in 1997, there is 
still oversampling of this population in the PSID data set. Therefore, there was a need to account 
for sample weights in the analyses. The PSID provides users with a variable that includes the 
weight for each year at the individual and family level. The PSID uses division into strata as the 
first step for obtaining the individual weight, and after obtaining the individual weight, family 
weight is calculated as the average of the individual weights of the family members. The variable 
of family weight was used in all of this study’s analyses to address the sample weight. 
Analytic Plan 
 First, descriptive statistics were provided for the dependent variable, independent 
variables, and control variables. Second, bivariate analyses were conducted to examine the 
relationships between psychological distress and control variables and between specific control 
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variables. The third analysis was a separate measurement model for each of the latent variables 
with psychological distress; each model included the psychological distress of the HHs and the 
psychological distress of the wives with only one latent variable at a time. Fourth, a composite 
measurement model of the entire asset-building theoretical framework, including all latent 
variables simultaneously, was developed. Fifth, an asset-building, theory-based SEM analysis 
that simultaneously examined the direct and indirect relationships among exogenous13 and 
endogenous14 predictors and psychological distress was performed in addition to the inclusion of 
control variables as exogenous predictors of psychological distress. The fit of the data to the 
theory was examined, and when the fit was not sufficient, in some cases, modification indices 
(MIs) were used. Sixth, after obtaining a good fit for the cross-sectional SEM of the first wave, a 
longitudinal SEM was conducted using the first-wave-modified, cross-sectional SEM model for 
the two waves.  
 Descriptive statistics and bivariate analyses were performed using SAS software version 
9.3 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC), and measurement and structural models were tested using Mplus 
version 6.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2011). Significance was set at p < .001 for the bivariate 
analyses to adjust for the large sample size and p < .05 for measurement and structural models. 
Bivariate Analyses  
 The relationships between control variables and psychological distress were examined 
using bivariate analyses of the first wave. The type of bivariate analysis to use can be determined 
by the type of expressed units of the outcome variable (i.e., continuous, dichotomous, or more 
than two categories) and the type of each control variable (Cohen et al., 2003). Assuming 
psychological distress was normally distributed among the representative population under 
                                                        
13 A variable that is not explained by any other variables. 
 
14 A variable that is explained or predicted by one or more variables. 
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study, dichotomous control variables (i.e., gender, prevalence of chronic illnesses, and imputed 
values) were tested using a two-sample t-test. Categorical control variables that had more than 
two levels (i.e., education, occupation, marital status, race, and health insurance coverage in this 
study) were tested using one-way analyses of variances, and the continuous variables (i.e., 
income, age, and family size) were tested using a simple linear regression that examined the 
linear relationship between health outcomes and the continuous control variables. A quadratic 
term for each continuous control variable was tested in a multiple linear regression to avoid 
misleading results due to a non-linear relationship between health outcomes and any of the 
continuous predictors (Allison, 1999).  
Measurement Model Analysis  
 Separate measurement models for each latent variable with psychological distress. 
For the first wave of this study, the 2001 data, separate measurement models were developed to 
examine the magnitude and significance of the effect a latent variable had on the observed items 
(the paths referred to as lambda [λ]) and the correlation (referred to as phi [φ]) between each 
latent variable and psychological distress (Figure 3). In other words, a separate measurement 
model was constructed for psychological distress with each latent variable. Each observed item 
had an error term (referred to as delta [δ]) that influenced the observed item and represented the 
measurement error of each item. Standardized scores for all variables were used, therefore the 
paths between observed items and error terms were fixed at 1 (Bowen & Guo, 2012). Because 
these models included only a correlation between the latent variables and psychological distress, 
latent variables and psychological distress were considered exogenous (referred as xi [ξ]). In 
addition, the path loading between one observed item for each latent variable was fixed at 1 to 
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“set a metric for the latent variable . . . for the scaling of the error variance and for identification 
purposes” (Bowen & Guo, 2012, p. 83). 
Using a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) was appropriate to test the fit of the data 
to the separate measurement models, because it handles continuous data, large sample sizes 
(Bowen & Guo, 2012), and the use of MIs to modify the models. Modification indices suggest 
additional paths that can be added to the model to improve its fit (Bowen & Guo, 2012).  
 To evaluate the fit of the data to the measurement models, several fit indices were used: 
the chi-square distribution (χ2), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA; Dimitrov, 2010). Although the comparative fit index is “an incremental 
fit index that measures the relative improvement in the fit of the researcher’s model over that of a 
baseline model” (Kline, 2011, p. 208), it is always higher than the TLI (Kenny, 2014); therefore 
only the TLI was used in this study. The TLI accounts for the expected χ2 of the target model that 
assumes a central χ2 distribution (Kaplan, 2009), and the RMSEA measures the discrepancy 
between the implied and the observed variance–covariance matrix (Bowen & Guo, 2012). The 
data were assumed to fit the model when the χ2 estimated value was low and the p-value was 
greater than .05 (Hoyle, 1995), the obtained TLI was greater than 0.90; and the obtained RMSEA 
was lower than 0.06 (Dimitrov, 2010). Because the sample size of this study was large (n = 6,925 
families), it was assumed that the χ2 value would be large and significant, meaning that the data 
would not fit the model considering the χ2 value. However, the χ2 is known to be sensitive to 
large sample sizes, so the other fit indices should be used as well (Bowen & Guo, 2012).  
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Figure 3. Separate measurement models for the latent variables of the asset-building theoretical framework and 
psychological distress. HH = heads of households; W = wives; x# = item number, the definitions of which can be 
found in the following locations within this dissertation: x1–x10 in Table 3, x11–x35 in Table 27, x36–x37 in Table 
4, x38–x43 in Table 5, x44–x58 in Table 6, and x59–x72 in Table 1. 
c) Measurement model for saving and investment actions 
and 
psychological 
distress 
e) Measurement model for institutional components 
and psychological distress 
d) Measurement model  
for intergenerational  
transfers and 
 psychological  
distress 
b) Measurement model 
for asset  
accumulation and 
psychological 
distress 
a) Measurement model for individual 
components and psychological 
distress 
81 
 The latent variables in this study were not constructed scales but a group of observed 
items expected to load on the latent variables. Therefore, the correlation between some of the 
items may not have been high. According to Kenny (2014), the TLI relies on the average size of 
the correlations between variables in the data, but whenever the average correlation is not high, 
the TLI will not be high either. To examine the contribution of the independent variables to the 
model more directly, many control variables were added in the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
models. Although the addition of these control variables was important to detect the contribution 
of the independent variables to the model, their addition may have caused a lower correlation 
between the variables and statistically reduced the value of the TLI. To examine that possibility, 
Kenny (2014) suggested examining the RMSEA for the null model, a model that includes all 
relevant variables but no correlations between them at all. A value of .158 suggests that the 
RMSEA of the examined model is .05 and the TLI of the examined model is .90. In case the 
RMSEA of the null model is smaller than .158, the TLI of the examined model will be less than 
.90 and may not be informative.  
 Composite measurement models. Next, using the modified separate measurement 
models explained previously, a composite measurement model was estimated for the first wave 
of this study (2001 data; Figure 4). This model examined the strength and significance of the 
correlations (φ) between all the latent variables. It included observed items that loaded on the six 
latent variables (i.e., institutional components, individual components, intergenerational 
transfers, saving and investment actions, asset accumulation, and psychological distress) and the 
correlations between these six latent variables. No control variables were added to the model 
(Bowen & Guo, 2012). Figure 4 illustrates the asset-building theory based on the composite 
measurement model for the psychological distress of HHs and wives. Again, just as in the 
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separate measurement models, all latent variables were considered exogenous (ξ), the path 
loading (λ) between one observed item for each latent variable was fixed at 1, each observed 
item had an error term (δ), and the paths between observed items and error terms was fixed at 1. 
 This model allowed a test of the hypothesized relationships among the variables because 
it was over-identified (df = 2463), meaning that the number of parameters to be estimated, a total 
of 165 from the sums of 7ξ + 21φ + 72δ + 65λ for psychological distress, was lower than the 
number of unique pieces of information, a total of 2628 arrived at from the equation of 72 
observed items × [(1 + 72 observed items) ÷ 2] (Bowen & Guo, 2012; Hoyle, 1995). The 
estimated coefficients of the direct relationships between observed items and latent variables 
were interpreted as regression coefficients in multiple regressions (Kline, 2011) and considered 
significant at p < .05. Again, an MLE was appropriate to test the fit of the data to the full 
measurement model, using the same fit indices that were mentioned previously (i.e., χ2, TLI, and 
RMSEA). The null hypothesis was that the observed covariance of the population under study 
would not significantly differ from the covariance of the parameter estimates of the measurement 
model (Bowen & Guo, 2012). In the case of a non-good fit, modifications such as removing 
loading paths were conducted based on MIs and the asset-building theoretical framework.
  
Figure 4. The composite measurement model of the asset-building theoretical framework for psychological distress. HH = head of 
household; W = wife; x# = item number, the definitions of which can be found in the following locations within this dissertation: x1–
x10 in Table 3, x11–x35 in Table 27, x36–x37 in Table 4, x38–x43 in Table 5, x44–x58 in Table 6, and x59–x72 in Table 1. 
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Cross-Sectional Structural Equation Modeling Analysis 
 To simultaneously examine direct and indirect effects, correlations, and the reciprocal 
relationship of the latent variables and the observed control variables, SEM was performed on 
data from the 2001 PSID (Bowen & Guo, 2012). Figure 5 summarizes the asset-building 
theoretical framework, which represents a set of regression equations with causal diagrams 
(Allison, 1999) and relationships between latent and control variables. To make this figure 
clearer, it excludes the measurement model (i.e., δ, λ, and ε), but that was taken into account in 
the analysis. Three latent variables (i.e., individual components, institutional components, and 
intergenerational transfers) were considered exogenous (i.e., ξ) predictors of the latent variable 
of saving and investment actions, meaning they were not explained by other variables in the 
model (Bowen & Guo, 2012). Although the exogenous latent variables were not explained by 
other variables in the model, they were assumed to be correlated with each other (Bowen & Guo, 
2012).  
 Saving and investment actions, asset accumulation, and psychological distress were 
considered endogenous latent variables (referred to as eta [η]), meaning they were predicted by 
other variables in the model (Bowen & Guo, 2012). Each of the endogenous latent variables had 
a structural error term (referred to as zeta [ζ]). The error term could have influenced the 
endogenous latent variables, and the path between them was fixed at 1 because the variance of 
the structural error term was the parameter of interest (Bowen & Guo, 2012). 
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Figure 5. Cross-sectional structural equation modeling for the asset-building theoretical 
framework and psychological distress. CI = chronic illness; Edu = education; FC = family 
composition; FS = family size; HH = head of household; HI = health insurance; IV = imputed 
values; MS = marital status; Ocp = occupation; Q = quadratic term; W = wife; WYN = wife 
yes/no in the family unit.  
 
 The main hypothesis of this study was about the fit of the data to the model. The null 
hypothesis was that the observed covariance of the population under study would not 
significantly differ from the covariance of the parameter estimates of the path model (Bowen & 
Guo, 2012). In addition, the significance and magnitude of all the direct and indirect hypotheses 
of both independent and control variables, which were described in Chapter 1, were examined. 
 This model estimated the direct effect between the three exogenous predictors of the 
latent variable of saving and investment actions and the direct effect between the latent variable 
of intergenerational transfers and the latent variable of asset accumulation (referred to as gamma 
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[γ]), and the direct effect between endogenous latent variables (referred to as beta [β]) such as 
the path between the latent variable of saving and investment actions and the latent variable of 
asset accumulation, the path between the latent variable of asset accumulation and psychological 
distress, and the reciprocal path between psychological distress and the latent variable of asset 
accumulation.  
 Indirect paths were examined between the three exogenous latent variables and the latent 
variable of asset accumulation through the latent variable of saving and investment actions, and 
between the three exogenous latent variables and psychological distress through the latent 
variable of saving and investment actions and the latent variable of asset accumulation. Another 
examined indirect path was between the latent variable of saving and investment actions and 
psychological distress through the latent variable of asset accumulation.  
 Because psychological distress is the outcome variable, the measurement error terms of 
the observed items that the latent psychological distress variable predicted were marked as 
epsilon (ε) instead of delta (δ); however, they are not presented in Figure 5.  
 Direct effects are the estimated coefficients of paths between exogenous or endogenous 
latent variables and endogenous latent variables (Raudenbush & Sampson, 1999). The indirect 
effect is a mediation of an exogenous predictor on an outcome through an endogenous predictor 
(Bowen & Guo, 2012). Indirect effects can be calculated by multiplying the estimated 
coefficients of paths between predictor latent variables to the mediator latent variables and paths 
between the mediator latent variables to the dependent latent variables (Raudenbush & Sampson, 
1999). For example, three estimated coefficients were multiplied to calculate the indirect effect 
of the latent variable of institutional components on psychological distress. The estimated 
coefficient of the path between the latent variable of institution to the latent variable of saving 
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investment actions was multiplied with the estimated coefficient of the path between the latent 
variable of saving and investment actions to the latent variable of asset accumulation, and the 
product of those equations was multiplied with the estimated coefficient of the path between the 
latent variable of asset accumulation and psychological distress. 
 There are many individual factors such as race, gender, age, sociodemographic factors 
(e.g., family size, marital status), and socioeconomic factors (e.g., income, education level, and 
occupation) that are known to have a significant relationship with health outcomes. In addition, 
differences in health outcomes may account for differential effects of socioeconomic status by 
individual factors such as age, race, and gender (Duncan, Daly, McDonough, & Williams, 2002). 
For example, House, Kessler, and Herzog (1990) summarized different studies that examined the 
influence of socioeconomic status and health outcomes in relation to age. They found that higher 
socioeconomic groups experienced less morbidity and fewer functional limitations compared 
with lower socioeconomic groups and that morbidity and functional limitations increased 
steadily throughout middle and early old age. Therefore, an examination of the interactions 
between socioeconomic status, race, and gender needed to be performed (Williams, 1996).  
 Most of these factors may also affect asset accumulation. In addition, sociodemographic 
and socioeconomic factors should be examined and interpreted using intersectionality theory. 
Intersectionality theory implies that gender should be examined not as a single analytic frame but 
in combination with factors like race, migration status, history, and social class (Samuels & 
Ross-Sheriff, 2008). In summary, health outcomes can be influenced by socioeconomic, 
sociodemographic, and individual factors and the interaction between gender and race. Also, 
individual factors can moderate the influence of socioeconomic factors on health outcomes. An 
interaction term between race and gender was added to the model to examine its effect on asset 
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accumulation and psychological distress (Figure 6). In case the fit of the model was not 
becoming significantly worse, considering the changes in the chi-square value and the degrees of 
freedom (df), the interaction term would be included in the final model.  
 
 
Figure 6. Moderation of race and gender on the cross-sectional structural equation modeling for 
the asset-building theoretical framework and psychological distress. CI = chronic illness; Edu = 
education; FC = family composition; FS = family size; HH = head of household; HI = health 
insurance; IV = imputed values; MS = marital status; Ocp = occupation; Q = quadratic term; W 
= wife; WYN = wife yes/no in the family unit.  
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 The structural model allowed a test of the hypothesized relationships among the variables 
because it was over-identified, 113 df, meaning the number of parameters to be estimated, a total 
of 97 arrived at from the sum of 28ξ + 4η + 55γ + 5β + 4ζ + 1φ, was fewer than the number of 
unique pieces of information, a total of 210 arrived at from the equation of  20 observed control 
items and latent variables × [(1 + 20 observed items and latent variables) ÷ 2] (Bowen & Guo, 
2012; Hoyle, 1995).  
 Again, as in the measurement model, the estimated coefficients between endogenous and 
endogenous variables were interpreted as regression coefficients in multiple regressions (Kline, 
2011) and direct and indirect paths were examined and considered significant for p < .05. A 
MLE was used to test the fit of the data to the structural model, using the same fit indices that 
were discussed previously (i.e., χ2, TLI, and RMSEA). In case the data did not have a sufficient 
fit to the model, a modification of the model would be performed based on the three Byrne, 
Shavelson, and Muthen (1989) conditions: the changes should be theoretically based, minor, and 
cause no significant changes in other items in the model. Using MIs, modifications such as 
removing or adding paths were done based on the data but also following the theory.  
Longitudinal Structural Equation Modeling Analysis 
 A longitudinal analog of the modified cross-sectional model was used to test the asset-
building theoretical framework over six years, using two time points of 2001 and 2007. Figure 7 
presents this longitudinal model, but for clarity, only path coefficients (γ and β) and structural 
errors (ζ) are included. Each time point included all paths that were examined in the cross-
sectional SEM. Paths were added between each latent variable from Time 1 to its corresponding 
latent variable in Time 2. In addition, paths were added between latent variables from Time 1 
and their hypothesized outcomes in Time 2.  
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Figure 7. Longitudinal structural equation modeling of the asset-building theoretical framework 
and psychological distress. CI = chronic illness; Edu = education; FC = family composition; FS = 
family size; HH = head of household; HI = health insurance; IV = imputed values; MS = marital status; 
Ocp = occupation; Q = quadratic term; W = wife; WYN = wife yes/no in the family unit.  
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 For example, the latent variable of institutional components in Time 1 predicted the latent 
variables of institutional components in Time 2 and saving and investment actions in Time 2. 
Paths between the exogenous latent variables in Time 1 and exogenous and endogenous latent 
variables in Time 2 were marked with gamma (γ), and all other cross-time paths were considered 
as paths between endogenous and endogenous latent variables and were marked as beta (β). 
Once again, the null hypothesis was that the data would fit the model, and an MLE was 
appropriate to use to test the fit of the data to the longitudinal structural model, using the same fit 
indices that were mentioned before (i.e., χ2, TLI, and RMSEA). In the case of a non-good fit, 
potential modifications such as removing or adding paths were examined according to the theory 
and using MIs. 
Power Analysis 
 In running an SEM analysis, a power analysis is required to determine whether the study 
has adequate power to reject a false hypothesis (Bowen & Guo, 2012). To determine the power 
of this study, three components needed to be fixed: sample size, df, and effect size. The PSID 
provided a fixed number of families (N = 6,295), and the identification of the models as 
measurement and structural provided a fixed number of df (2463 df and 113 df, respectively). 
The effect size of the study was determined using the RMSEA (Bowen & Guo, 2012). In 
general, the power of a study is influenced by sample size in relation to the df; because this study 
has more than 100 df and more than 500 participants, the power is essentially 100% 
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996).  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULT 
 This chapter presents the analyses of this study. First, descriptive statistics will be 
provided regarding the study sample, sociodemographic information, independent, dependent, 
and control variables. Second, the results for each separate measurement model for the 
independent latent variables will be described. Third, a composite measurement model will be 
examined. Fourth, a cross-sectional model that includes all control variables will be tested using 
SEM. Fifth, a longitudinal model will be described. In the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
analyses, direct and indirect hypotheses will be presented. In addition, in the longitudinal 
analysis, expected paths over time will be reported. All analyses will be provided with and 
without sampling weights.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 This section describes the study sample, followed by sociodemographic information on 
the HHs, wives, or family-level variables (e.g., annual family income, number of people in the 
family unit, number of children in the family unit). Next, information about the independent 
variables is presented followed by information about psychological distress, the dependent 
variable, for HHs and wives. Finally, control variables are explored.  
Study Sample 
 This study focused on 6,295 families represented by 9,634 participants who were 
considered HHs or wives in 2001. The original sample included 27,778 participants over the two 
time points, but only 11,873 were considered HHs or wives in 2001, and only 81.1% (n = 9,634) 
had information at the two time points. There were 3,721 (59.1%) families in which the HH was 
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male and there was a wife in the family unit. In 1,789 (28.4%) families, the HH was a female, 
and in the rest of the families (n = 785, 12.5%), there was a male HH without a wife.  
Sociodemographic Information 
 Tables 8 and 9 display sociodemographic information on HHs, wives, and families in this 
study. The mean age of participants was 44.1 (± 15.1) for HHs and 42.5 (± 13.4) for wives, and 
their mean numbers of years of education were 12.9 (± 2.8) and 13.1 (± 2.6), respectively. About 
half of the HHs were married (54.6%). The majority of HHs and wives were White (60.6% and 
70%, respectively), and the minority of both did not work for money (21.8% and 31.9%, 
respectively). Families in this study had 1 to 13 (mean = 2.8 ± 1.5) people in the family unit, and 
the number of children in the family unit ranged between 0 and 9 (mean = 0.9 ± 1.2). The mean 
total family taxable income was $53,883 (± $76,841). It was not normally distributed, and it was 
positively skewed (Figure 8). The average wage was $31,665 (± $41,117) for HHs and $19,876 
(± $32,261) for wives. Other descriptive statistics of the components of total family income are 
presented in Table 10.  
 
Table 8. 
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Sociodemographic Variables 
Continuous sociodemographic 
variables 
n Mean (SD) Min. Max. 
Age of HHs 6,292 44.1 (15.1) 17 96 
Age of wives 3,719 42.5 (13.4) 17 88 
Education of HHs 5,949 12.9 (2.8) 0 17 
Education of wives 3,439 13.1 (2.6) 0 17 
Number of people in the FU 6,295 2.8 (1.5) 1 13 
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Continuous sociodemographic 
variables 
n Mean (SD) Min. Max. 
Number of children in the FU 6,295 0.9 (1.2) 0 9 
Number of children in the FU for 
families with children 
3,076 1.9 (1.0) 1 9 
Total family taxable incomea ($) 6,295 
53,883.3 
(76,840.7) 59,948 
2,112,300 
Note. FU = family unit; HH= Heads of the household; Max. = maximum; Min. = minimum; SD = standard 
deviation. 
 
aCalculated by the PSID and includes family incomes from farms, business, HH’s and wife’s wages, dividends, 
interest, funds, and HH’s income from bonuses, overtime, tips, commissions, professional practice, gardening, 
roomers or boarders, extra jobs, and others. 
 
Table 9. 
Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Sociodemographic Variables 
Category  Sociodemographic 
Variables 
% of yes answers (n) 
HHsa Wivesb 
Race White 60.6 (3,747) 70.0 (2,532) 
Black 31.1 (1,921) 20.6 (745) 
Latino 4.8 (296) 5.7 (205) 
Asian 1.6 (96) 2.0 (71) 
American 
Indian/Aleut/Eskimo 
0.6 (39) 0.4 (14) 
Other 1.3 (82) 1.3 (457) 
Marital 
status 
Married 54.6 
NR 
Unmarried 20.8 
Widowed  6.0 
Divorced  14.3 
Separated  4.3 
Occupation  Professional, Technical, 
and Kindred Workers 
15.4 (965) 19.1 (705) 
Managers and 
Administrators (except 
Farm) 
12.2 (762) 9.2 (342) 
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Category  Sociodemographic 
Variables 
% of yes answers (n) 
HHsa Wivesb 
Sales Workers 4.5 (280) 3.2 (118) 
Clerical and Kindred 
Workers 
8.4 (526) 18.9 (698) 
Craftsman and Kindred 
Workers 
12.4 (777) 1.4 (53) 
Operatives, except 
Transport 
6.3 (394) 4.2 (154) 
Transport Equipment 
Operatives 
4.6 (291) 0.6 (22) 
Laborers (except Farm) 3.5 (222) 0.6 (24) 
Farmers and Farm 
Managers 
0.7 (46) 0.1 (2) 
Farm Laborers and Farm 
Foremen 
9.1 (569) 0.2 (8) 
Service Workers (except 
Private Household) 
0.3 (18) 10.2 (376) 
Private Household 
Workers 
21.8 (1,368) 0.5 (18) 
Did not work for money  31.9 (1,179) 
Note. HH = Heads of the household; NR = not relevant. 
 
aThere were three variables that provided the race of the HH. The first variable that included information about all 
HHs was used. The other two variables included 15 White, 5 Black, 65 Indian, 1 Asian, 21 Latino, and 16 Other 
designations. bThere were three variables that provided the race of the wife. The first variable that included 
information about all wives was used. The other two variables included 5 White, 44 Indian, 1 Asian, 7 Latino, and 4 
Other designations. 
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Figure 8. Distribution of total family income in 2001. 
 
Table 10.  
Descriptive Statistics of Components of Total Family Income  
Annual income type n Mean (SD) in $ Min $ Max $ 
HHs wages/salary 6,259 31,665.0 (41,116.7) 0 850,000 
Wives wages/salary 3,558 19,875.6 (32,261.2) 0 1,135,000 
HHs dividends 6,160 929.7 (10,350.0) 0 480,000 
Wives dividends 3,690 130.1 (1,938.7) 0 75,000 
HHs interest 6,099 636.3 (5,404.0) 0 250,000 
Wives interest 3,701 230.5 (9,912.2) 0 600,000 
HHs fund/trust 6,286 192.4 (7,075.6) 0 480,000 
Wives fund/trust 3,718 12.5 (400.2) 0 20,000 
HHs bonus 6,259 696.5 (11,014.2) 0 450,000 
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 
Total Family Income in Dollars 
Pe
rc
en
t 
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Annual income type n Mean (SD) in $ Min $ Max $ 
HHs overtime 6,259 120.8 (1,304.9) 0 45,000 
HHs tips 6,259 22.4 (458.9) 0 19,000 
HHs commission 6,259 172.3 (3,502.0) 0 200,000 
HHs roomer/boarder 6,295 19.7 (360.2) 0 16,800 
HHs other 6,295 43.9 (1,276.7) 0 70,000 
Wives other 3,710 479.8 (11,132.4) 0 624,000 
HHs extra job 6,295 72.0 (1,371.8) 0 80,000 
HHs professional 
practice 
6,295 243.7 (10,953.9) 0 840,000 
HHs 
market/gardening 
6,295 21.2 (461.6) 0 21,000 
Wives other assets 3,715 64.0 (1,399.4) 0 58,000 
HHs anything else 6,266 515.8 (13,601.9) 0 1,040,000 
Family business  
(-expenses) 
6,295 2372.3 (30,522.6) 200,000 1,500,000 
Family farm 
(-expenses) 
6,295 281.2 (6,782.2) 38,000 400,000 
Total family taxable 
incomea 
6,295 53,883.3 (76,840.7) 59,948 2,112,300 
Note. HH= Head of the household; SD= standard deviation.  
 
aCalculated by the PSID and includes family incomes from farms, business, HH’s and wife’s wages, dividends, 
interest, funds, and HH’s income from bonuses, overtime, tips, commissions, professional practices, gardening, 
roomers/boarders, extra jobs, and other sources. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Family business net worth (i.e., the profit minus expenses) ranged between $200,000 
and $1,500,000. Family farm net worth ranged between $38,000 and $400,000. Households in 
the sample had a variety of monthly and annual payments such as buying food for the home 
(91.5%), electricity (89%), and gasoline (84.9%; Table 11). A small proportion of households 
received public assistance such as food stamps (7.9%), TANF (1.9% for HHs and 0.5% for 
wives), and social security income (3.4% for HHs and 0.8% for wives; Table 12). More 
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households supported someone outside of the family unit (13.4%) than were supported by 
relatives (8.7% for HHs and 2.5% for wives) or non-relatives (4.8% for HHs and 0.003% for 
wives; Table 11). An even smaller percentage of households received any inheritance (1.5% in 
the last year and 3.6% in the last five years; Table 13). About a third of HHs and wives had a 
pension account through their employer, and for about 40% of those, the employer contributed to 
the pension accounts. However, only 8% of employers contributed to other saving plans for HHs 
and only 5.4% for wives (Table 12).  
 
Table 11. 
Descriptive Statistics of Individual Components 
Sub-
components 
Variables % of 
yesa 
N for 
mean 
Mean $ (SD) 
Min 
$ 
Max $ 
Economic 
resources 
and needs  
(Annually) 
Car load/lease 27.5% 6,149 
1,645.2 
 (2,851.4) 
0 48,084 
Car insurance 82.6% 5,851 
1,200.9 
 (1,992.4) 
0 115,200 
Other car 
payments 
62.4% 6,243 
1,262.4 
 (2,786.9) 
0 54,000 
Car repairs 41.4% 6,241 
1,445.5 
 (4,001.4) 
0 74,400 
Gasoline 84.9% 6,188 
1,442.3 
 (1,827.5) 
0 72,000 
Parking  6.3% 6,273 
42.3 
 (362.8) 
0 21,600 
Fare and train 
fare 
4.9% 6,281 
41.5 
 (375.2) 
0 19,200 
Taxi 2.4% 6,281 
12.9 
 (140.8) 
0 7,200 
Other 
transportation 
3.3% 6,282 
138.7 
 (1,339.4) 
0 36,000 
Child care 9.7% 6,274 
396.4 
 (1,412.9) 
0 21,000 
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Sub-
components 
Variables % of 
yesa 
N for 
mean 
Mean $ (SD) 
Min 
$ 
Max $ 
Adult care 0.3% 6,292 
6.0 
 (323.9) 
0 24,000 
Food at home 91.5% 6,262 
33,575.4 
(385,736.0) 
0 5,199,948 
Food delivered to 
door 
13.3% 6,293 
2,792.5 
(114,521.2) 
0 5,199,948 
Eat outside 85.5% 6,264 
15,508.9 
(257,176.9) 
0 5,199,948 
Property tax 53.9% 5,930 
1,033. 
(2,279.6) 
0 95,000 
Mortgage on a 
house 
45.4% 6,244 
5,105.7 
(11,644.9) 
0 600,000 
Rent  34.1% 6,248 
2,016.3 
 (3,644.5) 
0 60,000 
Gas and heat 59.9% 6,029 
665.4 
 (872.7) 
0 10,800 
Electricity 89.6% 6,087 
1,085.5 
 (793.8) 
0 9,600 
Other utilities 23.5% 6,277 
209.7 
 (508.1) 
0 6,000 
Water and sewer 58.3% 6,031 
284.8  
(379.3) 
0 9,600 
School-related 
expenses 
34.5% 6,262 
1,125.5 
 (4,481.7) 
0 92,000 
Other school-
related expenses 
4.5% 6,292 
42.9 
 (856.1) 
0 60,000 
Home repairs 
and maintenance 
7.3% 6,284 
2,321.8 
(22,969.1) 
0 1,500,000 
Other debts 52.9% 6,295 
6,439.0 
(19,626.4) 
0 450,000 
Social 
support 
(Annually) 
Help from 
relatives - HHs 
8.7% 6,244 258.3 (1,844.9) 0 41,600 
Help from 
relatives - wives 
2.5% 3,711 81.7 (995.0) 0 26,000 
Help from non-
relatives - HHs 
4.8% 6,256 90.2 (906.6) 0 30,000 
Help from non-
relatives - wives 
0.003% 3,721 12.0 (394.0) 0 20,000 
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Sub-
components 
Variables % of 
yesa 
N for 
mean 
Mean $ (SD) 
Min 
$ 
Max $ 
Supporting 
someone out of 
the FU 
13.4% 6,257 559.8 (3,170.1) 0 70,000 
Note. FU = family unit; HH = Heads of the household; SD = standard deviation. 
aOut of 6,259 families total.   
 
Table 12. 
Descriptive Statistics of Institutional Components 
Institutional components 
Family 
unit 
% of 
yesa 
n  Mean  
(SD) 
Min Max 
Asset limits  
(annual 
amount in $) 
Food stamps Family 7.9% 6,222 213.6 
(1,012.2) 
0 25,064 
Government help to 
pay heating 
Family 3.9% 6,216 11.3 
(79.4) 
0 2,544 
TANF HHs 1.9% 6,238 70.3 
(644.7) 
0 23,904 
Wives 0.5% 3,705 16.4 
(288.1) 
0 8,952 
SSI HHs 3.4% 6,236 125.5 
(994.2) 
0 28,800 
Wives 0.8% 3,703 36.3 
(487.4) 
0 13,200 
Other welfare HHs 0.5% 6,238 17.4 
(309.5) 
0 10,464 
Wives 0.2% 3,704 5.5 
(206.0) 
0 9,600 
Child support HHs 5.4% 6,224 355.8 
(8,107.6) 
0 624,000 
Wives 4.1% 3,697 171.6 
(1,258.8) 
0 43,200 
Unemployment 
compensation 
HHs 3.7% 6,221 262.5 
(3,452.7) 
0 234,000 
Wives 2.8% 3,698 167.9 
(1,401.6) 
0 25,000 
Workers’ 
compensation 
HHs 1.1% 6,222 111.6 
(2,923.9) 
0 180,000 
Wives 0.6% 3,700 38.4 
(977.5) 
0 46,800 
Access (in 
years) 
Pension through an 
employer 
HHs 39.2% 6,216 3.4 
(6.9) 
0 44 
Wives 30.7% 3,696 2.6 0 42 
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Institutional components 
Family 
unit 
% of 
yesa 
n  Mean  
(SD) 
Min Max 
(5.9) 
Security 
(annual 
amount in $) 
Homeowner 
insurance premium 
Family NI 5,816 336.2 
(500.2) 
0 8,000 
Incentives 
(annual 
amount in $) 
Employer 
contribution to 
pension 
HHs 16.6% 6,080 112.9 
(2,148.4) 
0 110,000 
Wives 12.9% 3,635 28.8 
(346.1) 
0 15,600 
Employer 
contribution to 
saving plan 
HHs 8.0% 6,195 81.3 
(3,278.0) 
0 197,600 
Wives 5.4% 3,685 11.9 
(182.9) 
0 7,000 
Note. HH = Head of the household; NI = No information SD = standard deviation; SSI = Supplemental Security 
Income; TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. 
 
aOut of 6,259 families and HHs, and out of 3,721 wives. 
 
Table 13. 
Descriptive Statistics of Intergenerational Transfers 
Intergenerational transfers  % of yesa n Mean $ (SD) 
Min 
$ 
Max $ 
Inheritance last year 1.5% 6,290 
582.0 
(9,446.9) 
0 420,000 
Inheritance in the last 2 years 3.6% 6,282 
1,859.9 
(18,497.8) 
0 650,000 
Note. SD = standard deviation. 
 
aOut of 6,259 families. 
 
 The mean annual family deposits and withdrawals are presented in Table 14, and the 
median deposits and withdrawals were 0. Deposits ranged from $965 (± $11,589) in stocks, 
mutual funds, or investment trusts to $1,226 (± $7,241) in private annuities or IRAs; however, 
less than 2% of HHs and wives voluntarily contributed to their pension accounts. Mean 
withdrawals from previous employer’s pensions were $225 (± $5,096) for HHs and $114 (± 
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$2,887) for wives. Mean family withdrawals from pensions, private annuities, or IRA was $725 
(± $6,754).  
  
Table 14. 
Descriptive Statistics of Saving and Investment Actions 
Saving and investment actions 
Family 
unit 
% of 
yesa 
n 
Mean $ 
(SD) 
Min 
$ 
Max $ 
Deposits 
(Annually) 
Private annuities 
or IRAs 
Family 14.3% 6,222 1,226.4 
(7,241.3) 
0 225,000 
Stocks, mutual 
funds, or 
investment trusts 
Family 13.9% 6,221 964.9 
(11,589.3) 
0 700,000 
Voluntarily 
contributions to 
pension 
HHs 1.6% 6,153 162.7 
(1,007.2) 
0 26,000 
Wives 1.1% 3,669 84.8 
(660.1) 
0 15,000 
Withdrawals 
(Annually) 
Pensions, private 
annuities, or IRAs 
Family 5.3% 6,279 725.2 
(6,754.2) 
0 275,000 
Stocks, mutual 
funds, or 
investment trusts 
Family 1.8% 6,290 310.8 
(10,555.7) 
0 800,000 
Previous 
employer 
pensions 
HHs 1.0% 6,285 225.1 
(5,096.4) 
0 275,000 
Wives 0.5% 3,719 113.7 
(2,886.6) 
0 160,000 
Note. HH = Head of the household; SD = standard deviation. 
 
aOut of 6,259 families. 
 
 In 2001, HHs and wives accumulated money through retirement savings (Table 15). The 
mean amount that was accumulated in pensions was $9,533 (± $143,594) for HHs and $2,388 (± 
$12,861) for wives. The mean amount in pensions from former employers was $1,322,349 (± 
$12,088,411) for HHs and $1,351 (± $13,444) for wives. Home values, after subtracting the 
mortgage principals, ranged between $798,000 and $2,750,000. The majority of families owned 
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a vehicle (87.6%), and the mean net worth of those was $12,587 (± $19,039). Other assets that 
families owned included stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts (23.5%), secondary real estate 
(13.6%), farms or businesses (11.5%), and other assets (18%). The mean net worths of those 
assets were presented in Table 8. In addition, most families had liquid savings (75.8%) that on 
average held a value of $15,019 (± $86,932). 
 
Table 15. 
Descriptive Statistics of Asset Accumulation 
Saving and investment 
actions 
Family 
unit 
% of 
yesa 
n Mean $ (SD) Min $ Max $ 
Retirement 
savings 
 
Pension HHs 39.2% 5,914 9,533.4 
(143,594.2) 
0 10,000,000 
Wives 31.8% 3,529 2,388.3 
(12,860.6) 
0 255,000 
Private 
annuities or 
IRAs 
Family 27.8% 6,295 21,833.6 
(85,298.4) 
0 1,750,000 
Rollover to 
IRA 
HHs 0.6% 6,295 8,270.0 
(282,017.2) 
0 10,014,998 
Wives 0.3% 3,719 196.9 
(6,106.9) 
0 300,000 
Pension from 
former 
employer 
HHs 18.4% 6,290 1,322,348.7 
(12,088,411.3) 
0 199,999,996 
Wives 13.7% 3,679 1,350.8 
(13,444.0) 
0 400,000 
Home 
equity 
 
Home value 
minus 
principle of 
mortgage 
Family 61.3% 6,295 51,653.8 
(103,398.8) 
798000 275,0000 
Sold home 4.2% 6,286 6,473.4 
(47,283.9) 
0 1,450,000 
Sold other real 
estate 
1.5% 6,290 1,106.2 
(16,005.2) 
0 500,000 
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Saving and investment 
actions 
Family 
unit 
% of 
yesa 
n Mean $ (SD) Min $ Max $ 
Bought other 
real estate 
3.3% 6,290 1,921.7 
(26,637.2) 
0 1,300,000 
Addition/ 
improvements 
of home/real 
estate 
7.3% 6,284 2,321.8 
(22,969.1) 
0 1,500,000 
Net worth 
(Value of 
owned 
asset minus 
debt) 
Second real 
estate 
Family 13.6% 6,295 23,688.7 
(283,583.8) 
0 15,000,000 
Vehicles 87.6% 6,295 12,586.9 
(19,039.5) 
0 300,000 
Farm/business 11.5% 6,295 27,634.3 
(368,511.4) 
0 22,000,000 
Stocks, mutual 
funds, 
investment 
trusts 
23.5% 6,295 33,114.3 
(533,704.9) 
0 40,000,000 
Other assetsb 18.0% 6,295 9,227.3 
(63,320.5) 
0 2,000,000 
Liquid 
savings  
Checking/ 
savings 
account, 
money market 
funds, etc. 
Family 75.8% 6,259 15,019.1 
(86,931.6) 
0 4,000,000 
Note. HH = Heads of the household; IRA = individual retirement account; SD = standard deviation.  
aOut of 6,259 families and HHs, and out of 3,721 wives. bThe value of bond funds, a life insurance policy, a 
collection for investment purposes, or rights in a trust or estate. 
 
Psychological Distress 
 Table 16 displays the descriptive statistics of the total score and the six items of 
psychological distress for HHs and wives. There was information about psychological distress 
for 4,169 HHs (66.2%) and 2,067 wives (55.5%). As was mentioned in Chapter 3, information 
about psychological distress was available only for one family member, head of household, or 
wife. Only one person was interviewed by the PSID researchers during each wave, and it is not 
appropriate to answer the psychological distress measure as a proxy. The total score for 
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psychological distress ranged between 6 and 30 and the scores for the psychological distress 
items ranged between 1 and 5, with lower scores for both representing worse psychological 
distress. The mean of the total score for psychological distress was 26.52 (± 3.94) for HHs and 
26.57 (± 3.80) for wives, and the median was 28.00. The means of the items for psychological 
distress ranged between 4.10 and 4.80 for HHs and wives, and the median for most of the 
psychological distress items was 5.00. The means and medians were similar, within one standard 
deviation, for the total score and for all items of psychological distress for HHs and wives. 
Similar information was obtained for the descriptive statistics using sampling weights. 
 
Table 16. 
Descriptive Statistics of Psychological Distress for Heads of Households (HHs; n = 4169) and 
Wives (n = 2067) 
 
Psychological 
Distress Itemsa 
HHs 
or 
Wives 
Meanb SDb Medianb Min Max 
Total score HHs 26.23 (26.78) 3.94 (3.74) 28.00 6 30 
Wives 26.57 (26.56) 3.80 (3.82) 28.00 
Sadness HHs 4.4 (4.5) 0.9 (0.9) 5.00 (5.00) 1 5 
Nervousness 4.3 (4.3) 0.9 (0.9) 5.00 (5.00) 
Restlessness 4.1 (4.1) 1.1 (1.0) 4.00 (4.00) 
Hopelessness 4.7 (4.7) 0.7 (0.7) 5.00 (5.00) 
Effort 4.2 (4.3) 1.2 (1.0) 5.00 (5.00) 
Worthlessness 4.8 (4.8) 0.6 (0.6) 5.00 (5.00) 
Sadness Wives 4.5 (4.4) 0.9 (0.9) 5.00 (5.00) 1 5 
Nervousness 4.2 (4.2) 1.0 (1.0) 5.00 (4.00) 
Restlessness 4.1 (4.1) 1.1 (1.0) 4.00 (4.00) 
Hopelessness 4.8 (4.7) 0.7 (0.7) 5.00 (5.00) 
Effort 4.2 (4.3) 1.1 (1.1) 5.00 (5.00) 
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Psychological 
Distress Itemsa 
HHs 
or 
Wives 
Meanb SDb Medianb Min Max 
Worthlessness 4.8 (4.8) 0.6 (0.6) 5.00 (5.00) 
 
Note. For HHs, N = 62,434,498 for the descriptive statistics analysis with sampling weights. For wives, N = 
26,755,301 for descriptive statistics analysis with sampling weight. SD = standard deviation. 
 
aLower scores represent worse psychological distress. bResults using sampling weights are reported in parentheses. 
 
 In addition, 44% of HHs (n = 2,769) and 23.9% of wives (n = 1,505) reported having at 
least one chronic illness, and the majority of families had health insurance (74%) for at least one 
family member (Table 17).  
 
Table 17. 
Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Control Variables 
Category  
Control 
Variables 
 % of yes (n) 
 Heads of 
Households 
Wives 
Medical 
history 
High blood pressure  23.5% (1,466) 17.8% (655) 
Diabetes  7.5% (465) 5.6% (206) 
Cancer  3.6% (226) 3.7% (138) 
Lung disease  3.8% (239) 2.8% (102) 
Heart attack  3.8% (237) 1.2% (45) 
Heart disease  5.7% (358) 4.2% (155) 
Emotional problems  5.3% (331) 6.2% (230) 
Arthritis  16.3% (1,016) 14.9% (548) 
Asthma   7.4% (459) 8.4% (309 
Mental loss  1.6% (99) 1.0% (35) 
Chronic illness   44.0% (2,769) 23.9% (1,505) 
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Category  Control 
Variables 
 % of yes (n) 
 
Families 
Health 
insurance 
No health insurance  13.1% (824) 
Health insurance  74.0% (4,658) 
Medicare or Medicaid  12.9% (810) 
 
Bivariate Analysis  
 The bivariate analyses were conducted with and without sampling weights. Tables in this 
section include information from both analyses; however, the text includes results only for the 
analysis without sampling weights. The reason is that all the relationships in the analysis with 
sampling weights were significant under p < .001 due to the large sample size of about 60 
million for HHs and about 25 million for wives. Therefore, in the weighted analysis, it is 
important to examine the magnitude of the relationships instead of the statistical significance, 
meaning that a relationship between two variables may be statistically significant, but not 
clinically or practically significant.  
 In this bivariate analysis section, the relationships between control variables and 
psychological distress levels will be presented as well as the relationships between selected 
control variables. 
The Relationships Between Control Variables and Psychological Distress During the Past 
30 Days 
 
 Correlations between the psychological distress of HHs, wives, and all continuous control 
variables are presented in Table 18. Older age in HHs was significantly related to lower levels of 
psychological distress in the past 30 days; older age in wives was to lower levels of 
psychological distress in the past 30 days under p < .05 (Tables 18 and 19). Lower levels of 
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psychological distress were also significantly related to more years of education for HHs and 
wives (Tables 18 and 19). For both, psychological distress levels were not related to the number 
of people or children living in the family unit (Table 18); however, under p < .05, lower levels of 
psychological distress of HHs were related to more people living in the family unit and fewer 
children living in the family unit (Tables 18 and 19). For HHs and wives, greater family income 
was significantly associated with lower levels of psychological distress (Table 18), and the 
regression showed that the quadratic term of family income was also significantly related to the 
psychological distress of HHs and wives (Table 19).  
 
Table 18. 
Correlations Between Psychological Distress and Continuous Control Variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. 
Psychological 
distress HH 
—         
2. 
Psychological 
distress W 
0.00 —        
3. Incomea 0.18* 0.10* —       
4. # people 0.04** 0.02 0.29* —      
5. # children 0.04** 0.03 0.10* 0.86* —     
6. Age HH 0.11* 0.07** 0.05* 0.18* 0.30* —    
7. Edu HH 0.16* 0.11* 0.42* 0.09* 0.10* 0.08* —   
8. Age W 0.07** 0.07** 0.01 0.27* 0.37* 0.94* 0.02 —  
9. Edu W 0.08* 0.14* 0.46* 0.11* 0.07* 0.11* 0.65* 0.09* — 
Note. Edu = education level; HH = head of household; W = wife. 
aA Spearman correlation was used to test correlations between income and other continuous control variables. 
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Table 19. 
Relationship Between Psychological Distress in the Past 30 Days of Heads of the Households (n 
= 4161) and Wives (n = 2067) and Continuous Control Variables 
 
Family Unit 
(FU) 
Continuous Control 
Variables 
B SE β p* 
Heads of the 
households 
Age (years) 0.275 
(0.281) 
0.039 
(0.000) 
0.109 
(0.125) 
< .001  
(< .001) 
Education (years) 0.581 
(0.418) 
0.057 
(0.000) 
0.160 
(0.124) 
< .001 
(< .001) 
# of people in FU 0.437 
(0.546) 
0.126 
(0.001) 
3.476 
(0.192) 
.001 
 (< .001) 
# of children in FU 0.150  
(0.088) 
0.053 
(0.000) 
0.044  
(0.023) 
.005 
 (< .001) 
Family income ($) 0.789 
(0.591) 
0.068 
(0.000) 
0.278 
(0.255) 
< .001 
 (< .001) 
Family income ($; 
quadratic) 
0.576 
(0.390) 
0.080 
(0.000) 
0.173  
(0.164) 
< .001  
(< .001) 
Wives  Age (years) 0.197 
(0.154) 
0.066 
(0.001) 
0.066 
(0.056) 
.003  
(< .001) 
Education (years) 0.722 
(0.719) 
0.122 
(0.001) 
0.135 
(0.142) 
< .001  
(< .001) 
# of people in FU 0.061  
(0.144) 
0.062 
(0.001) 
0.022  
(0.049) 
.325 
(< .001) 
# of children in FU 0.096  
(0.112) 
0.067 
(0.001) 
0.031  
(0.035) 
.157 
 (< .001) 
Family income ($) 0.447 
(0.378) 
0.082 
(0.001) 
0.196 
(0.170) 
< .001  
(< .001) 
Family income ($; 
quadratic) 
0.283  
(0.264) 
0.063 
(0.001) 
0.161  
(0.117) 
< .001 
 (< .001) 
Note. Lower scores represent worse psychological distress. Results using sampling weights are reported in 
parenthesis. For heads of households, N = 62,326,543 for bivariate analysis with sampling weights. For wives, N = 
26,755,301 for bivariate analysis with sampling weights. B = unstandardized beta coefficient; β = standardized beta 
coefficient; FU = family unit; SE = standard error. 
 
*For bivariate analysis with sampling weights, all p-values were less than .001 including quadratic terms. 
 Significantly higher levels of psychological distress were reported by female HHs than 
male HHs (Table 20). In addition, race influenced psychological distress levels for HHs but not 
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for wives. Using a conservative significance level of 0.001, White HHs reported significantly 
lower levels of psychological distress compared with Black HHs (Table 20). For HHs, being 
married was significantly related to lower levels of psychological distress during the past 30 days 
compared with unmarried, widowed, divorced, and separated HHs. In addition, being a widowed 
HH or a divorced HH was also significantly associated with lower levels of psychological 
distress compared with being a separated HH. However, the marital status of HHs did not 
significantly predict psychological distress levels for wives (Table 20).  
  
Table 20. 
Relationship Between Psychological Distress in the Past 30 Days of Heads of the Households (n 
= 4161) and Wives (n = 2067) and Dichotomous and Categorical Control Variables 
 
Dichotomous and categorical 
control variables 
Heads of households Wives 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Sex Male 27.18 
(27.35) 
3.35 
(3.20) 
    
Female 25.63 
(25.90) 
4.47 
(4.30) 
    
 Statistical Values 
t-value 12.22 (1,438.62)     
df 3,123 (41,610,692)     
p-value < .001 (< .001)     
  
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Chronic 
illness 
No 27.10 
(27.32) 
3.35 
(3.17) 
 27.24 
(27.23) 
3.07 
(3.06) 
 
Yes 25.83 
(26.22) 
4.44 
(4.18) 
 25.69 
(25.73) 
4.44 
(4.44) 
 
 Statistical Values 
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Dichotomous and categorical 
control variables 
Heads of households Wives 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
t-value 10.30 (1,177.23)  8.94 (996.35)  
df 3,450 (56,960,585)  1,510 (20,734,155)  
p-value < .001 (< .001)  < .001 (< .001)  
  
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Imputed 
values 
No 26.46 
(26.75) 
3.98 
(3.77) 
 26.47 
(26.50) 
3.77 
(3.77) 
 
Yes 26.84 
(26.92) 
3.73 
(3.61) 
 26.82 
(26.69) 
3.86 
(3.93) 
 
 Statistical Values 
t-value 2.48 (143.48)  1.90 (111.76)  
df 1,091 (16,331,499)  1,041 (14,160,050)  
p-value .013 (<.001)  .058 (<.001)  
  
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Race White (A) 26.86 
(26.88) 
3.62 
(3.62) 
B 26.58 
(26.62) 
3.70 
(3.73) 
 
Black (B) 25.88 
(26.06) 
4.34 
(4.34) 
A 26.80 
(26.63) 
3.81 
(3.81) 
 
American Indian (C) 25.41 
(27.00) 
4.73 
(3.90) 
 26.14 
(25.02) 
5.30 
(5.35) 
 
Asian (D) 27.16 
(27.31) 
3.47 
(3.23) 
 26.70 
(26.52) 
2.77 
(2.68) 
 
Latino (E) 26.99 
(27.05) 
3.99 
(3.66) 
 26.14 
(26.25) 
4.35 
(4.31) 
 
Other (F) 24.40 
(27.00) 
4.11 
(3.74) 
 26.65 
(26.51) 
3.73 
(3.92) 
 
 Statistical Values 
F-statistics 12.44 (81,471.82)  0.68 (6,524.13)  
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Dichotomous and categorical 
control variables 
Heads of households Wives 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
df 4,135 (62,086,146)  2,006 (26,127,906)  
p-value < .001 (< .001)  .680 (< .001)  
  
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Marital 
status 
Married (A) 27.57 
(27.74) 
3.02 
(2.84) 
B, C, 
D, E 
26.66 
(26.61) 
3.75 
(3.79) 
 
Unmarried (B) 25.85 
(26.12) 
4.28 
(4.07) 
A 25.72 
(25.96) 
3.73 
(3.38) 
 
Widowed (C) 26.13 
(26.44) 
4.16 
(3.92) 
A, E 22.33 
(21.60) 
12.42 
(10.26) 
 
Divorced (D) 26.27 
(26.43) 
4.05 
(3.97) 
A, E 25.82 
(26.15) 
4.23 
(4.30) 
 
Separated (E) 24.86 
(24.75) 
4.88 
(4.85) 
A, C, 
D 
21.33 
(20.74) 
5.32 
(4.93) 
 
 Statistical Values 
F-statistics 51.51 (787,954.09)  6.09 (55,961.11)  
df 4162 (62,326,542)  2,066 (26,755,300)  
p-value < .001 (< .001)  < .001 (< .001)  
  
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Occupation Not working (A) 25.61 
(26.27) 
4.76 
(4.49) 
B, C, 
F, G 
26.05 
(26.16) 
4.29 
(4.28) 
B 
Professional, Technical 
(B) 
27.31 
(27.24) 
2.85 
(2.88) 
A, E, 
L 
27.27 
(27.27) 
2.86 
(2.94) 
A, G 
Managers and 
Administrators (C) 
27.27 
(27.43) 
2.93 
(2.78) 
A, L 26.91 
(26.78) 
3.47 
(3.52) 
 
Sales Workers (D) 26.81 
(26.79) 
3.52 
(3.49) 
 27.45 
(27.67) 
2.56 
(2.26) 
 
Clerical (E) 26.25 
(26.48) 
3.92 
(3.79) 
B 26.99 
(26.79) 
3.38 
(3.53) 
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Dichotomous and categorical 
control variables 
Heads of households Wives 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Craftsman (F) 27.36 
(27.53) 
3.21 
(2.94) 
A, L 27.16 
(27.00) 
3.00 
(2.86) 
 
Operatives (G) 27.04 
(27.21) 
3.73 
(3.39) 
A 25.24 
(25.36) 
4.42 
(4.44) 
B 
Transport Equipment 
Operatives (H) 
26.39 
(27.02) 
4.16 
(3.67) 
 26.25 
(26.40) 
2.82 
(2.53) 
 
Laborers (I) 26.15 
(26.14) 
4.08 
(4.02) 
 26.07 
(25.77) 
3.43 
(3.58) 
 
Farmers, Farm 
Managers (J) 
28.14 
(28.15) 
1.93 
(1.90) 
 25.00 
(25.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
Farm Laborers, Farm 
Foremen (K) 
26.71 
(27.22) 
5.06 
(4.19) 
 28.00 
(28.15) 
4.02 
(3.64) 
 
Service Workers (L) 25.85 
(25.91) 
4.27 
(4.22) 
B, C, 
F 
26.18 
(26.08) 
4.40 
(4.24) 
 
Private Household 
Workers (M) 
25.44 
(24.00) 
6.48 
(5.84) 
 25.67 
(25.60) 
4.48 
(4.44) 
 
 Statistical Values 
F-statistics 12.16 (128,042.31)  4.32 (44,602.53)  
df 4,154 (62,229,145)  2,061 (26,721,389)  
p-value < .001 (< .001)  < .001 (< .001)  
  
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Health 
insurance 
No health insurance (A) 25.35 
(25.59) 
4.50 
(4.45) 
B 25.45 
(25.17) 
5.18 
(5.23) 
B 
Health insurance (B) 26.96 
(27.06) 
3.46 
(3.36) 
A, C 26.79 
(26.82) 
3.48 
(3.46) 
A 
Medicare or Medicaid 
(C) 
25.54 
(26.30) 
4.96 
(4.55) 
B 25.96 
(25.87) 
4.17 
(4.39) 
 
 Statistical Values 
F-statistics 64.57 (556,307.24)  15.57 (282,127.83)  
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Dichotomous and categorical 
control variables 
Heads of households Wives 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
Mean SD 
Post 
hoc* 
df 4,159 (62,241,547)  2,066 (26,755,300)  
p-value < .001 (< .001)  < .001 (< .001)  
Note. Lowers score represent worse psychological distress. Results using sampling weights are reported in 
parenthesis. For heads of households, N = 62,326,543 for bivariate analysis with sampling weights. For wives, N = 
26,755,301 for bivariate analysis with sampling weights. df = degrees of freedom; SD= standard deviation.  
 
*For bivariate analyses with sampling weights, all p-values were less than .001 including quadratic terms. 
 
 Significant relationships among different occupations and psychological distress and 
pairwise comparisons between different occupations are presented in Table 20 for HHs and 
wives. For example, not-working HHs reported significantly higher levels of psychological 
distress compared with HHs whose occupation was professional/technical, manager and 
administrator, craftsman, and operatives.  
 Heads of the households and wives who had someone in the family unit with health 
insurance reported significantly lower levels of psychological distress compared with those who 
did not have anyone in the family unit with health insurance or those who had someone in the 
family unit with Medicaid or Medicare (Table 20). Higher levels of psychological distress were 
significantly related to HHs and wives who had a medical history of chronic illness compared 
with those who had no such history (Table 20). In addition, having imputed values were not 
significantly related to psychological distress levels for HHs and wives (Table 20). 
The Relationship Between Selected Control Variables 
 Male HHs had significantly more years of education, greater income, and larger family 
sizes compared with female HHs (Table 21). 
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Table 21. 
Relationships Between Continuous Control Variables and Genders of Heads of the Households 
(HHs; n = 6295) 
 
Continuous control 
variables 
Mean ranka χ2 (Pearson 
Correlationb) 
p* 
Male Female 
Total family income 
3,633.8 
(3,616.6) 
1,924.5 
(1,983.2) 1,133.05 (0.39) 
< 0.001 
Number of people in the FU 
3,415.3 
(3,079.0) 
2,474.7 
(1,731.7) 359.72 (0.34) 
< 0.001 
Number of children in the FU 
3,146.7 
(2,823.1) 
3,151.2 
(2,463.3) 0.01 (0.10) 
0.924 
Age of HHs 
3,153.8 
(3,519.1) 
3,128.2 
(3,701.5) 
0.26 (0.04) 0.614 
HHs years of education 
3,095.1 
(3,269.2) 
2,671.1 
(2,905.5) 76.50 (0.09) 
< 0.001 
Note. N = 90,103,635 for bivariate analysis with sampling weights. FU = family unit.  
 
aResults using sampling weights are reported in parenthesis. bContinuous control variables were ranked and tested 
for Pearson correlation with PROC FREQ. 
 
*For bivariate analysis with sampling weight, all p-values were less than 0.001. 
 
 Table 22 displays the relationships between categorical control variables and HH gender. 
The marital status of female HHs was significantly more likely to be unmarried, widowed, 
divorced, and separated compared with male HHs who were significantly more likely to be 
married. There were significantly more White and Latino male HHs than female HHs who were 
significantly more likely to be Black. There were significant differences in occupations between 
male and female HHs. Male HHs were more likely to be managers, craftsman, transport 
equipment operatives, laborers and farmers, and female HHs were more likely to be clerical, 
services workers, private household workers, or not to work at all. Female HHs were 
significantly more likely to report a history of medical illness compared with male HHs, and 
male HHs were significantly more likely to have medical insurance compared with female HHs, 
who were more likely to have no medical insurance or be insured by Medicare or Medicaid.  
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Table 22. 
Relationships Between Categorical Control Variables and Gender of Heads of the Households 
(HHs; N = 6295) 
 
Category 
Dichotomous 
control 
variables 
Gender of HHsb 
Total p* 
Male Female 
Marital 
status 
Married 3,411 
(48,616,909) 
27 
(336,040) 
3,438 
(48,952,949) 
< 0.001 
Unmarried 602 
(8,696,557) 
707 
(8,266,797) 
1,309 
(16,963,354) 
< 0.001 
Widowed 59 
(1,039,689) 
317 
(6,080,322) 
376 
(7,120,011) 
< 0.001 
Divorced 348 
(5,903,157) 
552 
(8,507,899) 
900 
(14,411,056) 
< 0.001 
Separated 86 
(971,025) 
186 
(1,685,240) 
272 
(2,656,265) 
< 0.001 
Race of HH White 2,987 
(52,069,567) 
760 
(17,087,161) 
3,747 
(69,156,728) 
< 0.001 
Black 1,020 
(5,393,070) 
901 
(5,626,366) 
1,921 
(11,019,436) 
< 0.001 
American 
Indian 
26 
(397,328) 
13 
(120,279) 
39 
(517,607) 
NS 
Asian 80 
(1,322,399) 
16 
(324,366) 
96 
(1,646,765) 
NS 
Latino 240 
(4,007,311) 
56 
(1,133,700) 
296 
(5,141,011) 
< 0.001 
Other 59 
(985,673) 
23 
(421,978) 
82 
(1,407,651) 
NS 
Occupation 
of HH 
Not working 
for money 
790 
(13,913,941) 
578 
(9,273,243) 
1,368 
(23,187,184) 
< 0.001 
Professional/ 
Technical 
714 
(11,722,534) 
251 
(3,744,515) 
965 
(15,467,049) 
NS 
Managers and 
Administrators 
636 
(10,215,585) 
126 
(1,800,009) 
762 
(12,015,594) 
< 0.001 
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Category 
Dichotomous 
control 
variables 
Gender of HHsb 
Total p* 
Male Female 
Sales Workers 221 
(3,575,680) 
59 
(875,657) 
280 
(4,451,337) 
NS 
Clerical 225 
(2,886,652) 
301 
(4,139,604) 
526 
(7,026,256) 
< 0.001 
Craftsman 744 
(9,363,182) 
33 
(446,498) 
777 
(9,809,680) 
< 0.001 
Operatives 290 
(3,037,070) 
104 
(939,931) 
394 
(3,977,001) 
NS 
Transport 
Equipment 
Operatives 
278 
(3,035,835) 
13 
(146,538) 
291 
(3,182,373) 
< 0.001 
Laborers 201 
(2,262,635) 
21 
(308,684) 
222 
(2,571,319) 
< 0.001 
Farmers and 
Farm 
Managers 
46 
(681,426) 
1 
(15,362) 
47 
(696,788) 
< 0.001 
Farm Laborers 
and Farm 
Foremen 
44 
(607,871) 
2 
(38,456) 
46 
(646,327) 
< 0.001 
Service 
Workers 
288 
(3,638,733) 
281 
(2,900,574) 
569 
(6,539,307) 
< 0.001 
Private 
Household 
Workers 
1 
(3,625) 
17 
(207,091) 
18 
(210,716) 
< 0.001 
Health 
insurance 
No health 
insurance 
536 
(6,633,035) 
288 
(2,851,848) 
824 
(9,484,883) 
< 0.001 
Health 
insurance 
3,585 
(51,508,881) 
1,073 
(15,701,407) 
4,658 
(67,210,288) 
< 0.001 
Medicaid or 
Medicare 
384 
(7,079,647) 
426 
(6,243,822) 
810 
(13,323,469) 
< 0.001 
Chronic 
illness 
No 2,680 
(36,375,022) 
846 
(10,504,714) 
3,526 
(46,879,736) 
< 0.001 
Yes 1,826 
(28,852,315) 
943 
(14,371,584) 
2,769 
(43,223,899) 
< 0.001 
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Category 
Dichotomous 
control 
variables 
Gender of HHsb 
Total p* 
Male Female 
Imputed 
values 
No 3,554 
(52,001,195) 
1,415 
(19,066,444) 
4,969 
(71,067,639) 
NS 
Yes 952 
(13,226,142) 
374 
(5,809,854) 
1,326 
(19,035,996) 
NS 
Note. N = 90,103,635 for the bivariate analyses with sampling weights. NS = not significant. 
 
aResults using sampling weights are reported in parenthesis.  
 
*For the bivariate analysis with sampling weight, all p-values were less than 0.001. 
 
 Significant associations were found between income and marital status (Table 23). 
Married HHs reported significantly higher income compared with other marital statuses, and 
unmarried HHs reported significantly greater income compared with widowed and divorced 
HHs.  
 
Table 23. 
Differences in Total Family Income Between Marital Status of Heads of the Households (HHs) 
Marital status Married 
Not 
married 
Widowed Divorced Separated 
Married —     
Not married 28.90* —    
Widowed 23.32* 12.83* —   
Divorced 20.06* 5.96* 14.00* —  
Separated 13.73* 0.60 8.75* 2.76 — 
Note. Table presents Z-score using the Mann-Whitney U.  
*p < 0.001. 
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 In addition, there were significant associations between income and HH race (Table 24). 
For example, White HHs reported significantly higher income than Black, American Indian, and 
Latino HHs. Black HHs reported significantly greater income compared with Asian and other 
races. Higher income was significantly associated with more years of education for HHs and 
wives, rs = .42 and rs = .46, respectively (Table 18).  
 
Table 24. 
Differences in Total Family Income Between Races of Heads of the Households (HHs) 
HH Race 
White Black 
American 
Indian 
Asian Latino Other 
White —      
Black 19.93* —     
American Indian 3.55* 0.58 —    
Asian 2.06 7.04* 3.87* —   
Latino 8.80* 1.31 1.02 6.01* —  
Other 1.66 3.79* 2.29 2.53 3.19 — 
Note. Table presents Z-score using the Mann-Whitney U.  
*p < 0.001 
 
 Only a few relationships were significant when a participant had at least one imputed 
value for the independent variables and control variables (Tables 25 and 26). For example, HHs 
who were older, widowed, and not working for money were significantly more likely to have 
imputed values. 
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Table 25.  
Relationships Between Categorical Control Variables and Imputed Values 
Categories 
Dichotomous 
control 
variables 
Imputed values (counts)a 
Total p* 
No Yes 
Marital 
status of HH 
Married 2,664 
(38,268,011) 
774 
(10,684,938) 
3,438 
(48,952,949) 
NS 
Unmarried 1,098 
(14,288,339) 
211 
(2,675,015) 
1,309 
(16,963,354) 
< 0.001 
Widowed 248 
(4,499,740) 
128 
(2,620,271) 
376 
 (7,120,011) 
< 0.001 
Divorced 733 
(11,865,298) 
167 
(2,545,758) 
900 
(14,411,056) 
NS 
Separated 226 
(2,146,251) 
46 
 (510,014) 
272 
 (2,656,265) 
NS 
Gender of 
HH 
Male 3,554 
(52,001,195) 
952 
(13,226,142) 
4,506 
(65,227,337) 
NS 
Female 1,415 
(19,066,444) 
374 
(5,809,854) 
1,789 
(24,876,298) 
NS 
Race of HH White 2,987 
(54,595,268) 
760 
(14,561,460) 
3,747 
(69,156,728) 
NS 
Black 1,470 
(8,391,232) 
451 
(2,628,204) 
1,921 
(11,019,436) 
NS 
American Indian 32 
 (431,539) 
7  
(86,068) 
39 
 (517,607) 
NS 
Asian 77  
(1,282,248) 
19 
 (364,517) 
96 
 (1,646,765) 
NS 
Latino 250 
(4,293,610) 
46 
 (847,401) 
296 
 (5,141,011) 
NS 
Other 63  
(1,089,408) 
19 
 (318,243) 
82  
(1,407,651) 
NS 
Occupation 
of HH 
Not working for 
money 
1,034 
(16,890,748) 
334 
(6,296,436) 
1,368 
(23,187,184) 
< 0.001 
Professional/ 
Technical 
752 
(12,294,155) 
213 
(3,172,894) 
965 
(15,467,049) 
NS 
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Categories 
Dichotomous 
control 
variables 
Imputed values (counts)a 
Total p* 
No Yes 
Managers and 
Administrators 
611 
(9,601,903) 
151 
(2,413,691) 
762 
(12,015,594) 
NS 
Sales Workers 230 
(3,654,393) 
50 
 (796,944) 
280  
(4,451,337) 
NS 
Clerical 430 
(5,869,508) 
96 
 (1,156,748) 
526 
 (7,026,256) 
NS 
Craftsman 610 
(8,019,866) 
167 
(1,789,814) 
77 
7 (9,809,680) 
NS 
Operatives 308 
(3,214,623) 
86  
(762,378) 
394 
 (3,977,001) 
NS 
Transport 
Equipment 
Operatives 
236 
(2,644,541) 
55  
(537,832) 
291 
 (3,182,373) 
NS 
Laborers 170 
(1,910,029) 
52  
(661,290) 
222 
 (2,571,319) 
NS 
Farmers and 
Farm Managers 
34 
 (518,179) 
13  
(178,609) 
47 
 (696,788) 
NS 
Farm Laborers 
and Farm 
Foremen 
41 
 (565,049) 
5  
(81,278) 
46 
 (646,327) 
NS 
Service Workers 472 
(5,412,926) 
97 
 (1,126,381) 
569 
 (6,539,307) 
NS 
Private 
Household 
Workers 
16  
(178,578) 
2  
(32,138) 
18 
 (210,716) 
NS 
Health 
insurance 
No health 
insurance 
694 
(7,948,830) 
130 
(1,536,053) 
824 
 (9,484,883) 
< 0.001 
Health insurance 3,651 
(53,297,315) 
1,007 
(13,912,973) 
4,658 
(67,210,288) 
NS 
Medicaid or 
Medicare 
622 
(9,742,273) 
188 
(3,581,196) 
810 
(13,323,469) 
NS 
Chronic 
illness 
No 2,835 
(38,167,661) 
691 
(8,712,075) 
3,526 
(46,879,736) 
NS 
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Categories 
Dichotomous 
control 
variables 
Imputed values (counts)a 
Total p* 
No Yes 
Yes 2,134 
(32,899,978) 
635 
(103,23,921) 
2,769 
(43,223,899) 
NS 
Note. HH = head of household; NS = not significant. 
 
aResults using sampling weights are reported in parenthesis.  
 
*For the bivariate analysis with sampling weights, all p-values were less than 0.001. 
 
Table 26. 
Relationships Between Continuous Control Variables and Imputed Values (N = 6,295) 
Note. N = 90,103,635 for bivariate analysis with sampling weights. FU = family unit; HH = head of household. 
 
aResults using sampling weights are reported in parenthesis. bContinuous control variables were ranked and tested 
for Pearson correlation with PROC FREQ. 
 
*For the bivariate analysis with sampling weights, all p-values were less than 0.001. 
 
Separate Measurement Models  
 For data from 2001, five separate measurement models were constructed, one for each of 
the five latent variables. The correlation between psychological distress of HHs and 
psychological distress of wives was fixed to zero because each family had information on 
Continuous control 
variables 
Mean ranka χ2(Pearson 
Correlationb) 
p* 
No  Yes 
Total family income 3,139.7 
(3,202.5) 
3,179.0 
(3,028.2) 
0.49 (0.04) 0.484  
# of people in the FU 3,134.9 
(2,714.6) 
3,197.0 
(2,679.0) 
1.28 (0.01) 0.258  
# of children in the FU 3,175.5 
(2,760.5) 
3,044.8 
(2,586.7) 
6.36 (0.05) 0.012  
Age of HH 3,032.2 
(3,433.7) 
3,575.0 
(4,077.0) 
93.45 (0.14) < 0.001  
Education of HH 2,979.2 
(3,180.8) 
2,959.4 
(3,124.2) 
0.14 (0.01) 0.712  
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psychological distress about only one family member (i.e., HHs or wives, but not both). 
Therefore, there cannot be a correlation between psychological distress of the HHs and the 
wives.  
 In all five separate measurement models, the loadings on psychological distress of HHs 
and wives were significant, p < .001, and their magnitude was good, .541 to .787. In addition, the 
chi-square of all the models was significant, p < .001, indicating that the fit of the data to the 
models was not good; however, that was expected due to the large sample size. 
Latent Variable of Institutional Components15 
 In the analysis without sampling weights, the RMSEA for the null model was lower than 
.158, RMSEA = .131. Therefore, the TLI of the model was not expected to be sufficient, TLI < 
.900. The fit of the separate measurement model of institutional components with psychological 
distress (Figure 9) was good considering the RMSEA = .043, although the TLI was not 
sufficient, TLI = .894, as expected.  
 Two loadings on the latent variable were not significant in this model: income from 
unemployment compensation, p = .727, and child support, p = .239. But the exclusion of those 
two non-significant loadings caused a decrease in the fit of the model, RMSEA = .047 and TLI = 
.892. Therefore, the previous model, including the two non-significant loadings, was used in the 
composite measurement model. In addition, the correlations between institutional components 
and the psychological distress of HHs and wives were negatively significant, r = .464 and r = 
.309, respectively. 
  
 
                                                        
15 From this point forward, I will refer to this latent variable as institutional components. 
124 
 
Figure 9. Separate measurement model of the latent variable of institutional components and 
psychological distress, unweighted and weighted analyses. Unweighted coefficient estimates are 
presented outside the parenthesis, and weighted coefficient estimates are presented inside the 
parenthesis. Loadings that were not significant in the unweighted analysis but were significant in 
the weighted analysis are presented as grey lines; paths that were not significant but were kept in 
the model are presented as dashed lines; all loadings and paths were significant under p < 0.05 
unless otherwise stated. HH = head of household; RMSEA = root mean square error of 
approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; W = wife; x# = item #. The definitions of x1–x10 
can be found in Table 3 and x59–x72 in Table 1. 
* p > 0.05. 
 
  
 Similar results were found using family sampling weights of the 2001 data. The RMSEA 
for the null model was .134, the fit of the data to the model was good considering the RMSEA fit 
index, RMSEA = .045 and TLI = .887, and all loadings were significant, p < .001 (Figure 9). 
However, the variance of the two loadings on the latent variable that were not significant in the 
unweighted model did not contribute to the model, R2 < .001. In addition, the correlations 
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between institutional components and the psychological distress of HHs and wives were 
negatively significant, r = .486 and r = .334, respectively. 
 In both models, unweighted and weighted, two loadings on institutional components did 
not contribute to the model but were included in it. Although the correlations between 
institutional components and psychological distress of HHs and wives were significant in both 
models, the magnitudes of these correlations were slightly higher in the weighted model.  
Latent Variable of Individual Components 
 Due to limited variability in some of the observed items that represented individual 
components, several observed items were summed (Table 27). Those summed items include car 
payments (the sum of Items 11–13), transportation expenses (the sum of Items 14–18), food 
payments (the sum of Items 20 and 21), household possession payments (the sum of Items 24 
and 25), household-related expenses (the sum of Items 26–29), and school payments (the sum of 
Items 30 and 31). 
 
Table 27. 
Individual Components, Observed Item Numbers, and Summarized Items 
Sub-
components 
Variables Item # Summarized items 
Economic 
resources 
and needs 
Payment for car  X11 
Car payments Other payment for car X12 
Payment for car repairs X13 
Payment for gasoline X14 
Transportation 
expenses 
Payment for parking X15 
Payment for fare & train fare X16 
Payment for taxi X17 
Payment for other transportation costs X18 
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Sub-
components 
Variables Item # Summarized items 
Cost of child care X19  
How much spent on food delivered to 
the door 
X20 
Food payments 
How much spend on eating outside the 
home 
X21 
Car insurance X22  
Property taxes X23  
Loan payment for house X24 Household 
possession 
payments Rent payment X25 
Payment for gas and heating X26 
Household related 
expenses 
Payment for electricity X27 
Payment for other utilities X28 
Payment for water and sewer services X29 
School-related expenses X30 
School payments 
Other school-related expenses X31 
Total amount of other debts such as 
credit card charges, student loans, 
medical or legal bills, or loans from 
relatives 
X32 
 
Social 
support 
Received any help from relatives X33  
Receive any help from non-relatives X34  
Gave money toward the support of 
anyone not living at the home 
X35 
 
 
 The RMSEA for the null model, RMSEA = .120, indicated that the TLI would be 
insufficient in the unweighted model. The fit of the separate measurement model of individual 
components with psychological distress (Figure 10) was good considering the RMSEA fit index, 
RMSEA = .042, TLI = .880. Two loadings on the latent variable were not significant: food 
payments, p = .277, and financial help from non-relatives, p = .552. Although the fit of the data 
to the model was still good after the exclusion of those two non-significant loadings, RMSEA = 
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.045 and TLI = .882, it caused a decrease in the fit of the RMSEA. Therefore, the model with the 
two non-significant loadings was used in the composite measurement model. In addition, the 
correlations between individual components and the psychological distress of HHs and wives 
were significant, p < .001. The magnitude of the correlation between individual components and 
the psychological distress of HHs, r = .201, was greater than the magnitude of the correlation 
between individual components and the psychological distress of wives, r = .105.  
 The RMSEA for the null model using family sampling weights of the 2001 data was 
identical to the RMSEA for the null model without sampling weights. Considering the RMSEA 
fit index, the data had a good fit to the model, RMSEA = .045, TLI = .859, and all loadings were 
significant, p < .001 (Figure 10). Again, the variance of the two loadings on the latent variables 
that were not significant in the unweighted model did not contribute to the model, R2 < .003. In 
addition, the correlations between individual components and the psychological distress of HHs 
and wives were positively significant, r = .179 and r = .060, respectively. 
 In both models, unweighted and weighted, two loadings on individual components did 
not contribute to the model but were still included. Although the correlations between individual 
components and the psychological distress of HHs and wives were significant in both models, 
the magnitudes of these correlations were slightly lower in the weighted model.  
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Figure 10. The separate measurement model of the latent variable of individual components and psychological 
distress, unweighted and weighted analyses. Unweighted coefficient estimates are presented outside the parenthesis, 
and weighted coefficient estimates are presented inside the parenthesis. Loadings that were not significant in the 
unweighted analysis but were significant in the weighted analysis are presented as grey lines. Paths that were not 
significant but were kept in the model are presented as dashed lines. All loadings and paths were significant under p 
< 0.05 unless otherwise stated. HH = head of household; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; TLI = 
Tucker-Lewis index; W = wife; x# = Item #.  The definition of x11–x35 can be found in Table 27 and x59–x72 in 
Table 1.  
*p > 0.05. 
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Latent Variable of Intergenerational Transfers 
 In the unweighted analysis, the RMSEA for the null model was greater than .158, 
RMSEA = .204; thus, the TLI was expected to be sufficient. Indeed, the fit of the separate 
measurement model of intergenerational transfers with psychological distress (Figure 11) was 
reasonable considering the RMSEA and TLI fit indices, .063 and .906, respectively. No 
modification was made to improve the fit of the data to the model because the two loadings on 
intergenerational transfers were not significant, p = .282 for both, and the correlations between 
intergenerational transfers and the psychological distress of HHs and wives were not significant, 
p =.957 and p =.381, respectively. However, intergenerational transfers was still included in the 
composite measurement model to examine if this conclusion changed after including the other 
parts of that model. 
 The results from the weighted model indicated the same pattern for the fit to the model, a 
reasonable fit of the data to the model considering the RMSEA and TLI fit indices, .064 and 
.905, respectively (Figure 11). However, the two loadings on the inheritance latent variable were 
significant, p < .001. One of their variances had a large contribution to the model and the other 
had a small contribution to the model, R2 = .723 and .163, respectively. In addition, the 
correlations between intergenerational transfers and the psychological distress of HHs and wives 
were significant, p < .001, but had extremely low magnitudes, r = .002 and r = .022, 
respectively. 
 The weighted and unweighted analyses indicated similar fits of the data to the model but 
yielded different results. Although the loadings on the latent variable and the correlations 
between the latent variable and the psychological distress of HHs and wives were not significant 
in the unweighted model, they were significant under p < .001 in the weighted model. 
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Figure 41. The separate measurement model of the latent variable of intergenerational transfers 
and psychological distress, unweighted and weighted analyses. Unweighted coefficient estimates 
are presented outside the parenthesis, and weighted coefficient estimates are presented inside the 
parenthesis. Loadings that were not significant in the unweighted analysis but were significant in 
the weighted analysis are presented as grey lines. Paths that were not significant but were kept in 
the model are presented as dashed lines. All loadings and paths were significant under p < 0.05 
unless otherwise stated. HH = head of household; RMSEA = root mean square error of 
approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; W = wife; x# = Item #.  The definition of x36–x37 
can be found in Table 4 and x59–x72 in Table 1. 
*p > 0.05. 
 
Latent Variable of Saving and Investment Actions 
 Due to problems with the starting values of one of the observed items (Item 42 in Table 
5), that item was excluded from this analysis and all future analyses.  
 The RMSEA for the null model was greater than .158, RMSEA = .166, in the unweighted 
model; thus, the TLI of the examined model was expected to be sufficient. The fit of the separate 
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measurement model of saving and investment actions with psychological distress (Figure 12) 
was reasonable, RMSEA = .050 and TLI = .910. Two loadings on the latent variable were not 
significant: amount family withdraws from pension, p = .901, and amount family withdraws 
from stocks, p = .813. However, the exclusion of those two non-significant loadings caused a 
decrease in the fit of the model, RMSEA = .058 and TLI = .907. Therefore, the model with the 
two non-significant loadings was used in the composite measurement model.  
 To improve the fit of the data to the model, two modifications were made by including: 
correlations between the error terms of “feeling restless” and “feeling nervous” in the last 30 
days for HHs and wives. In this modified model with the two non-significant loadings (Figure 
12), the fit of the data to the model was good considering the RMSEA and TLI, .033 and .961, 
respectively. In addition, the correlations between saving and investment actions and the 
psychological distress of HHs and wives were significant, p < .001 and p = .007, respectively, 
but their magnitudes were low, r = .099 and r = .058, respectively.  
 In the weighted model (Figure 12), the RMSEA of the null model was .170, and the 
RMSEA and the TLI indicated a reasonable fit of the data to the model, .053 and .904, 
respectively. All loadings on saving and investment actions were significant, p < .01, but the 
variance of the two loadings that were not significant in the unweighted model did not contribute 
to the model, R2 < .001. To improve the fit of the data to the model, the same two correlations 
between error correlations were added, just as in the unweighted model. The fit of the weighted 
modified model (Figure 12) was good, RMSEA = .036 and TLI = .956, and the correlations 
between saving and investment actions and the psychological distress of HHs and wives were 
significant, p < .001. 
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Figure 52. The separate measurement model of the latent variable of saving and investment 
actions and psychological distress, unweighted and weighted analyses. Unweighted coefficient 
estimates are presented outside the parenthesis, and weighted coefficient estimates are presented 
inside the parenthesis. Loadings that were not significant in the unweighted analysis but were 
significant in the weighted analysis are presented as grey lines. Paths that were not significant 
but were kept in the model are presented as dashed lines. Observed items that had problematic 
starting values were excluded from the analyses and are marked in light grey. All loadings and 
paths were significant under p < 0.05 unless otherwise stated. HH = head of household; RMSEA 
= root mean square error of approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; W = wife; x# = Item #.  
The definition of x38–x43 can be found in Table 5 and x59–x72 in Table 1. 
*p > 0.05. 
 
 The same two loadings did not contribute to the model in the weighted and unweighted 
models, but those loadings were left in. By adding two correlations between error terms, the fit 
of the weighted and unweighted models were improved from reasonable fit to good fit, 
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considering the RMSEA and TLI fit indices. In both models, the correlations between saving and 
investment actions and the psychological distress of HHs and wives were significant; However, 
their magnitude was slightly higher in the weighted model. 
Latent Variable of Asset Accumulation 
 In the analysis without sampling weights, the RMSEA for the null model was .120; 
therefore, the TLI of the model was not expected to be sufficient, TLI < .900. The fit of the 
separate measurement model of asset accumulation with psychological distress (Figure 13) was 
reasonable considering the RMSEA, RMSEA = .052, but not sufficient considering the TLI fit 
index, TLI = .815. Of the 15 loadings on asset accumulation, 2 were not significant: amount from 
rollover money to IRA, p = .592, and amount in pension from former employer, p = .398. 
Following the removal of these non-significant loadings, the fit of the model worsened, RMSEA 
= .056 and TLI = .815. Therefore, the model with the two non-significant loadings was used in 
the composite model. Considering the RMSEA fit index, the fit of the data to the model became 
good after adding correlations between the error terms of feeling restlessness and feeling 
nervousness in the last 30 days for HHs and wives (Figure 7), but the TLI was not sufficient, TLI 
= .851. In addition, the correlations between asset accumulation and the psychological distress of 
HHs and wives were significant, p < .001, but their magnitudes were relatively low, r = .183 and 
r = .114, respectively.  
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Figure 6. The separate measurement model of the latent variable of asset accumulation and 
psychological distress, unweighted and weighted analyses. Unweighted coefficient estimates are 
presented outside the parenthesis, and weighted coefficient estimates are presented inside the 
parenthesis. Loadings that were not significant in the unweighted analysis but were significant in 
the weighted analysis are presented as grey lines. Paths that were not significant but were kept in 
the model are presented as dashed lines. All loadings and paths were significant under p < 0.05 
unless otherwise stated. HH = head of household; RMSEA = root mean square error of 
approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; W = wife; x# = Item #. The definition of x44–x58 
can be found in Table 6 and x59–x72 in Table 1. 
*p > 0.05. 
 
135 
 Similar results presented in the weighted analysis (Figure 13). The RMSEA of the null 
model was .123, the RMSEA of the examined model was reasonable, RMSEA =.056, and the 
TLI was not sufficient, TLI =.792. Although, the loadings on asset accumulation were 
significant, p < .001, the contributions of the variances of the two loadings that were not 
significant to the unweighted model were close to zero, R2 < .001. To improve the model, the 
same two correlations between error terms, as in the unweighted model, were added to the model 
(Figure 13). A good fit was reached according to the RMSEA fit index, RMSEA = .050, but the 
TLI was still not sufficient, TLI = .827.  
 In the weighted and unweighted models, the RMSEA of the null model indicated that the 
RMSEA of the examined model would be sufficient and the TLI would not. The RMSEA was 
indeed sufficient for both models, and they reached a good fit after the addition of the same two 
correlations between error terms. The same two loadings did not contribute to the model. In the 
unweighted model, they were not significant, but in the weighted model, they were significant 
but had a multiple correlation squared of less than .001. In addition, the correlations between 
asset accumulation and psychological distress of HHs and wives was significant in the weighted 
and unweighted models, but was slightly higher for the weighted model.  
Composite Measurement Model 
 Using the modified separate models from the previous section, a composite measurement 
model was developed and tested. The composite model included five latent independent 
variables (i.e., individual components, institutional components, intergenerational transfers, 
saving and investment actions, and asset accumulation) and the psychological distress of HHs 
and wives. All latent independent variables were correlated with each other and with the 
psychological distress of HHs and wives.  
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 The composite model did not run in its original structure (i.e., Items 1–10 were loaded on 
institutional components, Items 11–35 were loaded on individuals components, Items 36–37 
were loaded on intergenerational transfers, Items 38–43 were loaded on saving and investment 
actions, and Items 44–58 were loaded on asset accumulation), and one observed item needed to 
be shifted from one latent independent variable to another. The observed item amount of home 
insurance that was loaded on institutional component was shifted to be loaded on the individual 
component; theoretically, the amount of home insurance was thought to be related to a person’s 
feeling of security about his or her assets as an indicator of institutional components, but perhaps 
the amount of home insurance was more related to the financial burden of a family as measured 
in by individual components. 
 In the unweighted model (Figure 14), the RMSEA of the null model was .068, which is 
much lower than .158 and indicates an insufficient TLI. Indeed, the fit of the model was good 
considering the RMSEA= .031, but not sufficient considering the TLI= .790. The same loadings 
that were not significant in the separate measurement models were not significant in the 
composite measurement model. A new loading was not significant in the composite 
measurement model but was kept in the model. Most of the correlations between latent 
independent variables and psychological distress were significant, except the correlations 
between intergenerational transfers and the psychological distress of HHs and wives. Although 
these correlations were not significant, they were not removed from the composite measurement 
models because they are an essential part of these models. 
  
  
Figure 74. The composite measurement model of the asset-building theoretical framework and psychological distress, unweighted and weighted analyses. 
Unweighted coefficient estimates are presented outside the parenthesis, and weighted coefficient estimates are presented inside the parenthesis. Loadings that 
were not significant in the unweighted analysis but were significant in the weighted analysis are presented as grey lines. Observed items that had problematic 
starting values were excluded from the analyses and are marked as light grey. Paths that were not significant but were kept in the model are presented by dashed 
lines. All loadings and paths were significant under p < 0.05 unless otherwise stated. HH = head of household; RMSEA = root mean square error of 
approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; W = wife; x# = Item #. The definition of x1–x10 can be found in Table 3, x11–x35 in Table 27, x36–x37 in Table 4, 
x38–x43 in Table 5, x44–x58 in Table 6, and x59–x72 in Table 1.  
*p > 0.05. 
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 Similar results were found in the weighted composite measurement model (Figure 14). 
Although the TLI of the examined model was not sufficient, TLI = .735, the RMSEA for the null 
model was lower than .158, RMSEA = .071, and the fit of the data to the examined model was 
good considering the RMSEA fit index, RMSEA = .036. All loadings on the latent independent 
variables were significant under p < .001 as well as the correlations between latent independent 
variables and the psychological distress of HHs and wives. However, the magnitude of the 
correlations between intergenerational transfers and the psychological distress of HHs and wives 
was low, .004 and .017, respectively. In addition, the loadings on the latent independent 
variables that were not significant in the unweighted model did not contribute to the weighted 
composite model, R2 < .001. 
 In the weighted and unweighted models, the RMSEA of the null model indicated that the 
RMSEA of the examined model would be good and the TLI of the examined model would not be 
sufficient. The same seven loadings on both models did not contribute to the fit of the data to the 
model, and most of the correlations between the latent independent variables and psychological 
distress were significant. The two correlations that were not significant in the unweighted 
composite measurement model had extremely low magnitude in the weighted composite 
measurement model.  
Cross-Sectional Model 
 The cross-sectional model included directional paths between latent variables, 
independent and dependent, according to the asset-building theoretical framework using data 
from the 2001 wave. To account for other confounding variables that could have influenced the 
model, all control variables were added as exogenous variables that predicted asset accumulation 
and the psychological distress of HHs and wives. In addition, correlations between the 
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exogenous individual components, institutional components, and intergenerational transfers were 
added to the cross-sectional model. The two correlations between error terms that were added in 
previous models were added as well. The examination of the cross-sectional model that included 
the interaction term of race and gender showed that the fit of the model significantly worsened 
with the interaction term. Therefore, only the cross-sectional model without the interaction term 
was examined.  
 The main hypothesis of this study was that the data would fit the theoretical model (H1). 
In addition, there were seven direct and seven indirect hypotheses:  
 Direct Hypothesis 1 (DH1): Improvement in individual components (i.e., larger 
economic resources, fewer economic needs, and less informal financial social 
support) will increase saving and investment actions (i.e., larger deposits and smaller 
withdrawals).  
 
 Direct Hypothesis 2 (DH2): Improvement in institutional components (i.e., lower 
asset limits and greater access, security, and incentives) will increase saving and 
investment.  
 
 Direct Hypothesis 3 (DH3): Larger intergenerational and interhousehold transfers 
(i.e., larger inheritances) will increase saving and investment actions.  
 
 Direct Hypothesis 4 (DH4): Larger intergenerational and interhousehold transfers will 
increase asset accumulation (i.e., greater retirement savings, home equity, net worth, 
and liquid savings). 
 
 Direct Hypothesis 5 (DH5): Greater saving and investment actions will increase asset 
accumulation. 
 
 Direct Hypotheses 6 (DH6): Greater asset accumulation will improve psychological 
well-being (i.e., lower psychological distress). 
 
 Direct Hypotheses 7 (DH7): Better psychological well-being will increase asset 
accumulation. 
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 1 (IH1): Improvement in individual components will increase 
asset accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 2 (IH2): Improvement in institutional components will increase 
asset accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions.  
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 Indirect Hypothesis 3 (IH3): Larger intergenerational and interhousehold transfers 
will increase asset accumulation through an increase in saving and investment 
actions.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 4 (IH4): Improvement in individual components will improve 
psychological well-being through an increase in saving and investment actions and 
through an increase in asset accumulation.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 5 (IH5): Improvement in institutional components will improve 
psychological well-being through an increase in saving and investment actions and 
through an increase in asset accumulation.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 6 (IH6): Larger intergenerational and interhousehold transfers 
will improve psychological well-being through an increase in saving and investment 
actions and through an increase in asset accumulation.  
 
 Indirect Hypothesis 7 (IH7): Greater saving and investment actions will improve 
psychological well-being through an increase in asset accumulation.  
 
 Table 28 displays the main statistical results of the unweighted and weighted models and 
whether the hypotheses of the study were supported. 
 
Table 28. 
Summary of Main Statistical Results and Hypotheses Support in the Cross-Sectional Model, 
Unweighted and Weighted Analyses 
 
Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
Main 
hypothesis 
The observed 
covariance of the 
population under 
study is not 
significantly different 
from the covariance 
of the parameter 
estimates of the 
hypothesized model. 
RMSEA = 
0.037 
RMSEA = 
0.043 
 Yes Yes 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
Direct 
hypotheses 
(DH#) 
DH1-Improvement in 
individual 
components will 
increase saving and 
investment actions. 
γ = 1.127 γ = 0.938  Yes Yes 
DH2-Improvement in 
institutional 
components will 
increase saving and 
investment actions. 
γ = 0.531 γ = 0.302  Yes Yes 
DH3-Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers will increase 
saving and investment 
actions.  
γ = 0.277 γ = 0.275  Yes Yes 
DH4-Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers will increase 
asset accumulation. 
γ = 0.133 γ = 0.115  No No 
DH5-Greater saving 
and investment 
actions will increase 
asset accumulation. 
β = 0.657 β = 0.661  Yes Yes 
DH6-Greater asset 
accumulation will 
improve 
psychological 
distress. 
β = 0.187 
for HH 
β = 0.164 
for W 
β = 0.291 
for HH 
β= 0.144 
for W 
 No No 
DH7-Better 
psychological distress 
will increase asset 
accumulation. 
β = 0.186  
for HH 
β = 0.115 
for W 
β = 0.272  
for HH 
β = 0.114 
for W 
 Yes Yes 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
Indirect 
hypotheses 
(IH#) 
IH1-Improvement in 
individual 
components will 
increase asset 
accumulation through 
an increase in saving 
and investment 
actions (γ11 × β21). 
Indirect 
effect =  
0.740 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.620 
 Yes Yes 
IH2-Improvement in 
institutional 
components will 
increase asset 
accumulation through 
an increase in saving 
and investment 
actions (γ12 × β21). 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.349 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.200 
 Yes Yes 
IH3-Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers will increase 
asset accumulation 
through an increase in 
saving and investment 
actions (γ13 × β21). 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.182 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.182 
 Yes Yes 
IH4-Improvement in 
individual 
components will 
improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase in 
saving and investment 
actions and through 
an increase in asset 
accumulation (γ11 × 
β21 × β32 and γ11 × 
β21 × β42). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.138 
W 0.121 
Indirect 
effect =  
HH 0.180 
W 0.089 
 No No 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
IH5-Improvement in 
institutional 
components will 
improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase in 
saving and investment 
actions and through 
an increase in asset 
accumulation (γ12 × 
β21 × β32 and γ12 × 
β21 × β42). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.065 
W 0.057 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.058 
W 0.029 
 No No 
IH6-Larger 
intergenerational & 
interhousehold 
transfers will improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase in 
saving and investment 
actions and through 
an increase in asset 
accumulation (γ13 × 
β21 × β32 and γ13 × 
β21 X β42). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.034 
W 0.030 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH0.053 
W 0.026 
 No No 
IH7-Greater saving 
and investment 
actions will improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase in 
asset accumulation 
(β21 × β32 and β21 × 
β42). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.123 
W 0.108 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.192 
W 0.100 
 No No 
Note. HH = head of household; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; W = wife. 
Unweighted Cross-Sectional Model  
 H1: The RMSEA for the null model was lower than 0.158, null RMSEA = .108, meaning 
the RMSEA of the examined model was good, .037, and the TLI was insufficient, .599. Thus, the 
main hypothesis was supported. Two out of the nine loadings that were not significant in 
previous models became significant in the unweighted cross-sectional model, p < .05 (Figure 
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15): income from child support from institutional components and amount family withdraws 
from stocks from saving and investment actions. 
 
 
Figure 8. The cross-sectional model of the asset-building theoretical framework and 
psychological distress, unweighted and weighted analyses. Unweighted coefficient estimates are 
presented outside the parenthesis, and weighted coefficient estimates are presented inside the 
parenthesis. Loadings on the latent variables are not presented due to space limits of the page. 
Paths that were not significant in the unweighted analysis but were significant in the weighted 
analysis are presented as grey lines. Paths that were not significant but were kept in the model 
are presented as dashed lines. All paths were significant under p < 0.05 unless otherwise stated. 
CI = chronic illness; Edu = education; FC = family composition; FS = family size; HI = health 
insurance; IV = imputed values; HH = head of household; MS = marital status; Ocp = 
occupation; Q = quadratic term; W = wife; YN= yes/no.   
*p > 0.05. 
 
 Saving and investment actions was positively significantly associated with individual 
components, γ = 1.127, institutional components, γ = 0.531, and intergenerational transfers, γ = 
0.277. These findings support the first three hypotheses about direct effects in the asset-building 
theoretical framework (DH1, DH2, and DH3).  
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 Direct Hypothesis 4 was not supported because asset accumulation was negatively 
significantly associated with intergenerational transfers, γ = 0.133. However, DH5 was 
supported; asset accumulation was positively significantly associated with saving and investment 
actions, β = 0.657.  
 The hypothesis regarding the positive reciprocal relationship between asset accumulation 
and psychological distress was partially supported. Psychological distress of HHs and wives was 
negatively significantly associated with asset accumulation, β = 0.187 and β = 0.164, 
respectively. This finding is opposite to the relationship hypothesized in DH6. However, asset 
accumulation was positively significantly associated with psychological distress of HHs, β = 
0.186, and wives, β = 0.115, which supports DH7.  
 The first three hypotheses about indirect effects in the asset-building theoretical 
framework were supported: (IH1) improvement in individual components was significantly 
associated with an increase in asset accumulation through an increase in savings and investment 
actions, Indirect Effect × (γ11 × β21) = 0.740; (IH2) improvement in institutional components 
was significantly associated with an increase in asset accumulation through an increase in 
savings and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (γ12 × β21) = 0.349; and (IH3) larger 
intergenerational transfers was significantly associated with an increase in asset accumulation 
through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (γ13 × β21) = 0.182.  
 All other hypotheses about indirect effects in the asset-building theoretical framework 
(IH4, IH5, IH6, and IH7) were not supported because the directional hypothesis that greater asset 
accumulation would improve psychological distress was not supported. This indicates that 
improvement in individual components was not associated with improvement in psychological 
distress through an increase in saving and investment actions or through an increase in asset 
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accumulation, γ11 × β21 × β32 and γ11 × β21 × β42. Improvement in institutional components 
was not associated with improvement in psychological distress through an increase in saving and 
investment actions or through an increase in asset accumulation, γ12 × β21 × β32 and γ12 × β21 
× β42. Larger intergenerational transfers was not associated with improvement in psychological 
distress through an increase in saving and investment actions or through an increase in asset 
accumulation, γ13 × β21 × β32 and γ13 × β21 × β42. And greater saving and investment actions 
was not associated with improvement in psychological distress through an increase in asset 
accumulation, β21 × β32 and β21 × β42. 
 Individual components was significantly correlated with institutional components, r = 
.622, and intergenerational transfers, r = .106. In addition, institutional components was 
significantly associated with intergenerational transfers, r = .092. 
 Some of the control variables were not associated with asset accumulation or the 
psychological distress of HHs or wives, p > .05. For example, sex of HH, chronic illness history 
of HH, and if anyone in the family unit had health insurance were not associated with asset 
accumulation. The psychological distress of HHs was not associated with HH age, race, family 
size, number of children in the family unit, health insurance of someone in the family unit, 
imputed values, and quadratic terms of HH education, family size, and number of children in the 
family unit. Finally, the psychological distress of a wife was not associated with the wife’s age, 
race, education, occupation, family size, number of children in the family unit, and the quadratic 
terms of a wife’s education, family size, and number of children in the family unit. However, the 
exclusion of those non-significant control variables caused a decrease in the fit of the data to the 
model, RMSEA = .037 and TLI =.589. In addition, according to the literature, those control 
variables can influence asset accumulation and psychological distress. Therefore, all control 
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variables were left in the model regardless of their significant or non-significant relationship to 
asset accumulation or psychological distress.  
 Asset accumulation was significantly associated, under p < .05, with the age, race, 
education, and occupation of HHs and wives, family size, number of children in the family unit, 
marital status of HHs, income, chronic illness history of wives, if a family unit had a wife, and if 
the family had imputed values. The psychological distress of HHs was significantly associated 
with the HH quadratic terms of age, sex, marital status, education, occupation, chronic illness 
history, and by family income and the quadratic term of family income. And the psychological 
distress of the wives was significantly associated with the wives’ quadratic terms of age, marital 
status of HH, chronic illness history of wives, and by family income and the quadratic term of 
income.  
Weighted Cross-Sectional Model 
 The RMSEA for the null model was .114; therefore, a not-sufficient TLI was expected, 
TLI = .523, and the RMSEA of the examined model was good, RMSEA = .043 (Figure 15). 
Thus, the main hypothesis (H1) was supported. All loadings on the latent variables were 
significant, p < .05. In both separate and composite measurement models, nine loadings on the 
latent variables did not contribute to the models; the same nine loadings did not contribute to the 
weighted cross-sectional model as well, R2 < .001. 
 The first three hypotheses about direct effects in the asset-building theoretical framework 
were supported: savings and investment actions was positively significantly associated with 
(DH1) individual components, γ = 0.938; (DH2) institutional components, γ = 0.302; and (DH3) 
intergenerational transfers, γ = 0.275. However, DH4 was not supported because asset 
accumulation was negatively significantly associated with intergenerational transfers, γ = 
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0.115. In addition, asset accumulation was positively significantly associated with saving and 
investment actions, β = 0.661, supporting DH5.  
 The psychological distress of HHs and wives was negatively significantly associated with 
asset accumulation, β = 0.291 and β = 0.144, respectively, meaning that DH6 was not 
supported. However, asset accumulation was positively significantly associated with the 
psychological distress of HHs, β = 0.272, and wives, β = 0.114, which supports DH7.  
 Regarding the hypotheses about indirect effects in the asset-building theoretical 
framework, IH1, IH2, and IH3 were supported: (IH1) improvement in individual components 
was significantly associated with an increase in asset accumulation through an increase in saving 
and investment actions, Indirect Effect (γ11 × β21) = 0.620; (IH2) improvement in institutional 
components was significantly associated with an increase in asset accumulation through an 
increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect (γ12 × β21) = 0.200; and (IH3) larger 
intergenerational transfers was significantly associated with an increase in asset accumulation 
through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect (γ13 × β21) = 0.182.  
 Due to the direction of the influence of asset accumulation on psychological distress 
being the opposite of the hypothesized direction, all other hypotheses about indirect effects in the 
asset-building theoretical framework were not supported (IH4, IH5, IH6, and IH7). In other 
words, improvement in individual components was not associated with improvement in 
psychological distress through an increase in savings and investment actions or through an 
increase in asset accumulation (IH4), γ11 × β21 × β32 and γ11 × β21 × β42. Improvement in 
institutional components was not associated with improvement in psychological distress through 
an increase in saving and investment actions and through an increase in asset accumulation 
(IH5), γ12 × β21 × β32 and γ12 × β21 × β42. Larger intergenerational transfers was not 
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associated with improvement in psychological distress through an increase in saving and 
investment actions and through an increase in asset accumulation (IH6), γ13 × β21 × β32 and 
γ13 × β21 × β42. And greater saving and investment actions was not associated with 
improvement in psychological distress through an increase in asset accumulation (IH7), β21 × 
β32 and β21 × β42. 
 Individual components was significantly correlated with the latent variables of 
institutional components, r = .574, and intergenerational transfers, r = .085. In addition, 
institutional components was significantly associated with intergenerational transfers, r = .118. 
 All control variables were significantly associated with asset accumulation, and the 
psychological distress of HHs and wives, p < .001. However, the magnitude of some of those 
paths was low. For example, a magnitude of less than 0.100 was presented for the directional 
path between asset accumulation and race of wives, education of HHs, occupation of HHs and 
wives, history of chronic illness of HHs and wives, and health insurance for someone in the 
family unit. 
Comparison Between Unweighted and Weighted Cross-Sectional Models  
 In both models, the main hypothesis was supported (H1). In addition, the same direct 
(DH1, DH2, DH3, DH4, and DH7) and indirect (IH1, IH2, and IH3) hypotheses were supported 
in both models, and the same direct (DH5 and DH6) and indirect (IH4, IH5, IH6, and IH7) 
hypotheses were not supported in both models. 
 The weighted cross-sectional model presented a lower magnitude of the paths between 
saving and investment actions and the latent variables of individual components, institutional 
components, and intergenerational transfers compared with the unweighted cross-sectional 
model. However, in the weighted cross-sectional model, the magnitude of the paths between 
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asset accumulation and saving and investment actions and intergenerational transfers was higher 
compared with the unweighted model. The magnitude of the path between asset accumulation 
and the psychological distress of HHs was greater in the weighted model, and the path between 
asset accumulation and the psychological distress of wives was of similar magnitude in both 
models. In addition, the magnitude of the path between psychological distress of HHs and asset 
accumulation was greater in the weighted model, and the magnitude of the path between the 
psychological distress of wives and asset accumulation was smaller in the weighted model. 
 In the weighted cross-sectional model, all the paths between control variables and asset 
accumulation were significant. Three paths were not significant in the unweighted model (i.e., 
sex of HH, history of chronic illness of HH, and health insurance of someone in the family unit). 
Only nine paths between control variables and the psychological distress of HHs were significant 
in the unweighted cross-sectional model (i.e., sex, marital status, education, occupation, history 
of chronic illness of HH, family income and the quadratic terms of education and age of HH and 
family income), compared with the weighted cross-sectional model that presented significant 
paths between all control variables and the psychological distress of HHs. Out of 16 significant 
paths between control variables and the psychological distress of wives in the weighted model, 9 
were significant in the unweighted model (i.e., marital status of HH, family income, education of 
wives, imputed values and the quadratic terms of education of wives, age of wives, family size, 
number of children, and family income).  
Longitudinal Model  
 The longitudinal model included information from two time points, 2001 and 2007. For 
the weighted longitudinal model, family longitudinal sampling weights were used. The model 
used in the cross-sectional analysis was used for each time point, including control variables, and 
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directional paths were added between the time points. Each latent variable of the 2001 wave was 
assumed to predict the same latent variable of the 2007 wave. For example, individual 
components from the 2001 wave were expected to predict individual components from the 2007 
wave. The psychological distress of HHs and wives in the 2001 wave were assumed to predict 
the psychological distress of HHs and wives in 2007, respectively. Table 29 displays the main 
statistical results of the unweighted and weighted models and whether the hypotheses of the 
study were supported. Table 29 also shows whether the expected influences of the latent 
variables in 2001 on the latent variables in 2007 were found. 
 
Table 29. 
Summary of Statistical Results and Hypotheses Support in the Longitudinal Model, Unweighted 
and Weighted Analyses 
 
Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
Main 
hypothesis 
The observed 
covariance of the 
population under 
study is not 
significantly different 
from the covariance 
of the parameter 
estimates of the 
hypothesized model. 
RMSEA = 
0.030 
RMSEA = 
0.035 
 Yes Yes 
Direct 
hypotheses 
(DH#) in 
2001 
DH1-Improvement in 
individual 
components will 
increase saving and 
investment actions. 
γ = 1.152 γ = 0.992  Yes Yes 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
DH2-Improvement in 
institutional 
components will 
increase saving and 
investment 
γ = 0.539 γ = 0.294  Yes Yes 
DH3-Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers will increase 
saving and 
investment actions. 
γ = 0.231 γ = 0.216  Yes Yes 
DH4-Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers will increase 
asset accumulation. 
γ = 0.108 γ = 0.080  No No 
DH5-Greater saving 
and investment 
actions will increase 
asset accumulation. 
β = 0.657 β = 0.661  Yes Yes 
DH6-Greater asset 
accumulation will 
improve 
psychological 
distress. 
HH 
β = 0.188 
W 
β = 0.160 
HH 
β = 0.224 
W 
β = 0.154 
 No No 
DH7-Better 
psychological distress 
will increase asset 
accumulation. 
HH 
β = 0.187 
W 
β = 0.113 
HH 
β = 0.224 
W 
β = 0.112 
 Yes Yes 
Indirect 
hypotheses 
(IH#) in 
2001 
IH1-Improvement in 
individual 
components will 
increase asset 
accumulation through 
an increase in saving 
and investment 
actions (γ11 × β21). 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.748 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.637 
 Yes Yes 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
IH2-Improvement in 
institutional 
components will 
increase asset 
accumulation through 
an increase in saving 
and investment 
actions (γ12 × β21). 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.350 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.189 
 Yes Yes 
IH3-Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers will increase 
asset accumulation 
through an increase 
in saving and 
investment actions 
(γ13 × β21). 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.150 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.139 
 Yes Yes 
IH4-Improvement in 
individual 
components will 
improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase 
in saving and 
investment actions 
and through an 
increase in asset 
accumulation (γ11 × 
β21 × β32 and γ11 × 
β21 × β42). 
Indirect 
effect 
= 
HH 0.141 
W 0.120 
Indirect 
effect 
= 
HH 0.143 
W 0.089 
 No No 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
IH5-Improvement in 
institutional 
components will 
improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase 
in saving and 
investment actions 
and through an 
increase in asset 
accumulation (γ12 × 
β21 × β32 and γ12 × 
β21 × β42). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.066 
W 0.056 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.042 
W 0.029 
 No No 
IH6-Larger 
intergenerational & 
interhousehold 
transfers will improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase 
in saving and 
investment actions 
and through an 
increase in asset 
accumulation (γ13 × 
β21 × β32 and γ13 × 
β21 × β42). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.028 
W 0.024 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH0.031 
W 0.021 
 No No 
IH7-Greater saving 
and investment 
actions will improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase 
in asset accumulation 
(β21 × β32 and β21 × 
β42). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.122 
W 0.104 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.144 
W 0.100 
 No No 
Direct 
hypotheses  
in 2007 
DH1-Improvement in 
individual 
components will 
increase saving and 
investment actions.  
β = 0.521 β = 0.770  Yes Yes 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
DH2-Improvement in 
institutional 
components will 
increase saving and 
investment.  
β = 0.018* β = 
0.004* 
 No No 
DH3-Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers will increase 
saving and 
investment actions.  
β = 0.854 β = 0.436  Yes Yes 
DH4-Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers will increase 
asset accumulation. 
β = 1.040 β = 0.284  No No 
DH5-Greater saving 
and investment 
actions will increase 
asset accumulation. 
β = 1.341 β = 0.849  Yes Yes 
DH6-Greater asset 
accumulation will 
improve 
psychological 
distress. 
HH 
β = 0.030* 
W 
β = 0.087 
HH 
β = 0.034 
W 
β = 0.052 
 No for HH 
Yes for W 
No for HH 
Yes for W 
DH7-Better 
psychological distress 
will increase asset 
accumulation. 
HH 
β = 0.006* 
W 
β = 0.047 
HH 
β = 0.042 
W 
β = 0.015 
 No Yes for 
HH 
No for W 
Indirect 
hypotheses 
in 2007 
IH1-Improvement in 
individual 
components will 
increase asset 
accumulation through 
an increase in saving 
and investment 
actions (β85 × β98). 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.699 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.654 
 Yes Yes 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
IH2-Improvement in 
institutional 
components will 
increase asset 
accumulation through 
an increase in saving 
and investment 
actions (β86 × β98). 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.024* 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.003 
 No No 
IH3-Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers will increase 
asset accumulation 
through an increase 
in saving and 
investment actions 
(β87 × β98). 
Indirect 
effect = 
1.145 
Indirect 
effect = 
0.370 
 Yes Yes 
IH4-Improvement in 
individual 
components will 
improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase 
in saving and 
investment actions 
and through an 
increase in asset 
accumulation (β85 × 
β98 × β109 and β85 × 
β98 × β119). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.021* 
W 0.061 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.022 
W 0.034 
 No for HH 
Yes for W 
No for HH 
Yes for W 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
IH5-Improvement in 
institutional 
components will 
improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase 
in saving and 
investment actions 
and through an 
increase in asset 
accumulation (β86 × 
β98 × β109 and β86 × 
β98 × β119). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH  
0.001* 
W  
0.002* 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 
 < 0.001* 
W 
 < 0.001* 
 No No 
IH6-Larger 
intergenerational & 
interhousehold 
transfers will improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase 
in saving and 
investment actions 
and through an 
increase in asset 
accumulation (β87 × 
β98 × β109 and β87 × 
β98 × β119). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 
 0.034* 
W  
0.100 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 
0.013* 
W 
 0.019 
 No for HH 
Yes for W 
No for HH 
Yes for W 
IH7-Greater saving 
and investment 
actions will improve 
psychological distress 
through an increase 
in asset accumulation 
(β98 × β109 and β98 
× β119). 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.040* 
W 0.117 
Indirect 
effect = 
HH 0.029 
W 0.044 
 No for HH 
Yes for W 
No for HH 
Yes for W 
Expected 
influence of 
2001 latent 
variables 
on 2007 
latent 
variables 
Improvement in 
individual 
components in 2001 
will improve 
individual 
components in 2007. 
γ = 0.133 γ = 0.109  Yes Yes 
158 
Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
Improvement in 
institutional 
components in 2001 
will improve 
institutional 
components in 2007. 
γ = 0.109 γ = 0.064  Yes Yes 
Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers in 2001 will 
increase 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers in 2007. 
γ = 0.005* γ = 
0.001* 
 No No 
Greater saving and 
investment actions in 
2001 will increase 
saving and 
investment actions in 
2007.  
β = 0.106* β = 0.205  No No 
Greater asset 
accumulation in 2001 
will increase asset 
accumulation in 
2007. 
β = 0.056 β = 0.087  Yes Yes 
Better psychological 
distress in 2001 will 
improve 
psychological distress 
in 2007. 
HH 
β = 0.036 
W 
β = 0.024* 
HH 
β = 0.063 
W 
β = 0.024 
 No No 
Improvement in 
individual 
components in 2001 
will increase saving 
and investment 
actions in 2007. 
β = 0.066* β = 0.140  No Yes 
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Hypotheses 
Statistical results  Hypothesis support 
Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
 Unweighted 
model 
Weighted 
model 
Improvement in 
institutional 
components in 2001 
will increase saving 
and investment in 
2007. 
β = 0.028* β = 0.023*  No No 
Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers in 2001 will 
increase saving and 
investment actions in 
2007. 
β = 0.017* β = 0.019*  No No 
Larger 
intergenerational and 
interhousehold 
transfers in 2001 will 
increase asset 
accumulation in 
2007. 
β = 0.040* β = 0.050  No Yes 
Greater saving and 
investment actions in 
2001 will increase 
asset accumulation in 
2007. 
β = 0.046* β = 0.061  No No 
Greater asset 
accumulation in 2001 
will improve 
psychological distress 
in 2007. 
HH 
β = 0.006* 
W 
β = 0.029* 
HH 
β = 0.005* 
W 
β = 0.038 
 No No 
Better psychological 
distress in 2001 will 
increase asset 
accumulation in 
2007. 
HH 
β = 0.040 
W 
β =  0.018* 
HH 
β = 0.077 
W 
β = 0.010 
 No No for HH 
Yes for W 
Note. HH = heads of the household; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; W =wives.  
*p > .05. 
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Unweighted Longitudinal Model  
 The RMSEA for the null model was .079, indicating a good fit of the model according to 
the RMSEA of the examined model, RMSEA =.030, TLI =.545 (Figure 16). This finding 
supports the main hypothesis (H1). A total of 13 loadings on the latent variables were not 
significant in the unweighted longitudinal model; 7 in the 2001 wave and 6 in the 2007 wave. 
Only 4 non-significant loadings on the latent variables were similar in both waves: income from 
unemployment compensation, received financial help from relatives, received financial help 
from non-relatives, and amount in pension from former employer. 
 Just as in the cross-sectional model, saving and investment actions of the 2001 wave was 
significantly associated with the 2001 wave’s latent variables: individual components, γ = 1.152; 
institutional components, γ = 0.539; and intergenerational transfers, γ = 0.231. These findings 
support the first three direct hypotheses (DH1, DH2, and DH3). However, only two of these 
hypotheses were supported in the 2007 wave (DH1 and DH3). Saving and investment actions in 
2007 was significantly associated with the 2007 latent variables of individual components, β = 
0.521, and intergenerational transfers, β = 0.854, but not by the 2007 latent variables of 
institutional components, p = .165. Although saving and investment actions in 2007 was 
expected to be predicted by the 2001 wave’s latent variables, it was not: saving and investment 
actions, p = .606; individual components, p = .783; institutional components, p = .820; and 
intergenerational transfers, p = .808. Because the relationship between the latent variables was 
negative, DH4 was not supported, γ = 0.108. However, asset accumulation in the 2001 wave 
was significantly associated with saving and investment actions of 2001, β = 0.649. That finding 
supports DH5. Psychological distress of HHs and wives in the 2001 wave was negatively 
significantly associated with the 2001 wave’s asset accumulation, β = 0.188 and β = 0.160, 
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respectively. Thus, only one part of the hypothesized positive reciprocal relationship between 
asset accumulation and psychological distress was supported (DH6). But DH7 was supported, 
because asset accumulation in the 2001 wave was significantly associated with the 2001 wave’s 
psychological distress of HHs, β = 0.187, and wives, β = 0.113.  
 As hypothesized in DH5, asset accumulation in the 2007 wave was positively 
significantly associated with saving and investment actions in 2007, β = 1.341, p < .001. 
However, asset accumulation in 2007 was negatively significantly associated with the 2007 
wave’s intergenerational transfers, β = 1.040 and p < .001, and psychological distress of wives, 
β = 0.047 and p = .003, was opposed to the positive paths hypothesized in DH4 and DH6. In 
addition, asset accumulation in 2007 was not significantly associated with psychological distress 
of HHs in 2007, p = .715. In other words, the hypothesis regarding the relationship between asset 
accumulation and the psychological distress of HHs was not supported (DH6). 
 As expected, asset accumulation in 2001 positively significantly predicted asset 
accumulation in 2007, β = 0.056 and p = .009. Unexpectedly, psychological distress of HHs in 
the 2001 wave negatively significantly predicted asset accumulation in 2007, β = 0.040 and p = 
.005, and it was not predicted by psychological distress of wives in the 2001 wave, p = .190; 
saving and investment actions in the 2001 wave, p = .558; and intergenerational transfers in 
2001, p = .584. 
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Figure 16. Longitudinal model of the asset-building theoretical framework and psychological distress, unweighted 
and weighted analyses. Unweighted coefficient estimates are presented outside the parenthesis, and weighted 
coefficient estimates are presented inside the parenthesis. Loadings on the latent variables are not presented due to 
space limits of the page. Paths that were not significant in the unweighted analysis but were significant in the 
weighted analysis are presented as dark grey lines. Paths that were significant in the unweighted analysis but were 
not significant in the weighted analysis are presented as light grey lines. Paths that were not significant in 
unweighted and weighted analyses but were kept in the model are presented as dashed lines. All paths were 
significant under p < 0.05 unless otherwise stated. CI = chronic illness; Edu = education; FC = family composition; 
FS = family size; HH = heads of household; HI= health insurance; IV = imputed values; MS = marital status; Ocp = 
occupation; Q = quadratic term; W = wives; YN = yes/no wife.  *p > 0.05. 
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 Psychological distress of HHs and wives in the 2001 wave was significantly associated 
with asset accumulation in the 2001 wave, β = 0.188 and β = 0.160, respectively. 
Psychological distress of HHs in the 2007 wave was significantly predicted by psychological 
distress of HHs in 2001, β = 0.036 and p = .012, but not by asset accumulation of the 2001 and 
2007 waves, p = .667 and p = .122, respectively. For 2001 and 2007, the hypotheses regarding 
the positive reciprocal relationship between asset accumulation and psychological distress were 
not supported. However, as hypothesized in DH6, psychological distress of wives in 2007 was 
positively significantly associated with asset accumulation in 2007, β = 0.087 and p < .001. In 
addition, it was expected that psychological distress of wives in 2007 would be predicted by 
asset accumulation in 2001 and by psychological distress of wives in 2001; however, both paths 
were not significant, p = .102 and p = .054, respectively. 
 The same three indirect hypotheses that were supported in the cross-sectional model were 
also supported in the 2001 wave of the longitudinal model (IH1, IH2, and IH3). Improvement in 
individual components was significantly associated with an increase in asset accumulation 
through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (γ11 × β21) = 0.748. 
Improvement in institutional components was significantly associated with an increase in asset 
accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (γ12 × β21) 
= 0.350. Larger intergenerational transfers was significantly associated with an increase in asset 
accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (γ13 × β21) 
= 0.150.  
 All other indirect hypotheses for the 2001 wave were not supported due to the negative 
influence of asset accumulation on psychological distress in 2001 (IH4, IH5, IH6, and IH7). That 
indicates that improvement in individual components was not associated with improvement in 
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psychological distress through an increase in saving and investment actions and through an 
increase in asset accumulation, γ11 × β21 × β32 and γ11 × β21 × β42 (IH4). Improvement in 
institutional components was not associated with improvement in psychological distress through 
an increase in saving and investment actions and through an increase in asset accumulation, γ12 
× β21 × β32 and γ12 × β21 × β42 (IH5). Larger intergenerational transfers was not associated 
with improvement in psychological distress through an increase in saving and investment actions 
and through an increase in asset accumulation, γ13 × β21 × β32 and γ13 × β21 × β42 (IH6). And 
greater saving and investment actions was not associated with improvement in psychological 
distress through an increase in asset accumulation, β21 × β32 and β21 × β42 (IH7). 
 In 2007, four indirect hypotheses were supported (IH1, IH3, IH4, and IH6). Improvement 
in individual components was significantly associated with an increase in asset accumulation 
through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (β85 × β98) = 0.699. 
Larger intergenerational transfers was significantly associated with an increase in asset 
accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (β87 × β98) 
= 1.145. Improvement in individual components was significantly associated with improvement 
in psychological distress of wives through an increase in saving and investment actions and 
through an increase in asset accumulation, Indirect Effect × (β85 × β98 × β119) = 0.061. Larger 
intergenerational transfers was significantly associated with improvement in psychological 
distress through an increase in saving and investment actions and through an increase in asset 
accumulation, Indirect Effect × (β87 × β98 × β119) = 0.100.  
 Hypotheses that included institutional components were not supported because its 
influence on saving and investment actions was not significant (IH2). Therefore, improvement in 
institutional components was not associated with an increase in asset accumulation through an 
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increase in saving and investment actions, β86 × β98. In addition, hypotheses that included 
psychological distress of HHs were not supported because the influence of asset accumulation on 
psychological distress of HHs was not significant (IH5 and IH7). This indicates that 
improvement in institutional components was not associated with improvement in psychological 
distress through an increase in saving and investment actions or through an increase in asset 
accumulation, β86 × β98 × β109, and greater saving and investment actions was not associated 
with  improvement in psychological distress through an increase in asset accumulation, β98 × 
β109. 
 In the 2001 wave, individual components was significantly correlated with institutional 
components, r = .632, and intergenerational transfers, r = .095. And institutional components 
was significantly associated with intergenerational transfers, r = .081. In addition, as expected, 
institutional components in 2001 positively significantly predicted institutional components in 
2007, β = 0.133, and individual components in 2001 positively significantly predicted individual 
components in 2007, β = 0.109. However, intergenerational transfers in 2001 did not predict 
intergenerational transfers in 2007, p = .755. 
 The control variables, significant and non-significant, that were used in the unweighted 
cross-sectional model were also used in the longitudinal model. The non-significant paths 
between control variables and asset accumulation were different for the 2001 and 2007 waves. 
For 2001, they were history of chronic illness of HHs and health insurance of someone in the 
family unit. For 2007, they were race of HHs and wives, gender of HHs, marital status of HHs, 
imputed values, and whether there was a wife in the family unit.  
 Nine paths between control variables and psychological distress of HHs were not 
significant in the 2001 and 2007 waves (i.e., age of HHs, race of HHs, family size, number of 
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children, health insurance of someone in the family unit, imputed values and the quadratic terms 
of education of HHs, family size, and number of children), and education of HHs were not 
associated with psychological distress of HHs in the 2007 wave. In addition, five paths between 
control variables and psychological distress of wives were not significant in the 2001 and 2007 
waves (i.e., age, education, family size and the quadratic terms of education of wives and number 
of children). An additional five paths were not significant in 2001 (i.e., race of waves, occupation 
of wives, number of children, whether there was a wife in the family unit, and the quadratic 
terms of family size).  
 Due to a good fit of the data to the model considering the RMSEA fit index and the 
importance of all non-significant paths to the model, those paths were not removed from the 
longitudinal model. 
Weighted Longitudinal Model  
 Considering the RMSEA fit index, the data had a good fit to the model (Figure 16), 
RMSEA = .035. Although the TLI was .471, the RMSEA for the null model was .082, meaning 
that the main hypothesis (H1) was supported. In the weighted longitudinal model, one loading on 
a latent variable was not significant in the 2001 wave, and three loadings on the latent variables 
were not significant in the 2007 wave. There were no similar non-significant loadings on the 
latent variables in both waves. 
 In the 2001 wave of the weighted longitudinal model, as hypothesized in DH1, DH2, and 
DH3, saving and investment actions was positively significantly associated with the other latent 
variables of the 2001 wave: individual components, γ = 0.992; institutional components, γ = 
0.294; and intergenerational transfers, γ = 0.216. Thus, the first three direct hypotheses (DH1, 
DH2, and DH3) were supported. In the 2007 wave of the weighted longitudinal model, only two 
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of those hypotheses were supported (DH1 and DH3); saving and investment actions in 2007 was 
significantly associated with the latent variables of individual components, β = 0.770, and 
intergenerational transfers, γ =0.436, in 2007. However, DH2 was not supported; saving and 
investment actions in 2007 was not associated with the latent variables of institutional 
components in 2007, p = .429. As expected, saving and investment actions in 2007 was 
significantly predicted by the latent variables of saving and investment actions in 2001, β = 
0.205, and individual components in 2001, β = 0.140, but unexpectedly, it was not predicted by 
institutional components in 2001, p = .112, and intergenerational transfers, p = .163, in 2001.  
 Direct hypothesis 4 was not supported because asset accumulation of the 2001 wave was 
negatively significantly associated with intergenerational transfers, γ = 0.080, but DH5 was 
supported in the 2001 wave; greater saving and investment actions was significantly associated 
with an increase in asset accumulation, β = 0.642. Psychological distress of HHs and wives in the 
2001 wave were significantly associated with asset accumulation in the 2001 wave, β = 0.224 
and β = 0.154, respectively; however, the direction of these paths was in opposition to DH6. In 
addition, asset accumulation in the 2001 wave was significantly associated with psychological 
distress of HHs, β = 0.224, and wives, β = 0.112 in 2001, which supports DH7.  
 In 2007, DH5 was supported; asset accumulation in 2007 was significantly associated 
with saving and investment actions, β = 0.849. The psychological distress of HHs and wives was 
significantly associated with asset accumulation in 2007, β = 0.034 and β = 0.052, respectively, 
but DH6 was supported only for wives. Although, the other direct paths (DH4 and DH7) were 
significant, they were in opposite to the hypothesized direction; asset accumulation in 2007 was 
negatively significantly associated with intergenerational transfers in 2007, β = 0.284, and the 
psychological distress of HHs and wives in 2007, β = 0.042 and β = 0.015, respectively.  
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 As expected, asset accumulation in 2007 was significantly predicted by greater asset 
accumulation in 2001, β = 0.087, larger intergenerational transfers in 2001, γ = 0.050, and better 
psychological distress of wives in 2001, β = 0.010. Unexpectedly, asset accumulation in 2007 
was significantly predicted by less saving and investment actions in 2001, β = 0.061, and worse 
psychological distress of HHs, β = 0.077. Unexpectedly, the psychological distress of HHs and 
wives in 2007 was negatively significantly predicted by their psychological distress in 2001, β = 
0.063 and β = 0.024, respectively. In addition, asset accumulation in 2001 did not predict 
psychological distress of HHs in 2007, p = .087, and negatively significantly predicted 
psychological distress of wives in 2007, β = 0.038. 
 The latent variables of individual components, institutional components, and 
intergenerational transfers in 2001 were all significantly correlated with each other (Figure 10). 
Although, intergenerational transfers in 2001 did not predict intergenerational transfers in 2007 
as expected, p = .848, institutional components in 2001 positively significantly predicted 
institutional components in 2007, β = 0.109, and individual components in 2001 positively 
significantly predicted individual components in 2007, β = 0.064.  
 Three indirect hypotheses were supported in the weighted longitudinal model in 2001: 
(IH1) improvement in individual components was significantly associated with an increase in 
asset accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (γ11 × 
β21) = 0.637; (IH2) improvement in institutional components was significantly associated with 
an increase in asset accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect 
Effect × (γ12 × β21) = 0.189; and (IH3) larger intergenerational transfers was significantly 
associated with an increase in asset accumulation through an increase in saving and investment 
actions, Indirect Effect × (γ13 × β21) = 0.139.  
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 Due to the negative influence of asset accumulation on psychological distress in 2001, 
which is in opposition to DH6, all other indirect hypotheses in the 2001 were not supported (IH4, 
IH5, IH6, and IH7). In 2007, four indirect hypotheses were supported: (IH1) improvement in 
individual components was significantly associated with an increase in asset accumulation 
through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (β85 × β98) = 0.654; 
(IH3) larger intergenerational transfers was significantly associated with an increase in asset 
accumulation through an increase in saving and investment actions, Indirect Effect × (β87 × β98) 
= 0.370; (IH4) improvement in individual components was significantly associated with 
improvement in psychological distress of wives through an increase in saving and investment 
actions and through an increase in asset accumulation, Indirect Effect × (β85 × β98 × β119) = 
0.034; (IH6) larger intergenerational transfers was significantly associated with improvement in 
psychological distress through an increase in saving and investment actions and through an 
increase in asset accumulation, Indirect Effect × (β87 × β98 × β119) = 0.019.  
 Hypotheses that included institutional components were not supported because its 
influence on saving and investment actions was not significant (IH2). In addition, hypotheses 
that included psychological distress of HHs were not supported because the influence of asset 
accumulation on psychological distress of HHs was in opposition to IH5 and IH7. 
 All significant and non-significant paths between control variables and asset 
accumulation and the psychological distress of HHs and wives that were used in the weighted 
cross-sectional model were also used in the longitudinal model. There were no non-significant 
paths between control variables and asset accumulation for either the 2001 or 2007 waves. A 
total of six different paths between control variables and psychological distress of HHs were not 
significant for 2001 and 2007: three in 2001 (i.e., age of HH, health insurance, and imputed 
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values) and three in 2007 (i.e., race of HH, number of children, and the quadratic term of number 
of children). For paths between control variables and psychological distress of wives, three were 
not significant in 2001 (i.e., occupation of wives, imputed values, and the quadratic term of 
education of wives) and two were not significant in 2007 (i.e., race of wives and the quadratic 
term of number of children). Because the RMSEA fit index of the examined model indicated a 
good fit of the data to the model and the importance of all non-significant paths to the model, 
those paths were not removed from the longitudinal model. 
Comparison Between Unweighted and Weighted Longitudinal Models 
 In the unweighted and weighted models, the RMSEA for the null model indicated that the 
examined model would have a good fit when considering the RMSEA fit index but not when 
considering the TLI fit index. Thus, the main hypothesis (H1) was supported in both models. In 
the unweighted longitudinal model, thirteen loadings on latent variables were not significant 
compared with four in the weighted longitudinal model. The four loadings that were not 
significant in the weighted model were also not significant in the unweighted model. 
 For 2001, saving and investment actions was positively significantly associated with 
individual components, institutional components, and intergenerational transfers in the 
unweighted and weighted models. The magnitude of these relationships was greater in the 
unweighted model compared with the weighted model. However, the same two latent variables 
in 2007 were significantly associated with saving and investment actions in 2007 in the 
unweighted model; the magnitude of the influence of the latent variables of individual 
components on saving and investment actions was greater in the weighted model, and the 
magnitude of the influence of intergenerational transfers on saving and investment actions was 
greater in the unweighted model. Across time points in the unweighted model, none of the latent 
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variables for 2001 predicted saving and investment actions for 2007. However, in the weighted 
model, it was significantly predicted for 2007 by saving and investment actions and individual 
components of the 2001 wave. 
 In the 2001 and 2007 waves’ unweighted and weighted models, asset accumulation was 
positively significantly associated with saving and investment actions and negatively 
significantly associated with intergenerational transfers. The magnitude of these relationships 
was greater in the unweighted model compared with the weighted model. Although asset 
accumulation in the 2007 wave was not predicted by saving and investment actions in the 2001 
wave in the unweighted model, it was negatively significantly predicted in the weighted model. 
Over time, asset accumulation in the 2007 wave was positively significantly predicted by asset 
accumulation in the 2001 wave in the unweighted and weighted models. However, only the 
weighted model showed a significant influence of saving and investment actions and 
intergenerational transfers from 2001 on asset accumulation in 2007. 
 Psychological distress of HHs and wives in 2001 was positively significantly associated 
with asset accumulation in unweighted and weighted models in 2001, and psychological distress 
of HHs and wives in the 2001 wave was negatively significantly associated with asset 
accumulation. However, there were mixed results in the unweighted and weighted models of the 
2007 wave. In the unweighted model, psychological distress of HHs in 2007 was not associated 
with asset accumulation in 2007 nor asset accumulation in 2007 was associated with 
psychological distress of HHs in 2007. But in the weighted model, psychological distress of HHs 
was positively significantly associated with asset accumulation while asset accumulation was 
negatively significantly associated with psychological distress of HHs. In unweighted and 
weighted models, psychological distress of wives in 2007 was negatively significantly associated 
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with asset accumulation in 2007 while asset accumulation in 2007 was positively significantly 
associated with psychological distress of wives in 2007.  
 Considering the influence of psychological distress on asset accumulation over time in 
the unweighted model, psychological distress of HHs, but not wives, in 2001 significantly 
predicted asset accumulation in 2007. However, in the weighted model, the psychological 
distress of HHs and wives in 2001 predicted asset accumulation in 2007. Although the 
psychological distress of HHs and wives in 2007 was negatively significantly predicted by the 
psychological distress of HHs and wives in 2001 in the weighted model, that was true only for 
HHs in the unweighted model. In addition, in the unweighted model, the psychological distress 
of HHs and wives in 2007 was not predicted by asset accumulation in 2001. But in the weighted 
model, psychological distress of wives in 2007, but not of HHs, was negatively significantly 
predicted by asset accumulation in 2001. 
 In unweighted and weighted models, individual components, institutional components, 
and intergenerational transfers in 2001 were all significantly correlated with each other. In 
addition, individual components in 2001 and the latent variables of institutional components in 
2007 positively significantly predicted individual components in 2001 and the latent variables of 
institutional components in 2007, respectively. However, intergenerational transfers in 2001 did 
not predict intergenerational transfers in 2007. 
 Compared with the weighted model, the unweighted model contains many more non-
significant paths between control variables and asset accumulation and the psychological distress 
of HHs and wives. For example, there are no non-significant paths between control variables and 
asset accumulation in 2001 and 2007 in the weighted model, but eight non-significant paths were 
observed in the unweighted model, two in 2001 and six in 2007. As another example, six non-
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significant paths between control variables and psychological distress of HHs were observed in 
the weighted model, three in 2001 and three in 2007, but 19 were observed in the unweighted 
model, nine in 2001 and ten in 2007. 
 In summary, the main finding of this study is that the data support the asset-building 
theoretical framework in the cross-sectional and longitudinal model, using unweighted and 
weighted analyses. However, not all direct and indirect hypotheses were supported and not all 
expected paths over time were supported.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This chapter summarizes the main findings of the longitudinal SEM of the asset-building 
theoretical framework and psychological distress. An interpretation of the findings in the context 
of the theory is provided. Next, the strengths and weakness of this study are provided, in addition 
to suggested future research and policy implications. 
Discussion 
The Main Hypothesis (H1): the Data Fits the Model 
 This study examined the asset-building theoretical framework and psychological distress, 
controlling for expected confounders, in a U.S. representative population (i.e., the HHs and 
wives) using longitudinal SEM. In the unweighted and weighted analyses, H1 was supported 
because the data fit the model according to the RMSEA fit index. In other words, the theoretical 
model that was first presented by Sherraden (1991) and later expanded by Beverly et al. (2008) 
and Lerman and McKernan (2008) was empirically supported.  
Direct Hypothesis 1: Improvement in Individual Components Will Increase Saving and 
Investment Actions 
 
 This study supported Beverly et al.’s (2008) hypothesis that fewer financial expenses 
such as medical expenses, vehicle costs, and debt payment and more informal social support 
increase saving and investment actions. In 2001 and 2007, and in the unweighted and weighted 
models, greater individual components significantly increased saving and investment actions. In 
addition, in the weighted model, greater individual components in 2001 significantly predicted 
an increase in saving and investment actions in 2007.  
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 This empirical evidence is in line with Barr’s (2012) statement that suggests that those 
who have fewer financial resources have no slack and less financial flexibility. For example, 
low- and moderate-income individuals have been left with no money for ongoing expenses and 
none for savings after they cashed their paychecks and paid their debts and other payments 
(Caskey, 1997). Thus, low income individuals tend to manage their finances to meet present 
needs (e.g. cover daily consumption and monthly expenses) while high income individuals tend 
to manage their finances to meet future needs (e.g. saving for higher education, retirement 
savings, inheritance). Therefore, asset building programs, which provide institutional support to 
low income individuals, should take into consideration these differences in management of 
finances. For example, financial education, through asset building programs, should try to 
change management of finances of low income individuals to focus not only on meeting present 
needs but also on meeting future needs. The difficulty in changing management of finances is 
true not only for the low income individuals, but also to high income individuals; high income 
individuals who face economic hardship, might find it difficult to change their management of 
finances  from meeting future needs to present needs. 
 In this study, informal social support was examined using positive and negative social 
support; positive social support defined as financial help to the family unit and negative social 
support was defined as financial help from the family unit to someone outside the household 
unit16. Both represented the latent variable of individual components. Unlike the Sherraden et al. 
(2005) study, which suggested that support from relatives and nonrelatives was important for a 
person’s saving actions, in this study, financial help given to the family unit had little influence 
on saving and investment actions. However, the Sherraden et al. (2005) study was a qualitative 
                                                        
16 The PSID uses the term household unit to describe the physical place where family members live; however, living 
in the household unit does not automatically make a person part of the family unit. Only people that meet the criteria 
of relatedness and economic integration are considered part of the family unit.  
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study with a small sample size. It may be that financial help to the family unit is important to 
saving and investment actions (Beverly et al., 2008), but within the overall asset-building 
theoretical framework tested by this study, it had a smaller influence compared with the other 
components.  
 Although Beverly et al. (2008) and Sherraden (1991) hypothesized that greater negative 
social support would be related to less saving and investment actions, the influence of financial 
help given to someone outside the household unit was positively related to greater saving and 
investment actions in this study. It is possible that different participants in the PSID interpreted 
the question differently. For example, the term someone outside the household unit could be a 
relative or non-relative that needs help to cover debt. It could also mean a child, even a minor, 
who does not live in the household unit (e.g., attends private school or college). In the latter 
situation, if the information was available for this study, that financial help would have been 
categorized as an intergenerational transfer rather than as negative social support (i.e., as 
financial help of the family unit to someone outside the household unit that could prevent the 
family unit from saving and accumulating assets). Due to the potential differences in the 
interpretation of “someone outside the household unit”, providing financial help to someone 
outside the household unit may not necessarily have been a negative social support.  
 Future studies should try to differentiate between the two cases. For example, researchers 
could ask participants to divide the amount of financial help that was given to someone outside 
the household unit into whether the recipients were young dependents, older dependents, other 
family members, and/or non-family members. In that case, the amount of financial help given to 
children, elderly parents, or other close relatives living outside the household unit could be 
related to intergenerational transfers, and the amount of financial help given to other family 
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members and non-family members could be related to negative social support. Another way to 
look at that issue may be related to the circumstances rather than the person that receives the 
financial help. For example, a non-family member may have closer relationship to a person than 
a family member, therefore in similar circumstances as were mentioned before, the financial help 
would be considered, conceptually, as intergenerational transfers rather than negative social 
support.  
 In addition, the race of the family members in the household may have different impacts 
on how financial help given to someone outside the household unit affects their saving and 
investment actions. For example, a qualitative study reported that low-income African American 
and moderate-income Hispanics felt they could not save money due to the pressure they felt to 
share it with people outside their household (Caskey, 1997). Future studies should examine the 
differences in the influence of race on financial help given to someone outside the household unit 
and its effect on saving and investment actions. 
Direct Hypothesis 2: Improvement in Institutional Components Will Increase Saving and 
Investment Actions 
 
 To examine this hypothesis, only three out of the seven dimensions of institutional 
components presented by Sherraden (2003) and Beverly et al. (2008) were used: access, 
incentives, and security. Access was measured as years in a pension plan offered through the 
employer, incentives were measured as the amount the employer contributes to the pension and 
disincentives (i.e., asset limits) were measured as amounts received from food stamps, the 
government, for heating or cooling the house, TANF, SSI, other welfare, unemployment 
compensation, and child support. Security was measured as homeowner insurance premiums. 
 These three dimensions were the only institutional components dimensions that had 
available observed items in the PSID data set, meaning that four other institutional components 
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dimensions of the asset-building theoretical framework had no representation in this study. 
However, access and incentives strongly affected the saving behaviors of low-income individuals 
in the ADD program (Sherraden, 2003), making them essential dimensions to study. In addition, 
Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner et al. (2006) found that for ADD participants, institutional components 
as a block explained 11% of the variance in AMNDs. Thus, these three dimensions were 
considered sufficient for representing institutional components in the current study. 
 The dimension of security was examined using an observed item that measured the 
amount a family paid for home insurance. However, the model tested required this observed item 
be shifted to represent the latent variable of individual components rather than the latent variable 
of institutional components. The “amount a family paid for home insurance” was assumed to 
represent security; however, this assumption was probably wrong. The magnitude of its loading 
on individual components was higher than on institutional components. It seems this measure 
represents a financial burden, rather than a feeling of security due to the reduced risk of property 
loss as hypothesized by Beverly et al. (2008). In other words, the power of the current financial 
hardship born from paying for home insurance may override the reduction in distress over 
unexpected hazards (e.g., fires, etc.) that may take away the family home. 
 Theoretically, people who have greater access to institutional components are more likely 
to have higher saving rates than those without access (Sherraden, 1991; Sherraden et al., 2003; 
Beverly et al., 2008). Access to institutional components can come through the tax system or 
through an employer (Beverly et al., 2008; Johnson & Sherraden; 1992; Sherraden, 1991; 
Sherraden et al., 2003). To improve retirement security, the current president of the US, Barack 
Obama, proposed providing access to retirement accounts called myRA to people who do not 
have access to retirement accounts through their employers. The estimation of the White House 
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is that myRA could provide access to one quarter of U.S. workers who do not have access to 
retirement savings accounts today (The White House, 2014; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
2014).  
 In this study, access was examined using the number of years a person had a pension 
through an employer and it loaded significantly on the latent variable of institutional 
components. The amount an employer contributes to a person’s pension, an indicator of 
incentives, also significantly loaded on the latent variable of institutional components, but the 
magnitude of that loading was low. Although saving to a pension account is essential for asset 
accumulation at the time of retirement, it seems that the contribution of an employer to a pension 
account is not an important dimension of institutional components. That may be due to the 
restriction that pension accounts can only be used after retirement without paying a penalty. 
Perhaps employer contributions to short-term or medium-term savings accounts would have 
greater influence on institutional components. It may also be that the influence of employer 
contributions to a pension account depends on the age of the participants; a subgroup analysis 
may provide more information about that relationship.  
 Public and governmental assistance programs can discourage savings due to asset-tests 
(i.e., the requirement to own less than a specific amount of assets in order to be eligible for the 
assistance program). That lack of encouragement for saving is considered a disincentive for 
saving from the institution. In this study, amounts from several assistance programs loaded on 
the latent variable of institutional components. Most of the loadings were significant, but their 
magnitude was small, and their influence on savings may be small. Although the asset-tests of 
assistance programs do not allow asset accumulation over a certain threshold, that threshold may 
provide a goal that could foster the institutional component of expectation. In other words, asset 
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limits may create a saving goal for low-income individuals. Therefore, increasing the threshold 
for asset-tests may have two benefits: reducing disincentive in order to increase saving and 
increasing the saving goal. Additionally, assistance programs may discourage savings, but the 
influence of institutional components that do encourage savings may be greater on the individual. 
Practically, this may mean that policy should focus on institutional components that may 
encourage savings (e.g., match rates, cap rates, financial education) and increasing the threshold 
of assistance programs’ asset limits rather than changing the eligibility requirements for 
assistance programs entirely.  
 These findings may provide another explanation for results from other studies regarding 
the relationship between institutional components and savings (Curley et al., 2009; Grinstein-
Weiss, Wagner et al., 2006; Schreiner et al., 2001; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). A summary of 
findings from research on 401(k) plans (i.e., pension accounts) suggested that higher match rates 
increase participation (Schreiner et al., 2001, p.144). With the expectation of low match rates, 
match rates do not increase savings and may even decrease them. That finding was also 
supported by Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner et al. (2006) who found that a higher match rate was 
significantly associated with lower AMNDs for families with children who participated in the 
ADD.  
 However, studies that evaluated the ADD found that information, financial education, 
and expectations significantly increased the AMNDs of participants in the ADD, but they found 
no relationship between AMNDs and facilitation (i.e., direct deposit), access (i.e., number of 
deposit locations), and public assistance (Curley et al., 2009; Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner et al., 
2006; Schreiner et al., 2001; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden et al., 2003). In the R2S 
randomized control trial, each participant was randomly assigned to different suggested saving 
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amount of the tax refund (without matched funds). The suggested saving amounts were 25%, 
50%, and 75% of the tax refund or specific amounts of $100 or $250 of the tax refund 
(Grinstein-Weiss, Comer et al., 2013). Participants who were randomly assigned to suggested 
saving amount of 50% of the tax refund saved significantly greater amounts from their tax 
refunds than participants who were randomly assigned to suggested saving amount of 25% of the 
tax refund. In addition, six months after the random assignment, participants who were randomly 
assigned to suggested saving amount of50% of the tax refund were significantly more likely to 
have still saved their tax refund compared with participants in the control group (Grinstein-
Weiss, Comer et al., 2013). 
 In the current study, improvement in institutional components increased saving and 
investment actions in 2001 but not in 2007. In addition, institutional components in 2001 did not 
predict saving and investment actions in 2007. It is important to mention that when examined in 
a cross-sectional manner, this hypothesis was supported in both 2001 and 2007 (information 
regarding the 2007 cross-sectional SEM was not presented in the results section because it was 
similar to the 2001 cross-sectional SEM), but in the longitudinal model, it was not. It is unclear 
how the longitudinal model changed that path. It may be that using only three dimensions of this 
latent variable was not sufficient for detecting a longitudinal effect. Another explanation might 
be that the interval of six years between the waves was too long for showing a significant 
relationship; with a shorter period of time between waves, this path may have been significant.  
 It may also be that the theory does not apply to certain income levels, and that the 
influence of institutional components may have a more important role for low-income families’ 
saving and investment actions than those of middle- and upper-income families. A positive 
influence of institutional components on saving and investment actions was present in findings 
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on asset-building programs that targeted low-income individuals (Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner et 
al., 2006; Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2012; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 2003; 
Sherraden et al., 2003; Sherraden et al., 2005; Wheeler-Brooks & Scanlon, 2009). However, 
even in the ADD, almost half the participants in the intervention group were not considered 
savers, who were defined as individuals who saved at least $100 in net-IDA savings (Sherraden, 
2008). In other words, almost half of the participants who received the opportunity to open a 
matched-savings account for a specific goal chose not to take full advantage of that opportunity, 
thus the finding in the current study that there was no significant effects of institutional 
components on savings over time is not surprising.  
 Schreiner and Sherraden (2007) proposed three lessons for policy makers on asset 
accumulation based on the ADD studies: saving is not easy for poor people, even with 
institutional support; there may be a need to improve the design of asset-building programs; and 
“unmatched withdrawals should be unrestricted so poor people cannot harm themselves by 
saving in IDAs” (p. 124). From a policy perspective, this means that institutional components 
should not only be available to people of all income levels but also be progressively distributed. 
For example, considering incentives such as match rates, the lower the income of a family, the 
greater the incentive the institution (e.g., a bank) should provide, and the higher the income of a 
family, the lower the incentive the institution should provide. In that example, instead of helping 
the rich to become richer, institutions such as banks or employers would and could promote the 
savings of low-income families.  
 The main difference between this study and the studies of asset-building programs is its 
nature; this study was an observational study, and the asset-building programs were 
interventional studies. According to the non-significant finding in this study and the significant 
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findings from the asset-building programs, it seems that institutional components have greater, 
and thus more important, influences on saving and investment actions over time in an asset-
building program that includes IDAs and financial education. The differences between the 
findings from this study and findings from the studies of asset-building programs may illustrate 
the importance of comprehensive asset-building programs that include multiple components 
(e.g., financial education and matched savings accounts with restrictions on withdrawals except 
for specific goals). From the policy perspective, if providing financial education and matched-
savings accounts restricted to specific goals, which can both be considered institutional 
components, in an intervention has a positive influence on savings, especially for low-income 
families, and providing institutional components such as matched-savings accounts without an 
intervention do not have an influence on savings, the conclusion may be that it is important to 
design interventions that provide financial education, especially for low-income families, and 
matched-savings accounts with restrictions for specific goals to promote savings.  
 For example, people without access to retirement accounts through their employers could 
be automatically enrolled in myRA. MyRA is supposed to be an accessible, tax-free retirement 
account designated for a specific goal (i.e., providing financial security during retirement), and it 
is planned to have a maximum savings amount of $15,000 (The White House, 2014; U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 2014). Both restrictions for specific goals and maximum savings 
amounts, as discussed, have been shown to be motivating for potential savers. However, myRA’s 
$15,000 maximum may be too low of a goal for funds intended for use in retirement. 
Direct Hypothesis 3: Larger Intergenerational Transfers Will Increase Saving and 
Investment Actions 
 
 The two observed items that loaded on the latent variable of intergenerational transfers 
indicated whether the family received any inheritance during the last year and/or during the last 
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five years. They were both statistically significant and had high magnitudes. Thus, these two 
observed variables were strong indicators of the latent variable of intergenerational transfers. The 
hypothesis that larger inheritances would increase savings was supported for 2001 and 2007 and 
in unweighted and weighted models. That supports Beverly et al.’s (2008) and Sherraden’s 
(1991) hypotheses, which suggest that intergenerational transfers can be associated with better 
saving behaviors. Similar findings were presented in other cross-sectional studies. For example, 
Zagorsky (2012) reported that people who received an inheritance had roughly six times more 
savings than people who did not receive an inheritance when controlling for income, race, 
gender, and age. Juster, Lupton, Smith, and Stafford (2004) reported that higher inheritances 
were significantly related to more savings when controlling for income, age, marital status, 
capital gains, and the participant’s own pension. 
 However, considering the influence of inheritance on savings over time, intergenerational 
transfers in 2001 did not predict the saving and investment actions of 2007. It may be that the 
time interval between the two waves under study was too long to detect a significant influence of 
intergenerational transfers on saving and investment actions. For example, Chang (1994) tested 
an interval of three years and found that the amount of inheritance received had a positive effect 
on household saving.  
 Regardless of the time effect, an inheritance also has to be large enough to sufficiently 
support asset accumulation. Therefore, due to the oversampling of low-income families in this 
study, their inheritances may have been small and the participants who received the inheritances 
may have been more likely to use them to cover debt or other expenses. That assumption is 
supported by Zagorsky (2012), who found that almost half of the people who received smaller 
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inheritances (i.e., less than $1000) spent it, compared with less than a fifth of the people who 
received larger inheritances (i.e., $100,000 or more).  
Direct Hypothesis 4: Larger Intergenerational Transfers Will Increase Asset Accumulation 
 
 In contrast with the hypotheses derived from the asset-building theoretical framework, 
which suggest that larger intergenerational transfers can increase asset accumulation (Beverly et 
al., 2008; Sherraden, 1991), intergenerational transfers had a negative influence on asset-
accumulation in 2001 and 2007 in unweighted and weighted models. This finding has some 
support from other studies. In one study, more than one third of participants who received an 
inheritance had a decline or no change in their wealth after receiving the inheritance (Zagorsky, 
2012), and in another, one fifth of participants chose to spend the inheritances they received 
(Joulfaian, 2006). It should be noted that in this study, intergenerational transfers in 2001 had a 
negative influence on asset accumulation in 2001 and intergenerational transfers in 2007 had a 
negative influence on asset accumulation in 2007. 
 In the weighted model, greater intergenerational transfers in 2001 significantly predicted 
greater asset accumulation in 2007. This finding may illustrate the influence of intergenerational 
transfers on asset accumulation over time and supports the asset-building theoretical framework. 
In the present time, people may choose to save part of their inheritances and spend the rest, but in 
the long run, part of the inheritance was saved and shifted to assets. This type of saving behavior 
was also reported by Joulfaian (2006) and Keister (2003), who found that a larger inheritance 
was significantly related to more asset accumulation over time. Keister (2003) also reported that 
a larger inheritance was significantly associated with higher home value. That suggests that 
people who received a larger inheritance may have used it to purchase a more valuable house, 
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and people who received smaller inheritances or people who did not receive any inheritances 
could only purchase less valuable houses.  
 Another way to interpret that finding is that people who receive a larger inheritance 
invest the money in a tangible asset. Shapiro et al. (2013) illustrated the importance of taking 
into consideration the difference in inheritance use among races. White families were five times 
more likely to receive inheritances compared with African American families, and “each 
inherited dollar contributed to 91 cents of wealth for White families compared with 20 cents for 
African American families” (p. 5). 
Direct Hypothesis 5: Greater Saving and Investment Actions Will Increase Asset 
Accumulation 
 
 In this study, greater saving and investment actions was significantly related to greater 
asset accumulation in 2001 and 2007 in the unweighted and weighted models. That finding 
supports Hypothesis 5. However, in the weighted model, greater saving and investment actions 
in 2001 significantly predicted lower asset accumulation in 2007. That finding is in opposite to 
the asset-building theoretical framework.  
 Saving and investment actions should include the amount and frequency of deposits and 
withdrawals (Beverly et al., 2008). However, it may be that the observed indicators of saving and 
investment actions were insufficient for fully capturing their important aspects. For example, the 
PSID does not contain variables about the frequency of deposits and withdrawals or portfolio 
composition, which may better account for saving and investment actions and contribute to the 
finding of non-significant paths between saving and investment actions and asset accumulation. 
Although the PSID provides some information about deposits and withdrawals, the available 
observed variables included only the amount of deposits to IRAs and stocks, the amount of 
voluntary contributions to pension accounts, the amount of withdrawals from IRAs and stocks, 
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and the amount of money that was cashed from pension accounts. These observed variables may 
not represent the actual saving and investment actions of the participants in this study. There may 
have been other measures of savings or withdrawals that were not available from the PSID data 
set, such as deposits to or withdrawals from 529 plans (i.e., an education savings account).  
 However, the PSID provides substantial information about liquid savings, retirement 
savings, home equity, and net worth, which are the main components of asset accumulation 
(Beverly et al., 2008; Sherraden, 1991). In addition, Sherraden (1991) noted that home equity 
and asset accumulation in retirement pension accounts are the two main forms of assets related to 
savings. The observed items in this study were selected according to the components of the 
theoretical asset accumulation; therefore they were expected to be a valid representation of the 
latent variable of asset accumulation. 
 Another explanation for this unexpected finding is that the time interval was too short. 
Sherraden (1991) discussed the positive long-term influence of savings on asset accumulation, 
but a six-year interval between the two waves may have been too short to detect the influence of 
saving and investment actions on asset accumulation. In addition, the theory does not take into 
consideration other life events that can influence asset accumulation. For example, those life 
events may include personal reasons such as a loss of a job or a birth of a new baby or 
macroeconomic reasons such as market fluctuations that can influence the amounts in retirement 
accounts, net worth, and home values. Therefore, the scope of the asset-building theoretical 
framework may be limited and need to be expanded. For example, in the ADD Wave 4, 
Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2012) did not find significant differences in homeownership, retirement 
savings, or net worth 10 years after the randomization of participants who received and did not 
receive the opportunity to open IDAs. Moreover, 18 months after randomization, the effect of the 
188 
IDA program on net worth was significantly negative, which may have been due to purchases of 
homes that increased liabilities and decreased the total net worth of participants (Mills, G., 
Patterson, R., Orr, L., & DeMarco, 2004).  
Direct Hypothesis 6 and 7: Greater Asset Accumulation Will Improve Psychological Well-
Being and Better Psychological Well-Being Will Increase Asset Accumulation  
 
 The health outcome of this study was the psychological distress of HHs and wives. 
Despite the hypothesis that greater asset accumulation would improve psychological distress, the 
directional paths between asset accumulation and the psychological distress of HHs and wives 
were in the opposite directions of those hypothesized: greater asset accumulation was 
significantly related to the higher psychological distress of HHs and wives in 2001 and to HHs in 
2007. Although the direct path between asset accumulation and psychological distress was 
negative, the direct path between psychological distress and asset accumulation was positive; 
lower psychological distress was significantly associated with greater asset accumulation. Thus, 
less psychological distress may increase asset accumulation, but greater asset accumulation may 
increase psychological distress. The reason for that may be that people who are less distressed, 
meaning they have better psychological well-beings, have more energy to improve their lives 
through working, earning money, investing that money, and accumulating assets. However, 
people who already have greater assets may invest those assets in riskier investments, such as the 
stock market, which may result in more distress due to the increased risk of losing their money. 
Or greater assets may require more effort to secure them, which can increase the psychological 
distress of a person. It is also possible that wealth has a nonlinear relationship with psychological 
distress; lower wealth may relate to more psychological distress, moderate wealth may relate to 
less psychological distress, and high wealth may relate to more psychological distress.  
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 Most studies have found that greater wealth is significantly associated with lower 
psychological distress (Carter et al., 2009; Headey & Wooden, 2004; Myer et al., 2008; Xu, 
2011). However, Searle, Smith, and Cook (2006) found that people with less wealth experienced 
high psychological distress and that the percentage of people with greater wealth who reported 
low psychological distress was similar to the percentage of people with greater wealth who 
reported high psychological distress.  
 Those studies examined cross-sectional associations and not direct or reciprocal 
relationships, which are “superior to most other approaches” (Bowen & Guo, 2012, p. 121). In 
the current study, similar results were found in the separate and composite measurement models 
(Figure 13 and 14, respectively), which examined associations and not the reciprocal direct 
paths. There were positive correlations between asset accumulation and the psychological 
distress of HHs and wives. This indicates that less psychological distress in HHs and wives was 
significantly associated with greater asset accumulation. It is important to note that if this study 
had examined only correlations and not direct paths, the conclusions about the relationship 
between assets and psychological distress would have been similar to those of previous studies. 
However, whenever testing for correlations, it was not clear if wealth influenced participants’ 
psychological distress or if their psychological distress influenced their wealth.  
 In the weighted model, greater asset accumulation in 2001 significantly predicted higher 
psychological distress for wives in 2007 and did not significantly predict psychological distress 
for HHs. However, the magnitude of the directional path between asset accumulation in 2001 
and the psychological distress of wives in 2007 was extremely low, β = −0.038. Regardless, 
those longitudinal relationships were unexpected. Theoretically, it may be that it was not 
appropriate to test the asset-building theoretical framework for the entire population using 
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psychological distress as the outcome variable. Moreover, higher psychological distress for HHs 
in 2001 significantly predicted their greater asset accumulation in 2007, and less psychological 
distress for wives in 2001 predicted their greater asset accumulation in 2007. This difference 
between the influence of psychological distress for HHs and wives on asset accumulation may be 
related to the participants under study. Almost one third of the HHs was single females, and all 
the wives were females that lived with a spouse. Therefore, wives may have lived in a more 
secure environment, financially and emotionally, than HHs, which allowed them be less 
psychologically distressed over time. However, for HHs, knowing that the burden of asset 
accumulation was theirs as the main financial provider, as defined by the PSID, may have caused 
males and females to have higher psychological distress.  
 In summary, although statistically the data fit the asset-building theoretical framework, 
theoretically and practically, some important direct hypotheses were not supported. Institutional 
components and intergenerational transfers in 2001 did not predict saving and investment actions 
in 2007. Saving and investment actions in 2001 negatively predicted asset accumulation in 2007. 
Asset accumulation in 2001 negatively predicted the psychological distress of wives in 2007 and 
did not predict the psychological distress of HHs in 2007. And the psychological distress of HHs 
in 2001 negatively predicted asset accumulation in 2007. Potential explanations for these results 
were provided previously in this dissertation.  
 Although studies on health outcomes and wealth suggest that psychological distress is 
sensitive to change over time (Brown et al., 2005; Singh-Manoux et al., 2005), in the current 
study, psychological distress may not have been the best health outcome to be examined using 
the asset-building theoretical framework. The measure of psychological distress refers to general 
psychological distress rather than specific financial distress. It may be that a measure of distress 
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that represents cumulative stressors, and thus represents fuller picture of distress, might offer the 
chance to partition out those families with stressors that do directly relate to impoverished 
finances. However, a change in psychological distress may be more sensitive for low-income 
individuals, because they usually report higher levels of psychological distress compared with 
high-income individuals (Carter et al., 2009; G. Kim et al., 2011; Pirraglia et al., 2011; Xu, 
2011); therefore, asset-building programs, which are usually tailored to low-income families, 
should examine psychological distress as a health outcome of the program as well.  
Strengths and Weaknesses  
 This longitudinal study used data from a large, nationally representative population in the 
US with the availability of a wide range of measures that represent the asset-building theoretical 
framework and control variables. Despite these strengths, potential limitations of this study need 
to be mentioned. Although the entire asset-building theoretical framework was examined in this 
study, several components of it were not available in the PSID data set. For example, there was 
no variable for measuring financial literacy, one of the key indicators of the construct of 
individual components. Furthermore, the PSID does not include a measure describing the 
financial information a participant receives from institutions (e.g., banks, the government, an 
employer). The omission of variables that theoretically could have had an influence on the model 
may have increased the chance of Type II errors, meaning that the null hypothesis may have 
been false and the statistical findings failed to reject it. These omitted variables may have 
influenced the findings of this study (i.e., non-significant paths in this study may have been 
significant in a model that included the omitted variables).  
 In addition, the PSID provides high quality data, but it is based only on self-reports. That 
may be a threat to construct validity (Shadish et al., 2002), because using only one method to 
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measure variables may have opened the theoretical model under study to biased information due 
to the subjectivity of self-reporting. For example, participants may not remember exactly the 
value of their assets and they will provide an estimation of the value they think is the closest to 
the truth. However, collecting information regarding assets from financial institutions, such as 
banks, may be an objective measure to estimate value of assets.  
The use of more than one method to measure variables may provide greater insight into 
the construct than just using a single method. It is useful to use more than one method when 
measuring a given construct (Shadish et al., 2002) whenever a potential bias of information may 
be introduced. Therefore, future research on asset building and health can address this limitation 
by collecting accurate data about financial information from financial institutions and objective 
health information from clinics or hospitals. However, that information can be collected only 
after the formal consent of participants and IRB approval are obtained. 
 By definition, the HH was male; only single females who had lived without a partner for 
at least a year were considered HHs. That may have caused significant differences between male 
and female HHs. For example, most male HHs lived in a household with a spouse who may have 
provided the male HH different types of support such as financial, emotional, and physical 
support, and female HHs were mainly single mothers who had no such support. However, the 
longitudinal model included a control variable that indicated whether the HH was male or 
female, which should statistically have handled that problem. After controlling for the gender of 
HHs in the model, the effect of gender on asset accumulation and psychological distress was 
separated out from the effects of the independent variables on psychological distress. 
 Another problem with the data was that information about psychological distress was 
available only for one member of the family unit. To create a more comprehensive model, future 
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studies should test the asset-building theoretical framework with psychological distress for a HH 
and a wife from the same family unit, because health outcomes of one family member can 
influence health outcomes of another family member. 
 The sample size in this study was large (N = 6,295 families) and was even larger with 
sampling weights (N = 137,063 families). Although the power of the study was essentially 100%, 
that large sample size may have caused most of the relationships under study to be statistically 
significant. However, the findings of this study were interpreted according to the magnitude of 
the relationships and not just according to their statistical significances. In addition, the asset-
building theoretical framework is a complex model that requires control of many confounders. 
This study controlled for 25 confounders in the cross-sectional SEM and for 50 confounders in 
the longitudinal SEM. That complexity may have been illustrated in the different results between 
separate and composite measurement models and cross-sectional and longitudinal SEM. In the 
separate and composite measurement models, less psychological distress was significantly 
associated with greater assets, and in the cross-sectional and longitudinal SEMs, greater assets 
caused more psychological distress.  
 Finally, it should be mentioned that the timing of data collection in 2001 and 
subsequently, in 2007, took place in a unique period of history in the US. On September 11, 
2001, a series of four terrorist attacks were launched upon the US in New York City and in the 
Washington, DC, metropolitan area, an event referred to as 9/11. Those attacks were the cause of 
death for almost 3,000 people and had a financial effect of billions of dollars on the American 
population (Bram, Orr, & Rapaport, 2002). Those horrible events may have influenced the 
psychological distress of people and their financial situations. From the financial perspective, 
Becker and Murphy (2001) estimated an immediate loss of 0.06% of the total productive assets 
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of the U.S. economy due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and in the long run, an impact of 0.3% on 
the gross domestic product of the US. From the psychological well-being perspective, Silver, 
Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, & Gil-Rivas (2002) reported a prevalence of 17.0% for PTSD two 
months after the 9/11 attacks, but it decreased to 5.8% six months after the attacks. However, the 
PTSD prevalence among low-income minorities one year after the attack was still higher 
(10.2%) than the national PTSD rate, which is 6.8% for lifetime prevalence and 3.5% for 12-
months prevalence (Neria et al., 2006;  National Institutes of Health, n.d.). It is possible that the 
model tested in this study was influenced by those terror events and the effect of some of the 
variables was suppressed.  
Future Research 
 Based on the findings presented, several implications for future research to test the asset-
building theoretical model are outlined. To my knowledge, the study reported here is the first 
quantitative examination of the entire asset-building theoretical framework using the available 
observed variables of the PSID data set; more specifically, this study is the first to provide 
empirical evidence regarding the asset-building theoretical framework and psychological 
distress. Previous studies have examined specific components of the theory and usually tested 
low-income individuals rather than a representative sample (Grinstein-Weiss, Sherraden et al., 
2013; Y. Kim et al., 2012; Moore et al., 2001; Ssewamala et al., 2010).  
 Although Sherraden (1991) stated that the theory should have applicability to a 
population of widely varying asset levels, it is possible that a subgroup analysis of low-income 
families would have provided a better fit of the same data to the model. In case that is true, the 
theory may need to be modified for different income levels. For example, it is possible that for 
middle- and upper-income families, the individual components of needs and social support are 
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less meaningful in changing savings than for low-income families, and intergenerational 
transfers may be less meaningful in changing savings and asset accumulation for low-income 
families who receive small or no intergenerational transfers. In addition, in a subgroup analysis, 
the hypotheses that were not supported by this study may have been supported. Future studies 
should examine the theory as a whole, using different subgroups of income levels such as low-, 
middle-, and upper-income families. Findings from those kinds of studies may provide empirical 
evidence that could illustrate the parts of the theory that are more essential for each income 
group. That will allow modification of the asset-building theoretical framework to be tailored to 
each income level and modification of asset-building programs to be tailored to low-income 
families.  
 In the current study, the HH were mainly married males, but the females were mainly 
single parents. Although the gender of HH and the marital status were controlled in the cross 
sectional and longitudinal models, there might have been large differences in the psychological 
distress of male HH who were married compared to female HH who were single. Future studies 
should conduct subgroup analysis of single parent families which may financially struggle more 
and have higher psychological distress than 2-parent families. 
 Psychological distress was used in this study as the health outcome tested with the asset-
building theoretical framework. In the longitudinal model, less psychological distress caused 
greater asset accumulation, and greater asset accumulation caused more psychological distress. 
Future studies should examine this relationship in asset-building programs that provide IDAs and 
financial education. Receiving the opportunity to open an IDA and to receive financial education 
may improve psychological distress through an increase in savings and asset accumulation. For 
low-income individuals, simply providing the opportunity to apply for Medicaid has a positive 
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influence on psychological well-being. Findings from the Oregon Medicaid health experiment 
showed that uninsured low-income individuals, who were randomly selected to receive the 
opportunity to apply for Medicaid, reported a significant increase in self-reported overall 
happiness compared with those who were not selected to receive that opportunity (Finkelstein et 
al., 2011). Thus, for low-income individuals, any amounts of financial help, such as health 
insurance, might be enough to improve their psychological well-being.  
 The findings of the current study supported only part of the theorized reciprocal 
relationship between asset accumulation and psychological distress. That may be due to different 
reasons, such as omitted variables or that the asset-building theoretical framework did not apply 
to psychological distress. To reach any conclusion, more studies should provide evidence about 
the theorized relationship. Moreover, psychological distress provides information about one 
dimension of psychological well-being. To obtain greater insight into the psychological well-
being of a person, asset-building programs should include different measures of psychological 
well-being. 
 The asset-building theoretical framework implies that asset accumulation can affect 
psychological well-being. This study focused on psychological distress as a health outcome, 
which can represent one component of a person’s psychological well-being. The asset-building 
theoretical framework also implies that asset accumulation can affect physical health and health 
behaviors. Therefore, researchers who design health research should take the asset-building 
theoretical framework into consideration to provide a fuller picture of changes in health 
outcomes. It is also important that asset-building programs test the influence of IDAs and 
financial education interventions on health outcomes and health behaviors over time to provide a 
fuller picture of the change in financial status of individuals and families.  
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 Research is needed to examine the extent to which asset-building programs are related to 
other health outcomes and health behaviors that are associated with greater asset accumulation, 
such as better general health, lower BMI, lower alcohol consumption, less smoking, and so forth 
(Banks et al., 2010; Boyas et al., 2009; Chung et al., 2009; Cubbin et al., 2011; Finnegan et al., 
2005; Hajat et al., 2010; Headey & Wooden, 2004; Janssen et al., 2006; B. Kim & Ruhm, 2010; 
J. Kim, 2011; Laaksonen et al., 2004; Zagorsky 2004, 2005). Future studies that examine the 
influence of asset accumulation, through asset-building programs, on health outcomes and health 
behaviors, may produce implications for theory, future interventions, and policy development. A 
positive influence of asset-building programs on health outcomes might provide evidence to 
support the theory, encourage more health-researchers to use it when designing their studies, and 
expand the theory based on the evidence. From the policy perspective, the improvement of health 
outcomes and health behaviors may have macroeconomic impacts such as less job-loss days and 
less use of health utilities. In other words, asset-building programs may indirectly affect society 
through health outcomes and health behaviors.  
 The PSID is one of the few databases that includes information on asset accumulation 
and health outcomes. Most databases that include a wealth of information regarding asset 
accumulation do not include information about health outcomes or health behaviors and vice 
versa. Future studies that examine asset accumulation, especially asset-building programs, 
should examine health outcomes as well, and future studies that examine health outcomes should 
include specific measures of asset accumulation.  
Policy Implications 
 Asset-building programs usually include an opportunity to open a matched savings 
account (e.g., IDAs or CDAs) for a specific goal (e.g., higher education, retirement, 
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homeownership) and financial education. Both IDAs and financial education are dimensions of 
the institutional components of the asset-building theoretical framework. They should promote 
the saving of individuals and families, which in turn will theoretically increase asset 
accumulation. Today, there are several asset-building policy discussions taking place. For 
example, myRA is supposed to improve access to retirement accounts (The White House, 2014; 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2014), R2S is supposed to encourage allocating tax refunds to 
savings (Grinstein-Weiss, Comer et al., 2013; Key et al., 2013), and SEED is supposed to 
provide access and incentives to restricted CDAs from birth (Huang et al., 2014). 
 The findings of the current study suggest that individual components (i.e., economic 
needs and social support) are more essential than institutional components (i.e., incentives, 
access, and asset limits) to saving and investment actions in the general population because the 
former had a significant positive effect on savings and the latter did not. Although the findings of 
this study did not support the hypothesis that an increase in institutional components would 
increase saving and investment actions, it can still be an important component of asset 
accumulation for low-income families because there is a large difference between the 
institutional components available to low-income families and upper-income families, with more 
available to the latter. Therefore, asset-building programs should provide both institutional and 
individual components. For example, in addition to IDAs and financial education, seed money or 
vouchers for helping with monthly expenses should be provided as well.  
 Due to the small contribution of financial education to variance of financial behaviors 
(Fernandes et al., 2014), asset-building programs should reallocate some of their financial 
education funds to help in covering regular monthly expenses. In addition, although 
intergenerational transfers did not predict savings over time, they did predict greater asset 
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accumulation. Therefore, asset-building programs may need to provide financial education that 
includes information on how to invest lump sums such as an inheritance.  
 Theoretically, it seems the asset-building theoretical framework requires modification in 
order to apply to specific populations (e.g., low- vs. upper-income levels, minorities vs. non-
minorities). Therefore, asset-building programs should be tailored to different populations. For 
example, intergenerational transfers may have less influence on savings for low-income families, 
but financial education, which can be provided through an asset-building program, can provide 
information about how to invest money received as an inheritance. Although institutional 
components, such as financial education and matched savings accounts, may have less influence 
on savings for upper-income families, asset-building programs tailored to low-income families 
should provide them. Findings from this study suggest that financial needs and social support 
affect savings. Therefore, asset-building programs should put more emphasis on providing 
financial help to cover monthly expenses that represent the financial needs of families. 
Conclusion 
 Studies have shown that asset-based policies can help promote savings and asset 
accumulation among poor individuals and families (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2012; Huang et al., 
2014; Marks et al., 2009; Loke & Sherraden, 2009; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 
2008). Asset-building programs have examined the influence of providing institutional support 
on savings and asset accumulation. However, those programs did not take into consideration the 
entire theoretical framework and only a few of them have examined health outcomes. Future 
research on assets and health outcomes will advance both fields: health researchers will better 
understand how diverse economic resources (i.e., assets in addition to income) relate to health 
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outcomes and health behaviors, and asset researchers will move beyond the current focus on 
economic and social outcomes. 
 This study examined the asset-building theoretical framework as it relates to the 
psychological distress of HHs and wives using a U.S. representative sample. The data structure 
in the PSID data set fit the theoretical framework after controlling for potential confounders in 
the cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. Most of the directional hypotheses were supported; 
a few were not. It seems that the asset-building theoretical framework and asset-building 
programs may need modification in order to be tailored to different samples (e.g., income level, 
race).  
 In the current study, less psychological distress had mainly a positive influence on asset 
accumulation, but greater asset accumulation predicted a negative influence on psychological 
distress. Although the hypothesis about this reciprocal relationship between asset accumulation 
and psychological distress was only partially supported, it is important to examine the 
relationship in future studies before reaching a conclusion about it. To fully understand the 
influence of assets on health, the asset-building theoretical framework should be examined for 
other health outcomes and health behaviors.  
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